MORAL SCIENCE, 






OUTLINES 



OF 



MOEAL SCIENCE. 



BT 



ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, D.D., 

LATE PROFESSOR IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT PRINCETON, N. J. 



NEW YORK: 

OHAELES SCKIBNEK, 

No. 124 GEAND STREET. 
1860 



th 



Q 









Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1852, by 
JAMES W. ALEXANDER 
the Cleik's Uttice of the District Court for the %mthe*n District of 
New- York. 



John F. Trow, 
Tnuter, Stereotype^ and Electrotyper 
317 & 379 Broadway, 
Cor. Wliite Street, New York. 



CONTENTS. 



no* 

CHAPTER L 
CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY, . . . 19 

CHAPTER II. 
THE MORAL FACULTY, ORIGINAL AND UNIVERSAL, . 27 

CHAPTER IIL 

A MORAL FACULTY BEING SUPPOSED, WHETHER ITS 

DICTATES ARE UNIFORM, 80 

CHAPTER IV. 

HOW FAR ALL MEN ARE AGREED IN THEIR MORAL 

JUDGMENTS, 35 

CHAPTER V. 

WHETHER CONSCIENCE IS THE SAME AS THE UNDER. 
STANDING, OR A FACULTY DIFFERENT FROM AND 
INDEPENDENT OF IT, 40 

CHAPTER YL 
THE MORAL SENSE COMPARED WITH TASTE, . . 44 



VI CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VII. 



MOEAL OBLIGATION, 



CHAPTER VIII. 
THE SUPBEMACY OF CONSCIENCE, . .60 

CHAPTER IX. 

WHETHER .WE ALWAYS DO EIGHT BY OBEYING THE 
DICTATES OP CONSCIENCE? . . . . .64 

CHAPTER X. 

WHETHER THEEE IS IN THE MIND A LAW OE EULE, 
BY WHICH MAN JUDGES OP THE MOEALITY OF PAE- 
TICULAE ACTIONS? T3 

CHAPTER XL 

THE MOEAL FEELING WHICH ACCOMPANIES EVEEY 

MOEAL JUDGMENT, . . • . ' . .78 

CHAPTER XII. 

BELIEF IN GOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE OPEEA- 
TION OF CONSCIENCE, 84 

CHAPTER XIII. 
MOEAL AGENCY, AND WHAT IS NECESSAEY TO IT, . 8» 

CHAPTER XIV. 
MAN A MOEAL AGENT, 97 

CHAPTER XV. 
MAN NOT UNDEE A FATAL NECESSITY, . . .101 



CONTENTS. VU 



CHAPTER XVI. 



PAOB 



MAN'S DIRECTION AND GOVERNMENT OF HIS ACTIONS, 

AND HIS CONSEQUENT RESPONSIBILITY, . . 107 

CHAPTER XVII. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIFORM INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES, 11T 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
SUMMARY VIEW OF LIBERTY, 135 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE KIND OF INDIFFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN CON- 

SIDERED ESSENTIAL TO FREE AGENCY, . . 182 

CHAPTER XX. 

WHETHER MEN ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIE MO- 
TIVES; OR WHETHER DESIRES AND AFFECTIONS 
WHICH PRECEDE VOLITION, HAVE A MORAL CHAR- 
ACTER? . 136 

CHAPTER XXL 

THE DIVISION OF MOTIVES, INTO RATIONAL AND ANI- 
MAL, 141 

CHAPTER XXIL 

WHETHER MORALITY BELONGS TO PRINCIPLES AS 

WELL AS ACTS, OR IS CONFINED TO ACTS ALONE? 147 

CHAPTER XXIII. 
MORAL HABITS, 155 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE, 



CHAPTER XXV. 

THE NATURE OF YIRTUE, CONTINUED. DIFFERENT 
HYPOTHESES, . • . . . .171 

CHAPTER XXVI. 
THE NATURE OF YIRTUE, CONTINUED, . . .184 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

WHETHER YIRTUE AND YICE BELONG ONLY TO AC- 
TIONS? 199 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

THE AUTHOR OF OUR BEING CONSIDERED IN RELA- 
TION TO MORAL SCIENCE, . . . . .209 



CHAPTER XXIX. 
THE PHENOMENA OF THE UNIVERSE, . . .239 

CHAPTER XXX. 

DUTIES OF MAN TO THE CREATOR AS THUS MANI- 
FESTED, . 255 



PREFACE. 



The work now offered to the public is the 
last which proceeded from the lamented 
author's hand. In the days which imme- 
diately preceded his peaceful departure out 
of the present life, and while his powers 
were free from all clouds and weakness, he 
spoke of these papers as nearly prepared for 
the press, and consigned them with that in- 
tention to two of his sons. "With a trifling 
exception, the whole had been carefully 
transcribed by the hand of filial duty from 
bis own character, which, more from de- 
clining eyesight than any manual debility, 
had lost its former boldness and clearness, 



10 PREFACE. 

and had become difficult. In giving hia 
commands respecting the printing, lie em- 
powered his representatives to use a discre- 
tion as to lesser points in the form, which 
has been found to be almost entirely 
needless. 

The ministers of Christ who in this and 
other countries remember the instructions 
of Dr. Alexander, will be best able to judge 
of this production. They will recognise in 
it the doctrines and arguments which char- 
acterized the author's theological method, 
and will doubtless prize it as a comprehen- 
sive syllabus, even while they miss that 
copiousness, vivacity, and warmth, which 
added efficacy to his oral teachings. 

The subject of Ethical Philosophy may 
be said to have engaged the mind of the 
author for at least threescore years. The 
earliest vestiges of his boyish studies show 
proofs of this, in connection with the met- 
aphysical inquiries which afterwards be- 



PREFACE. 11 

came his favourite employment of mind. 
Though, in after years he was almost daily 
adding to his knowledge of ethical litera- 
ture, with an avidity which was unabated 
to the last, and which sought to be satisfied 
with the most recondite disquisitions in the 
ancient tongues no less than our own, he 
nevertheless appears to have arrived at 
definite conclusions very early, and to have 
maintained them with little change. It 
was not the habit of his mind, as is well 
known, to accumulate authorities, to load 
his discourses with learned citation, or 
even to break the continuity of his analyti- 
cal discourse by unnecessary sallies against 
opponents. Amidst a life of perpetual 
reading, of which he held the spoils in his 
memory with singular exactness and tena- 
city, he persevered in seeking and present- 
ing truth with the minimum of quoted aid. 
This quality of his thinking will be all the 
rather obvious in a treatise like the present, 



12 PREFACE. 

which, as an epitome of extended results, 
necessarily leaves out a thousand particu- 
lars of the process and all the lighter play 
of illustration. 

During the period .of nearly forty years, 
in which he was theological professor, the 
author had an exercise, for the most part 
weekly, in Mental and Moral Science ; as a 
transition from college work and a reca- 
pitulation of juvenile studies. The lectures 
thus delivered were the basis of the suc- 
cinct manual now made public. All its 
parts were thrown into a shape suitable for 
the printing, except the closing chapters on 
the Being and Attributes of God, and the 
duties resulting from the relation of the 
Creator and creature. 

These portions not having been copied 
remain in autograph, and may be regarded 
as the last written speculations of one who 
employed his pen almost every day for 
more than half a century. If the articular 



PREFACE. 13 

tion of this important member with the 
body of the discourse seem less obvious 
than might be desired, it will become suf- 
ficiently clear to such as reflect on the great 
earnestness with which, in the former part, 
the author maintains the intuitive percep- 
tions of conscience as independent of everj 
doctrine of theology, even the greatest. 

A casual inspection will be enough to 
show any reader that this is a book of 
elements ; laying clown principles, dealing 
the statement of fundamental questions, 
and marking limits around the science. It 
does not descend therefore to the more 
usual and far easier work of gathering, 
naming, and tabling the human duties. 
This labour he did not undervalue ; indeed 
it was part of his course of instructions; 
and his unfinished manuscripts contain 
large contributions towards a separate 
work in this kind, embracing even all the 
range of duties which are pr.>perly Chris- 



14 PREFACE. 

tian and even ecclesiastical. But the trea- 
tise now presented was intended to lay 
foundations and elucidate principles; in 
other words it is upon the Philosophy of 
Morals. At the same time, however, that 
the topics here discussed are some of the 
most puzzling which have exercised human 
acuteness, patience and abstraction, from 
the days of the Greek authors till our own, 
they are such as cannot be set aside or 
turned over to others as matter for autho- 
rity ; for the very reason that they concern 
the springs of daily action, are presented 
every hour in the household, and meet us 
in the very babblings of the nursery. And 
notwithstanding the tenuity of the objects 
brought under review, and the delicate 
thread of inquiry along which the analysis 
must often feel its way, the writer seems to 
derive an advantage from his unusual sim 
plicity and transparency of language, which 
might betray a superficial reader into the 



PREFACE. 15 

opinion that the train of argument Is not 
original or profound. In none of the 
author's works is this quality more appa- 
rent than in that which follows. 

One of the reasons which impelled Dr. 
Alexander, at a stage of life which was 
encumbered with cares and infirmities, to 
address himself to this toilsome composi- 
tion, was the desire to furnish a Manual for 
the young men of America, in our colleges, 
theological seminaries, and other schools. 
He was repeatedly besought to supply 
such a volume, and never wavered in his 
persuasion that it was necessary ; especially 
when he saw with pain to what an extent 
the place of a class-book was occupied by 
the great but dangerous work of Archdea- 
deacon Paley. In common with other 
sound ethical inquiries he recognised the 
value of President "WaylancPs labours, and 
the eloquence and richness of Dr. Chal- 
mers's striking but fragmentary contribu- 



16 PREFACE. 

tions. Yet lie thought lie saw room for a 
brief hand-book level to the capacity of 
all ; and he had a natural and pardonable 
desire common- to all original thinkers, to 
give vent to his own opinions in his own 
order. In regard to the ethical system 
here expounded, the work may safely be left 
to speak for itself. It is positive and di- 
dactic rather than controversial, yet there 
is scarcely a chapter which, however tran- 
quil and subdued in its tone, will not 
awaken opposition in some quarter or other. 
The polemic aspect of the treatise is, how- 
ever, apparent only in cases where to avoid 
the naming of opponents would have been 
an affectation no less than a breach of trust. 
No one, whatever his private dissent may 
De, will justly complain that his opinions 
have been treated with unfairness or rigour. 
The connection of ethics with theology is 
such that no one can treat of the nature of 
virtue, of the will, of motives, and the like, 



PREFACE. 17 

without at least indicating his tendencies in 
regard to the great dividing questions of 
revelation : which only increases the neces- 
sity for giving the right direction to 
juvenile studies ; unless we would receive 
to the professional curriculum minds 
already pre-occupied with ethical tenets 
subversive of great truths in law, politics 
and theology. Those who have watched 
the progress of modern speculation will 
not fail to apprehend the drift of this 
observation. Yet the way in which even 
these somewhat delicate parts of moral 
science are here set forth, is such as 
never to awaken suspicion of any sinister 
intention, or to betray any irregular pas- 
sage into a neighbouring but separate 
science. Even those discussions which, at 
a first view, might seem to belong rather to 
natural theology, were deliberately assigned 
to their place after long experience in 
teaching, as pertaining to the limits where 



18 PREFACE. 

the two fields osculate if tliey do not cutj 
and with a clear pre-eminence given to the 
ethical side of 'the truths common to both. 
The labours of the author were arrested 
by his last illness, when the work here 
published was complete indeed as has been 
said, but not ready for the press in the 
sense of being revised and corrected. It is 
this which has made these prefatory pages 
necessary ; an introduction from the au- 
thors hand would have precluded all 
such attempts as weak and impertinent. 

As he gave the work in charge with his 
dying lips, after having no doubt offered it 
to God in many of his solicitous and ele- 
vated thoughts during the preparation, so 
it is now humbly dedicated to Him, with 
ut whose blessing, no human effort, even 
in the best cause, is other than worthless. 

New Yoek, Aug.* 1, 1852. 



MORAL SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER I. 

CONSCIENCE, OK THE MOEAL FACULTY. 

As all men, when reason is developed, have a 
faculty by which, they can discern a difference be- 
tween objects of sight which are 
beautiful and those which are de- f^™*' 
formed, so all men possess the power 
of discerning a difference between actions, as tc 
their moral quality. The judgment thus formed 
is immediate, and has no relation to the useful- 
ness or injuriousness to human happiness, of the 
objects contemplated. 

Whatever difference of opinion may exist re- 
specting the origin of this faculty, it is univer 
sally admitted that men, in all 

True in all ages 

ages and countries, have judged 

some actions to be good and deserving of appro 



20 MORAL SCIENCE. 

bation, while they have judged others to be bad 
and of ill desert. 

In all languages, we find words expressive oi 

the ideas of moral excellence, and moral evil. 

In the laws and penalties estab- 

Agreementofman- ^^ ^ ^ ageg throug]lout the 

world, it is evidently implied that 
some actions ought to be done, and others 
avoided. In cases of flagrant injustice or in- 
gratitude, all men, of every country and of every 
age, agree in their judgment of their moral evil. 
There is, in regard to such actions, no more dif- 
ference in the judgment of men, than respecting 
the colour of grass, or the taste of honey. If any 
man does not perceive grass to be green, or ho- 
ney to be sweet, we do not thence conclude that 
men's bodily senses are not similarly constituted, 
but that the organs of the individual who does 
not see and taste as other men do, are defective. 
or depraved by disease. 

To determine whether all men have one ori- 
s ginal moral faculty, the case pro- 

Case proposed must o J i 1 

be simple. posed for their moral judgment 

should be simply good or evil. For a complex 



CONSCIENCE. 21 

act, in which there is something good and 
something evil, or rather where there must be an 
accurate weighing of motives in order to ascertain 
he quality of the action, is not a proper test as to 
the existence of a uniformity of moral judgment 
in men. Therefore, the historical fact adduced 
by Dr. Paley,* from the history of Valerius Max- 
imus, is not at all suited to his purpose ; because 
the case is very complex, and one 
on which it is difficult to determine C ^ ]a °^ T e OTaniU3 ir * 
at first view, what the true moral 
character of the action is. The facts, as related 
by him, are as follows: The father of Caius 
Toranius had been proscribed by the Trium- 
virate. Caius Toranius — coming over to the in- 
terests of that party — discovered his father's , 
place of concealment to the officers who were in 
pursuit of him, and gave them, withal, a descrip 
tion of his person by which they might distin- 
guish him. The old man, more anxious for 
the safety and fortunes of his "son than for the 
little that might remain of his own life, began 

* Id the chapter of his Moral Philosophy, under the head 
•« The Moral Sense." 



22 MORAL SCIENCE. 

immediately to inquire of the officers whether 
his son were well, and whether he had done his 
duty to the satisfaction of the generals. c That 
son (replied one of the officers), so dear to thy 
affections, has betrayed thee to us ; by his infor- 
mation thou art apprehended, and diest.' With 
this, the officer struck a poniard to his heart, 
and the unhappy parent fell, affected not so 
much by his fate, as by the means to which he 
owed it." Now, the question is, if this story 
were related to the wild boy caught some years 
ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage 
without experience and without instruction, cut 
off in his infancy from all intercourse with his 
species, and consequently under no possible influ- 
ence of example, authority, education, sympathy, 
or habit, whether or not such a one would feel 
upon the relation any degree of that sentiment 
of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct which w 
feel. 

In our judgment, such a case would afford no 
„_ ., _ . criterion by which to determine 

Why it affords no «/ 

criterion. whether men possess constitution- 

ally a moral sense. For, in the first place, the 



CONSCIENCE, 23 

trial would be no better than if the question were 
proposed to a child two years old, in whose 
mind the moral faculty is not yet developed 
A human being, arrived at adult age without in- 
struction or communication with others, would be 
— as it relates to the mind — in a state differing very 
little from that of infancy. It is not held that 
the moral sense will be exercised without the 
usual means by which human faculties are devel- 
oped. If an organical defect in the brain should 
prevent the intellectual faculties from coming 
into exercise, the unhappy individual thus de- 
prived of reason would prove nothing in regard 
to the operations of reason where it is developed. 
So, also, if a human being were brought up from 
early infancy in a dark dungeon, and if no infor- 
mation were communicated to him, the mental 
faculties would not be developed, and it would 
be absurd to have recourse to such a one to ascer- 
tain what faculties belong to the human mind. 
The same remark will apply to the case of the 
wild boy, referred to by Dr. Paley ; and also, 
though in an inferior degree, to savages of the 
most degraded class. 



f 



24 MORAL SCIENCE. 

Let it then be fairly understood what it is 

winch is asserted in regard to conscience, as an 

original, universal faculty. It is 

What is meant by 

anoriginai,niiiver- that every human mind, when its 

sal faculty. 

faculties have been developed, and 
have arrived at some degree of maturitj^, dis- 
cerns a quality in certain actions which is termed 
moral ; that is, it intuitively perceives that some 
actions are right and some wrong. 

Another objection to the historical fact ad- 
duced by Dr. Paley, is, that it presents to the 

mind, not a case of simple, unmix- 

Paley^nstanoocom.^ gQod Qr ^ ^ ft CQmplex 

case, in which — before a judgment 
can be formed of the action of the son — it must be 
decided whether a man ought to be governed by a 
regard to the welfare of a parent, or to the public 
good. If the son believed that the party in pursuit 
of his lather was promoting the public good, he 
might feel that he ought to be governed by this 
rather than by filial affection. Here, then, we 
have presented a complex and difficult case in 
morals, about which men would be very apt to 



CONSCIENCE. 25 

differ ; and we are to determine whether all men — 
even those totally uneducated — would view it in 
the same light. 

To render the case a suitable one to be a test 
of the question under consideration, it should be 

supposed that the father was act- 
A posT ■"■ SUP " in § in conformity with the strictest 

principles of rectitude ; that his life 
was sought by wicked men, aiming not at the good 
of the commonwealth but its destruction ; and that 
the son, in betraying the place of his concealment, 
was actuated by mercenary motives, or by unjust 
and unnatural dislike to a good parent. If a case 
like this were presented to a thousand persons, 
from as many different parts of the world, there 
would be but one judgment and one feeling, 
all would judge the conduct of the son to be 
blamable. Different degrees of moral disappro- 
bation would be felt by those whose moral faculty 
was in a cultivated state ; but there would be no 
difference in the opinion entertained of his con- 
duct. All would feel disapprobation, accom- 
panied by a desire for the punishment of the 



26 MORAL SCIENCE. 

offender. It is found that savages appear to 
have but an obscure exercise of conscience, but 
in proportion as their minds are cultivated, this 
faculty becomes more manifest, and operates mor 
forcibly. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE MORAL FACULTY, ORIGINAL AND UNIVERSAL. 

If conscience were not an original faculty, en* 
abling us to form a conception of moral qualities, 
man could never acquire such, an 
idea by any other means. The Moral ide + f. ot ^ er " 

J J "wise unattainable. 

opinion, therefore, that moral feel- 
ings are merely the effect of instruction and edu- 
cation, is erroneous. For every class of simple 
ideas there must be an appropriate faculty, without 
which these ideas can never be acquired. In re- 
gard to the bodily senses, this is too evident to be 
called in question. Without the organ of vision 
the simple idea of light and colours could never b 
communicated by any instructions ; without the 
organ of hearing, no idea of sound can be convey- 
ed ; and so of the other senses. And it is equally 
true of that knowledge which is acquired by 



28 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

what some have called the internal senses II 
there were in man no such faculty as taste, by 
which beauty is perceived, no idea of the beau- 
tiful could possibly be communicated. A horse 
has no perception of the beauty of a scene which 
perhaps enchants his rider, even though the ani- 
mal sees all the objects with equal distinctness. So 
it is in regard to moral qualities. There must 
be an original faculty to give us the simple idea 
which we have of morality ; otherwise the idea 
of virtue or vice could never have entered the 
human mind, and the feelings of moral obligation, 
of which all men are conscious, would never 
have been felt. 

I am aware that those who advocate the utili- 
tarian scheme, resolve all our ideas of morality 
and moral obligation into the mere 
^of^" 11 ° b " P rm ciples of benefit or injury, ap 
prehended to be connected witb 
each action. Dr. Paley informs us, that the sub- 
ject continued to be involved in impenetrable 
mystery, until he took this view of it. 

It is deemed useless to argue this point ; it 
cannot be decided by reasoning. The appeal 



UNIVERSALITY OF CONSCIENCE. 2U 

must be made to the consciousness of every 
man. 

If any one persists in declaring 

, , , ., . . Appeal to conscious- 

that he sees no evil m any action nes3 . 
but as it is evidently detrimental to 
human happiness, nothing can be said in the way 
of argument to alter convictions derived from his 
own consciousness. All that is proper to be said 
is, that the mind of such a person is differently 
constituted from that of most men ; or rather 
that an impartial examination of this subject has 
not been made. It is recommended to such per- 
sons caref ally to scrutinize the exercises of their 
own minds ; they will perceive that the idea of 
virtue or moral good is entirely distinct from 
that of mere utility. There is, indeed, a con- 
nection between these two things which is very 
intimate, and this seems to have misled many 
in their judgments. Virtuous conduct leads to 
happiness, and is always beneficial; yet our idea 
of its moral character is not derived from this 
consideration, but from the nature of the action 
itself 



CHAPTER III. 

A MOKAL FACULTY BEING SUPPOSED, "WHETHER ITS DIG 
TATES AEE UNIFOKM ? 

One of the strongest objections which has been 
brought against the doctrine laid down is, that 

among men of different countries, 
°i«aSle a nt. and of entirely different education, 

there is no agreement in their 
judgments respecting the morality or immorality 
of the same actions. Whereas, it is alleged, that 
if such a faculty were originally a part of man's 
constitution, there would as certainly be uniform- 
ity, as in the perception of objects by the exter- 
nal senses. Now, if the dictates of conscience 
in men of different ages and countries do so 
much differ, does it not show that the moral feel- 
ings of men are just what education makes them? 
And what is gained by maintaining the existence 



UNIFORMITY OF MORAL DICTATES. 31 

of a moral faculty, as part of man's original 
constitution ? 

It will, I think, be admitted, that in all coun- 
tries and conditions in which, men have been 
found, there exists a perception of 
a difference in the moral character ^JJST 
of actions ; that is, some things are 
accounted wrong, which ought not to be done, 
And some right, which ought to be done. 

Again, it has never been pretended as being a 
matter of fact, that between men of different 
countries there is a total difference 
in the opinions entertained respect- To ^ t ^^^ 
ing what is right and what is 
wrong. A few cases only of difference are al- 
leged, in which this discrepance is observed; 
but in regard to those actions which are reckoned 
good or evil, there is a general agreement. As 
to those in which there seems to be a fundamen- 
tal difference, an explanation will be given here- 
after. Xo nation, or tribe, or class of mankind 
has ever held that it is a virtuous and proper 
thing to do injury to men, or that there is no more 
harm in taking away life than in preserving it. It 



32 MORAL SCIENCE. 

has never been held that ingratitude — though 
everywhere common in practice — is a commend- 
able thing ; or that deceit and fraud are as praise- 
worthy as honesty and fair dealing. 

There is in every country a difference made 

in the estimation of the character of men, derived 

from the course of their conduct. 

Proof from common 

estimate of char- Some men are reckoned good in 

scter. 

the public estimation, while others 
are considered wicked ; the former obtain esteem, 
the latter are despised. That course of conduct 
which secures a good reputation, does not in 
any country consist of actions which we con- 
sider wicked, but of actions which in all coun* 
tries are considered praiseworthy ; and men have 
never obtained a bad character by a course oi 
good behaviour. 

It is also important to observe, that the con- 
duct of a people is not a fair test of the internal 
state of the mind, as it relates to 

Practice does not _^^ . 

prove absence of morals. We know that mdividu- 

moral judgment 

als often pursue a course of con- 
duct, which in their serious moments they con 
demn. Yet the power of temptation, and the 



UNIFORMITY OF MOKAL DICTATES. 33 

aabit of indulgence are such, that notwithstand- 
ing the convictions of conscience, they continue 
in a course of evil-doing. It would be a very in- 
conclusive inference to determine from their 
habitual conduct, that they acted in accordance 
with the dictates of conscience. And what is 
true of individuals, may be true of nations and 
tribes. Those customs which they have received 
from their forefathers, may not meet with the 
approbation of their moral sense, and yet such 
is the force of an established custom, that they 
go on in the way in which they were brought up. 

But a more satisfactory explanation of those 
facts, in which men seem conscientiously to go 
contrary to the fundamental prin- 
ciples of morals, is, that the prin- E p ™^ theap " 
ciple on which they act is correct, 
but through ignorance or error they make an 
erroneous application of it. 

When parents murder their own female chil- 
dren — a thing very customary in China — it is on 
the principle that they will be 

Infanticide 

subject to more misery than hap- 
piness in the world ; and therefore it is doing 

2* 



34 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

them a favour. Here, the general principle is 
correct — that parents should consult the best in- 
terests of their offspring — but the mistake is in 
the application. The same may be said of the 
practice of exposing aged patents, when they 
become incapable of enjoying the world. 

As to those acts of cruelty which the Pagans 

perform in their religious services, (the wife 

committing herself to the flames 

Heathen enormi- ^^ ^ b()dy Qf ^ deceased 

husband ; children voluntarily 
thrown into the Ganges, or persons devoting 
their own lives by falling under the car of Jug- 
gernaut,) they are performed on the principle 
that what God requires, or what pleases him, or 
what will secure happiness for ourselves or 
friends, should be done. It is true that the will 
of God should be obeyed, whatever sacrifice he 
may require ; their error is in thinking that 
such sacrifices are required by Him. 



CHAPTER IV. 

HOW FAR AfX MEN AEE AGEEED IN THEIR MORAL JITDG 
MENTS. 

As the subject of morals is very extensive, and 
particular cases may be complicated, and as 
men are not only ignorant, but 
prejudiced by the errors received ri ^ Truth3 m M °" 
in their education, it is no more 
wonderful that they should adopt different opin- 
ions on these subjects than on other matters. 
That, however, which is true in regard to every 
department of human knowledge, is doubtless 
true in regard to the science of morals. There 
are certain self-evident truths, which are intui 
tively perceived by every one who has the exer- 
cise of reason, as soon as they are presented to 
the mind. In regard to these fundamental truths, 
there has never been any difference of opinion. 



36 MORAL SCIENCE. 

It is not meant that all men distinctly think oi 
these primary truths in morals ; for many are so 
inattentive, or so much occupied with sensible 
objects, that they can scarcely be said ever to 
reflect on the siibject of moral duty. But let an 
act of manifest injustice be performed before 
their eyes, and among a thousand spectators 
there will be but one opinion, and but one feel- 
ing. If a strong man, for example, violently 
takes away the property of one weaker than 
himself, and for no other reason than because he 
covets it, all men will condemn the act. So, if 
any one who has received from another great 
benefits, not only refuses to make any grateful 
return, but on the contrary, returns evil for good, 
all men will agree in judging his conduct to be 
wrong. All intuitively discern that for a ruler 
to punish the innocent and spare the guilty, is 
morally wrong. It is not true, in fact, that there 
is no agreement among men as to the funda- 
mental principles of morals. Their judgments 
on these points are as uniform as on the axioms 
of mathematics ; as in their agreement that tie 
starry firmament is grand and beautiful ; yea, as 



AGREEMENT IN MORALS. o7 

uniform as concerning the greenness of the grasa, 
or the varied colours of the rainbow. 

Mr. Locke, in his zeal to disprove the ex- 
istence of innate truths, attempts 
to render uncertain some of these 
first truths of morals. 

When we go beyond these first principles, 
we may expect to find men falling into grievou3 
error respecting moral duty ; and 
this often appears in their applica- intuitive judg- 
tion of general principles to parti- 
cular cases. Most men either reason not at all, 
or reason badly, and draw from sound principles 
incorrect conclusions. For the most part, they 
receive implicitly what they have been taught ; 
or they are governed in their opinions by the 
common sentiment ; or they adopt as true what 
is most for their interest, or most agreeable to 
their feelings. And as men are often under the 
influence of feelings or passions which produce 
perturbation of mind, and so bias the judgment, 
it is easy to see how errors of judgment respect 
ing moral conduct, in many cases, may spring 
up. And yet it is true, that there are primary 



38 MORAL SCIENCE. 

truths in morals, in which, all men agree, so soon 
as they are presented to the mind. As in other 
cases, by pursuing a course of sophistical reason- 
ings, conclusions may be arrived at which are 
contradictory to these first principles, and this 
will produce perplexity ; or even a kind of spe- 
culative assent may be yielded to such conclu- 
sions of ratiocination ; but whenever it is neces- 
sary to form a practical judgment, the belief of 
intuitive truths must prevail. Our assent in 
these cases is not a matter of choice, but of ne- 
Berkeiey. cessity. Bishop Berkeley thought 

he had demonstrated that there 
was no external world ; andlnany others thought 
there was no flaw in his reasoning : but all these 
speculative skeptics were, nevertheless, practical 
believers in the real existence of external ob- 
jects. Atheistical and infidel philosophers have 
often endeavoured to prove that there is no in- 
trinsic difference between right and wrong, and 
some of them probably persuaded themselves 
that this opinion was true ; but these very men, 
when an act of great injustice towards them- 
selves or friends was committed, could not but 



AGREEMENT IN MORALS. 39 

feel that it was morally evil; and when they 
saw an act of disinterested benevolence per- 
formed, they could not but approve it as morally 
good 



CHAPTER V. 

WHETHER CONSCIENCE IS THE SAME AS THE UNDERSTAND* 
ING, OR A FACULTY DIFFERENT FROM AND INDEPEND. 
ENT OF IT. 

Some have maintained that our moral feelings 
and judgments are the exercise of a peculiar 
«. . . ._ sense, and that the perceptions and 

State of the ques- ' * * 

tion. feehngs of this sense cannot be 

referred to the understanding. Such as main- 
tain this theory suppose, also, that the dictates 
of conscience are infallibly correct, if the mind 
is in a proper state. 

Others have maintained that the dictates of 
conscience are the judgments of the understand- 
ing, in regard to moral duty, and 

Truths premised. 

that, of course, an error in the 
judgment of the understanding must affect the 
decisions or dictates of conscience. To clear 



CONSCIENCE AND REASON. 41 

this subject, if possible, from all obscurity and 
perplexity, I would make the following re- 
marks : 

1st. The exercise of the moral faculty, or 
conscience, is not simply an intellectual act ; it 
is complex, including two things 

The act complex 

— a judgment and an emotion, or 
feeling of a peculiar kind. 

2d. All judgments of the mind, whatever be 
the subject of them, appertain to the under- 
standing. This comprehensive fa- 
culty includes all intellectual acts, *«*■■***«■ 

J ' tellectuaL 

whether relating to external ob- 
jects, mathematical relations, natural beauty and 
sublimity, or moral duty. So far, therefore, as 
conscience is a judgment respecting any moral 
subject, so far it is an exercise of the understand 
ing. We have not one faculty by which we 
discern physical truths, another by which we 
judge of mathematical theorems, and another for 
matters of taste ; but all these are the one and. 
the same understanding, exercised on different 
objects. Accordingly, when moral qualities are 
the objects of our contemplation, it is not a dif- 



tS 



42 MORAL SCIENCE. 

ferent faculty from the reason or understanding 
which thinks and judges, but the same, exercised 
on other subjects; and the only difference is in 
the object. Our conclusion therefore is, that so 
far as conscience is an intellectual act or judg- 
ment of the mind, so far it belongs to the under- 
standing. 

3d. But as more is included under the name 
conscience than a mere intellectual act or judg- 
ment, and as this judgment is at- 

More than intellect- 
ual acts in con- tended with a peculiar feeling, 

sciencb. 

called moral, and easily distin- 
guished from all other emotions; and as mere 
emotion or feeling can with no propriety be re- 
ferred to the reason, therefore conscience is, so 
far as this is concerned, different from the un- 
derstanding. 

4th. If the moral judgments of the mind 
were from a faculty distinct from the under- 
standing, and often differing from 

Harmony of mentai 

operations as to it, the harmony of the mental 

morals. 

operations would be destroyed. 
While reason led to one conclusion, conscience 
might dictate the contrary. And upon this 



OXSCIENCE AND EEASON. 43 

theory, conscience must always be correct, un- 
less the faculty be morbid 

All experience and history show that men 
may act under the influence of an erroneous 
conscience. The dictates of con- 
science are always in conformity Ho ^ r ^ enoe 
with the practical judgments of 
reason. AVhen these are erroneous, conscience 
is erroneous. The conclusion therefore is that 
conscience is not a distinct faculty from reason, 
so far as it consists in a judgment of the quality 
of moral acts. Eeason or understanding is the 
genus ; the judgments of conscience are the 
species. Eeason has relation to all intelligible 
subjects; the moral faculty is conversant about 
moral qualities alone. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE MORAL SENSE COMPARED WITH TASTE, 

Feom what was said in the preceding chapter, it 
appears that conscience, or the moral sense, is 

not a simple but a compound fac- 
The gens ^ rm moral ulty, including both an intellectual 

act or judgment, and a peculiar 
feeling or emotion. The name moral sense was 
probably adopted to express this feeling, or 
internal emotion. It will serve perhaps to illus- 
trate this subject, if we bring into view another 
faculty, between which and the moral sense 
there is a remarkable analogy. I refer to what 
is commonly called Taste, or that faculty by 
which men are in some degree capable of per- 
ceiving and relishing the beauties of nature and 
art. In this there is a judgment respecting that 
quality denominated Beauty, but there is also 



CONSCIENCE AND TASTE. 45 

a vivid emotion of a peculiar kind, accompany- 
ing this judgment. The external objects in 
which beauty is resident, might be distinctly 
seen, and yet no such quality be perceived ; as 
was before mentioned in regard to certain ani- 
mals, whose sight and hearing is more acute than 
those of men, and which yet appear to be utterly 
insensible of the quality called beauty. 

If the question should be raised whether 
Taste is merely an exercise of the under- 
standing, the proper answer WOnld Analogy between 
., . , . judgments of taste 

be precisely as m the case of an d of conscience, 
conscience, viz., so far as it consists 
in judgment, it appertains to the intellectual facul- 
ty ; but so far as it consists in emotion, it does 
not. And in this, as in matters of conscience, 
errors of judgment will affect the emotions pro- 
duced. In cultivating Taste, it is of the utmost 
importance that correct opinions be adopted in 
relation to the objects of this faculty. 

The question may perhaps be asked, why 
either of these should be considered a distinct 
faculty of the mind. In regard to mental facul- 
ties or powers, there is a want of agreement 



46 MORAL SCIENCE. 

among philosophers, as to what is requisite tc 

entitle any mental operation to be referred to a 

distinct and original faculty. In 

"Whether in ei- 
ther case a distinct these two cases, there exists in the 

faculty. 

mind a capacity for perceiving pe- 
culiar qualities in certain appropriate objects. 
Though the ideas of beauty and morality are 
judgments of the understanding, it requires a 
faculty suited to the objects, to enable the under- 
standing to obtain the simple ideas of beauty and 
morality. We can conceive of a rational mind 
without such a capacity. There is also in these 
faculties, the susceptibility of a peculiar emo- 
tion, dissimilar from all others ; and these two 
things constitute the faculty of Taste or Con- 
science But it is a matter of no importance 
whether taste and conscience be called distinct 
and original faculties, if what has been said re* 
specting their nature be admitted. 

There is in the human mind a capacity oi 

discerning what is termed beauty, 
°tt S hT tM * in the works of nature and art. 

lty in DOtn. 

This judgment is accompanied by 
a pleasurable emotion, and" to this capacity or 



CONSCIENCE AND TASTE. 4'* 

susceptibility we give the name Taste. There is 
also a power of discerning moral qualities, which 
conception is also attended with a vivid emo- 
tion ; and to this power or faculty we give the 
name Conscience, or the moral faculty. Both these 
are so far original parts of our constitution, that 
if there did not exist in every mind a sense of 
beauty and its contrary, and a sense of right and 
wrong, such ideas could be generated, or com- 
municated by no process of education. 



CHAPTER VII. 

MOEAL OBLIGATION. 

Much has been written to explain the true 

ground of moral obligation. But the subject 

has been rather darkened and per- 

Obligation. 

plexed than elucidated, by these 
comments. It is always so when men undertake 
to explain that which is so clear that it needs no 
explanation. 

Every idea of morality includes in it that of 
moral obligation. A moral act is one which 

ought to be performed ; an im- 

^"X" 7 moral act > is one which ought not 

to be performed. As soon as we 
get the conception of a moral act, we receive 
with it the idea of moral obligation. It would 
be a contradiction to say that any act was moral, 
and yet that there was no obligation to perform 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 49 

li One of the best definitions which, can be 
given of a moral act, is that it is an act which 
we are bound to perform, and of 

. What a moral act is. 

an immoral act, that it is one 
which ought not to be done. The more clearly 
we see any thing to be moral, the more sensibly 
we feel ourselves under a moral obligation to 
perform it. This being a matter of common 
intuition, and universal experience, all that is 
necessary to convince us of its truth, is to bring 
it distinctly before our minds. There is there- 
fore no need to look any further for the grounds 
and reasons of moral obligation, than to the 
morality of the act itself, as this idea is involved 
in every conception of morality. 

The following citation from Dr. Price's work 
on Morals, is in accordance with the view just 
given: "From the account given of obligation, 
it appears how absurd it is to 

Why we are obliged 

inquire, what obliges us to practise to do righe-m* 
virtue? as if obligation were no 
part of the idea of virtue, but something adven- 
titious and foreign to it : that is, as if what was 

our duty might not be our duty ; as if it might 
l 



50 MORAL SCIENCE. 

not be true, that what is fit to do, we ought to 
do, and that what we ought to do, we are 
obliged to do. To ask why we are obliged to 
practise virtue, to abstain from what is wicked, 
or perform what is just, is the very same as to 
ask why we are obliged to do what we are 
obliged to do. It is not possible to avoid won- 
dering at those who have so unaccountably 
embarrassed themselves, on a subject that one 
would think was attended with so little diffi- 
culty: and who, because they cannot find any 
thing in virtue and duty themselves, which can 
induce and oblige us to pay a regard to them — 
fly to self-love, and maintain that from hence 
alone are derived all inducement and obligation.' 7 

Dr. Paley commences his second 
^ e ^ chdea - book on Moral Philosophy, by an 

inquiry into the nature of moral 
obligation. He asks, "Why am I obliged to 
keep my word ? " and mentions several answers 
which would be given by different persons, and 
which he says all coincide. But he goes on to 
say that all the answers leave the mattej short ; 
for the inquirer may turn round up^n his 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 51 

teacher with a second question, " P. hy am I 
obliged to do what is right, to act ag* eeably to 
the fitness of things, to conform to reason, nature 
or truth, to promote the public good, or to do 
the will of God?" 

All this, it appears to us, is fitted to mystify 
as plain a subject as ever engaged the thoughts 
of a rational mind, and is designed 
to remove the true ground of insufficient, 

moral obligation, and reduce all 
such obligation to the single principle of self-love, 
or the tendency of an act to promote individual 
happiness. 

Suppose then, after Dr. Paley had made all 
obligation to rest on the ground that the per- 
formance of a good act promotes 
our eternal happiness, the inquirer The inquiry unrea- 

x x ' x sonable. 

should again ask, "Why am I 
bound to perform that which will promote my 
happiness?" The question, indeed, would be 
unreasonable, because all men are agreed that 
happiness is a good ; but is it not equally unrea- 
sonable, when an action is seen to be virtuous, 
or morally right, to ask " Why am I obliged to 



52 MOEAX, SCIENCE. 

do it ?" The moment we see a thing to be mor 
ally right, the sense of obligation is complete, 
and all further inquiring for reasons why I am 
obliged to do right is as absurd as would be in- 
quiring for reasons why I should pursue hap- 
piness. 

Where we have intuitive certainty of any 

thing it is foolish to seek for other reasons. If 

there is any thing clear in the 

intuitive certainty Y ' lQW f a ra ti nal mind, it is this : 

is ultimate. ' 

that virtue should be practised, 
that what is right should be done. But still 
further to perplex this plain subject, Dr. Paley 
has undertaken to inform us what is meant by 
obligation. "A man," says he, "is said to be 
obliged when he is urged by a violent motive 
resulting from the will of another." 

This is, indeed, a very extraordinary defini- 
tion. The motive, he says, must be violent; 

but what should hinder that a mo- 
Paiey's definition, tive not violent should create an 

obligation according to its force? 
The main error of this definition is that it con- 
founds moral obligation with other motives of 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 53 

an entirely different kind. The obligation of 
which lie speaks, is created by the will or com- 
mand of another. The law of a tyrant requir- 
ing his subjects to do what is evidently wrong 
cannot create a moral obligation. A rational 
being may be urged by the threats of a tyrant, 
on the universal principle of self-love, and this 
force may, by an abuse of terms, be called an 
obligation ; but according to the common usage 
of the language, when a man is said to be un- 
der obligation to perform an act, we mean that 
he is morally bound. But whether the opera- 
tion of any violent motive, resulting from the 
will of another, may be said to oblige a man or 
not, the main inquiry is, what is the ground of 
moral obligation? The difference between a 
moral obligation and other motives w r hich may 
oblige should be kept in view. 

He then returns to the question, " TVhy am 
I obliged to keep my word?" and applies the 
preceding definition of the nature 
of obligation, and gives the follow- ^g^T* " 
ing answer: ''Because I am urged 
to do so by a violent motive (namely, the ex- 



54: MOKAL SCIENCE. 

pectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, 
or punished if I do not), resulting from the com- 
mand of another (namely, of God)." ' He goes 
on to say, " When I first turned my attention tt 
moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to 
hang oyer the whole subject, which arose, I be- 
lieve, from hence ; that I supposed with many 
authors whom I had consulted that to be obliged 
y to do a thing, was different from being induced 
to do it ; and that the obligation to practise vir« 
tue, and to do what is justice, is quite another 
thing and of another kind from the obligation 
which a soldier is under to obey his officer, or a 
servant his master, or any of the ordinary obli- 
gations of human life." 

We cannot but be of the opinion that Dr. Taley 
has here made a radical mistake, which it is ex- 
ceedingly important to consider, 
erroneous. since, unhappily for sound morals, 

his system is so much employed in 
the instruction of youth. 

The theory of morals, of which the above 
principle is a part, is no other than this : that the 
only difference between virtue and vice, consists 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 5£ 

in their tendency, respectively, to promote or 
hinder the happiness of the indi- 
vidual; so that if a man could P ^ d f heme ^ 
persuade himself that no evil would 
arise to him from telling a lie, he would be 
under no obligation to speak the truth. It is a 
scheme of morals which obliterates all intrinsic 
difference between virtue and vice, and makes 
the one preferable to the other on no other ac- 
count than its tendency to promote individual 
happiness in the future world. 

If a man does not believe in a future world, 
he can, according to this theory, feel no obliga- 
tion to keep his word. We be- 
lieve, on the contrary, that moral m ^L^ the 
obligation is felt by the atheist, - 
and that he cannot divest himself of it. When 
men are tempted by some strong motive to de- 
viate from the truth, and yet are enabled to re 
sist the temptation, there is in most cases no dis- 
tinct consideration of any future good to be 
gained by it, but the man feels himself under 
an obligation to do that which is in itself right. 
The conflict is not between a greater and a lesa 



56 MORAL SCIENCE. 

happiness, but between the prospect of happi- 
ness and moral obligation. 

On this subject, the appeal must be to the 
common judgment of men. And we are per- 
suaded that this confounding of moral obligation 
with motives of another kind, is a radical defect 
in Dr. Paley's system, which — lying at the foun- 
ds tion — vitiates the whole, and has already been 
thd cause of great evil to society. 

The true doctrine is, that vir- 
True doctrine tue an( j y - ce are distinct and op- 

etated. ^ 

posite, and that when we know 
any act to be right, we are bound — aside from 
all considerations of self-interest — to perform it. 
Dr. Paley maintains that " we can be obliged 
to nothing, unless we are to lose or gain some- 
thing by it, for nothing else can be 
doctol ° PP ° Site a 'violent motive' tons. And as 
we should not be obliged to obey 
the laws or the magistrate, unless rewards 01 
punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or othei 
depended on our obedience ; so neither should 
we, without the same reason, be obliged to do 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 57 

what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the 
command of God." 

According to this view, unless a man is per- 
suaded that he shall gain something by keeping 
his word, he is under no obligation 

. t •• tti 'n r\ j i in Virtue thus mada 

tO GO it. JiiVeil It (rod Should mercenary. 

clearly make known his will, and 
lay upon him his command, he is under no obli- 
gation to obey, unless certain that he shall re- 
ceive benefit by so doing. This is, indeed, to 
make virtue a mercenary thing, and reduce all 
motives to a level. And as self-love, or the de- 
sire of happiness, is the only rational motive, 
and all men possess this in a sufficient degree oi 
strength, the only conceivable difference between 
the good and the bad, consists in the superioi 
sagacity which the one has above the other te 
discern what will most contribute to happiness. 
And if what we call vice or sin could be made 
to contribute to happiness, then it would change 
its nature and become virtue. 

The definition of obligation, given by Dr. 
Paley, upon his own principles, is unnecessarily 
encumbered with what adds nothing to its im* 

8* 



58 MORAL SCIENCE. 

port "Why should the "violent motive" result 
from the command of another? 
tion P ofscure dCfini " ^ command of another ought 
to have no influence, except as 
obedience or disobedience will be attended with 
loss or gain. It would, therefore, have been 
more simple and intelligible to say at once, what 
is certainly implied, that the only motive which 
can oblige us to be virtuous, is the expectation 
of the happiness to be derived from such con 
duct in the future world. 

Cicero, in his work " De Finibus," says that 

those men who confounded the honestum with 

the utifaj deserved to be banished 

The honestum from soc i ety# The result of the 

and the utile. J 

whole scheme is, that there us no 
such thing as moral excellence, abstractly con- 
sidered ; that the only good in the universe is 
happiness ; and that other things, among w inch 
virtue is included, are good only as related to 
this end. If this is true, the moral attributes of 
God have no intrinsic excellence ; they are all 
merged in his infinite felicity. Surely tins view 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 59 

is not suited to increase our reverence for the 
Supreme Being. 

But every man who carefully examines into 
his own primary ideas of morality, will find that 
he has a sense of right and wrong, 
independent of all considerations mar A ? a p e e a a s 1 t0 pri 
of personal happiness, or its loss. 
This distinction is too deeply engraven on the 
mind to be erased by any process of reasoning. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SUPEEMACY OF CONSCIENCE. 

That the dictates of conscience should be 

obeyed, is one of the most evident perceptions 

of the human mind. No matter 

neo C beyei enCemUSt h ° W milch mi g ht be g ained b 7 

going contrary to conscience, every 
honest mind has the same judgment, that duty 
should be done. If it is plain that a certain 
act — such as confessing the truth of the gos- 
pel — is a duty, and we are convinced that no- 
thing but suffering will ensue from performing 
it; yet the judgment of the impartial mind is, 
that no prospect of pain or loss can ever justify 
us in denying the truth, or in doing any thing 
else that we know to be wrong. On this point, 
there is no room for reasoning. The judgment 
that conscience should be obeyed, is intuitive: 



SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE. 61 

all men must acknowledge it, unless they belie 
the clear convictions of their own reason. 

That conscience should be obeyed, that duty 
should be performed at every risk, are maxims 
which must receive the assent of 

Admitted mpin\, 

all who are capable of under- 
standing them. On the subject of the supremacy 
of conscience, the following quotation from Dr. 
Chalmers, is very much to our purpose : 

"In every human heart there is a faculty— 
not, it may be, having the actual power, but 
having the just and rightful pre- 
tension to act as judge and master Ohaimera 
over the whole of human conduct. 
Other propensities may have too much sway, 
but the moral propensity — if I may so term it — 
never can ; for, to have the presiding sway in all 
our concerns, is just that which properly and 
legitimately belongs to it. A man under anger, 
may be too strongly prompted to deeds of retali- 
ation, or under sensuality may be too strongly 
prompted to indulgence, or under avarice, be too 
closely addicted to the pursuit of wealth, or even 
under friendship be too strongly inclined to 



62 MORAL SCIENCE. 

partiality ; but he never can, under conscience, 
be too strongly inclined to be as lie ought, and 
to do as he ought. We may say of a watch, 
that its main-spring is too powerful, but we 
would never say that a regulator was too power- 
ful." " And neither do we urge the 

proposition that conscience has in every instance 
the actual direction of human affairs, for this 
were in the face of all experience. It is not 
that every man obeys her dictates, but that 
every man feels that he ought to obey them. 
These dictates are often, in life and practice, 
disregarded ; so that conscience is not the sove- 
reign de facto. Still there is a voice within the 
hearts of all which asserts that 

Conscience is sov- • • o 7 

erei<riu conscience is the sovereign dejure: 

that to her belongs the command 
rightfully, even though she do not possess it 
actually." .... "All that we affirm is, that it 
conscience prevail over the other principles, then 
every man is led, by the very make and mechan- 
ism of his internal economy, to feel, that it is as 
it ought to be ; or if these others prevail over 
conscience, that it is not as it ought to be." .... 



SUPKEMACY OF CONSCIENCE. 63 

" When stating the supremacy of conscience, in 
the sense that we have explained it, we but state 
what all men feel ; and our only argument in 
proof of the assertion is — our only argument 
can be, an appeal to the experience of all men." 
These sentiments wil? find a 

Inward verdict 

response in every honest mind. 
However often Ave disobey the voice of this 
monitor, we always have the feeling of self- 
condemnation accompanying our disobedience. 



CHAPTER IX. 

WHETHER WE ALWAYS DO EIGHT BY OBEYING THE 
DICTATES OF CONSCIENCE? 

This is one of the most perplexing questions m 

the science of morals. Many are of opinion 

that all that is necessary to render 

Difficulty of tliw - , . , , 

problem. &n action good is that the agent 

act agreeably to the dictates of his 
own conscience. This may be considered a vul- 
gar opinion, usually taken up without much 
consideration. But there is an opinion, neai 
akin to this, which has been advocated by some 
of the greatest men of the age; namely, that 
nen are not responsible for their opinions or be- 
lief. It is thought that the adoption of this as 
a maxim is the only effectual method of putting 
an end to the bitter animosities and controver- 
sies among the advocates of different creeds. 



OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 65 

It is not wonderful that they who make the 
moral sense, in a sort, infallible, 
and the ultimate standard of right Source of error, 
and wrong, should hold that men 
cannot go astray if they will honestly listen to 
the voice of conscience, and obey her dictates. 

But as we have shown that conscience is the 
judgment of the mind respecting duty, and as no 
man's knowledge is perfect or in- 
fallible, it follows, therefore, that Error of under- 

standing may affect 

so far as there is error in the un- moral judgment, 
derstanding in relation to matters 
of duty, just so far the conscience will be mis- 
guided. The question at issue, therefore, is 
whether an action, wrong in itself, can be con- 
sidered as a good and virtuous action if the 
agent believes that it is right. If the affirma- 
tive were true, then the discovery 
of truth would be of no value, otherwise truth 

would be needless. 

for obviously upon this principle 
error is just as good as truth. But as soon would 
we believe that darkness is as good as light to 
direct us in the way which we wish to traveL 
Again, this theory supposes that a man is under 



66 MORAL SCIENCE. 

no law but his own opinion, or the dictates of 

conscience; that, therefore, which 

opinion wonid is a sin in one man may be a duty 

be law. 

to another in precisely the same 
external circumstances and relations; which 
would be to confound all moral distinctions. 

This theory would go to sanction 
False religion would ever y f orm f religion, however 

be right J & ' 

corrupt and superstitious ; and to 
make the vilest immoralities virtuous ; for there 
can be no doubt that the votaries of idolatry, in 
their most cruel and abominable rites, follow the 
dictates of an erring conscience. When the 
heathen sacrifice to demons, and when the vic- 
tim is a human being, or even a first-born son, 
there is nothing wrong, for all these acts of wor- 
ship are performed in obedience to conscience. 
Every species of persecution and the Inquisition 
itself may be justified on this principle. In 
stead, therefore, of putting an end to all animos- 
ity, it would bring back, in all their horrors, the 
days of persecution for conscience' sake. 

On this subject, again, our appeal must be to 
the unbiassed judgment of mankind ; and we 



OBEYHSTG CONSCIENCE. 67 

tliink tlie verdict will be, that error which might 
have been avoided, and ignorance, 

n . t . ...,-. t Avoidable and 

which is not invincible, do not unavoidable, 
excuse. The knowledge neces- 
sary to duty is within the reach of every man, 
were he disposed sincerely to seek after it. But 
it is a truth which is of importance on this sub- 
ject, that one false step leads to another; and 
though a man who has adopted fundamental 
error, labours under a kind of necessity to do 
wrong, yet this does not excuse him, because he 
ought to have exercised more diligence and im- 
partiality in seeking for the truth, and is justly 
liable to all the evil consequences resulting from 
this neglect. 

Suppose a man to have been educated in a 
wrong system of religion and morals ; he is re- 
sponsible, because, when arrived 
at the years of maturity, he should Dut ^ of correcting 

J ° errors. 

have brought the opinions received 
by education under an honest examination. The 
more difficult it is to divest ourselves of preju- 
dices thus imbibed, as it were, with the mother's 
milk, the more necessary is it that, under the in- 



68 MORAL SCIENCE. 

fluence of a sincere love of truth, we should, with 
impartiality, diligence, and resolution, endeavour 
to do so. It is no proof that such a course is not 
the solemn duty of man, that few ever perform 
it. The prevalence of error in the world, is very 
much owing to the neglect of this duty. This 
neglect arises from culpable indolence, from a 
desire to remain in agreement with the multitude 
or with our parents and teachers, from aversion 
to the truth and an unwillingness to deny our- 
selves, and incur the inconvenience and perse- 
cution which an avowal of the truth would bring 
upon us. But none of these reasons will justify 
us in adhering to opinions which are detrimental 
to ourselves and others, or contrary to our moral 
obligations. It is true, if a man's conscience 
dictates a certain action, he is morally bound to 
obey ; but if that action is in itself wrong, he 
commits sin in performing it, nevertheless. He 
who is under fundamental error, is in a sad 
dilemma. Do what he will, he sins. If he dis- 
obey conscience, he knowingly sins ; doing what 
he believes to be wrong ; and a man never can 
be justified for doing what he believes to bo 



OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 69 

wrong, even though it should turn out to be 
right. And if he obey conscience, performing 
an act which is in itself wrong, he sins; because 
he complies not with the law under which he is 
placed. It may be asked, "How can a man be 
responsible in such circumstances, 

The seat of respon- 

when he is under a necessity of sibnityinsuchacase. 
doing wrong?" We are responsi- 
ble for suffering ourselves to be brought into 
such a state ; we are responsible for our ignor- 
ance of the truth. Hence we see how important 
the duty of seeking after truth with untiring dili- 
gence, and honest impartiality. The same neces- 
sity is found to arise from forming bad habits, 
and cherishing evil passions. The heart in which 
envy to another has been indulged until it has 
become habitual, cannot exercise kind and bro- 
therly affections to that person ; but this is no 
excuse. The fault may be traced far back, but 
guilt is attached to every act of envy, however 
inveterate the habit. If this were not so, the 
greater the sinner, the less his responsibility. 

The objection to making a man responsible 
for his opinions, is, that his belief does not de- 



70 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

pend upon his will, but results necessarily from 

the evidence existing before tile mind, at any 

moment. This is true; but we may turn our 

minds away from the evidence 

objection, that be- ^ic^ would have produced a Con- 
ifer is involuntary. x 

viction of the truth. And this is 
not all ; there may be such a state of mind, that 
evidence of a certain kind cannot be perceived 
Depravity produces blindness of mind, in regard 
to the beauty and excellency of moral objects. 
But every man ought to be free from such a 
state or temper of mind, as produces distorted or 
erroneous views. Surely, moral depravity can- 
not be an excuse for erroneous opinions. All 
actions proceed from certain principles ; if, there- 
fore, the action is wrong, because of the corrupt 
principle, the burden of culpability must be rolled 
back upon the principle, or state of the soul, 
which sends forth evil acts, as a poisoned foun- 
ain sends forth deleterious streams. 

Metaphysical reasoning, however, rather per- 
plexes and obscures than elucidates such points. 
Let us hold fast by the plain principles of com- 
mon sense, and appeal to the common judgment 



OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 71 

of mankind ; and the decision will be, that igno- 
rance or error which, might have 

Avoidable igno- 

been avoided, never excuses from ranee does not ex- 
cuse. 
- olame. The same is true of all evil 

jiabits and inveterate passions, which have 
oeen voluntarily or heedlessly contracted. The 
whole course of a moral agent must be taken 
together; his moral acts are complicated, and 
intimately connected. They form a web, in 
which one thread is connected with another, and 
one serves to give strength to another. If we 
honestly consult our conscience, we feel guilty 
when we have done wrong, even though we did 
it ignorantly; because we ought not to have 
been in ignorance. 

Two things, therefore, are necessary, in or- 
der to determine that an action is right : first, 
that the state of mind of the agent 

What consti- 

be such as it ought to be ; and se- tutes a right ac- 
tion, 
condly, that the action be in con- 
formity with the law under which we are placed ; 
for the very idea of morality supposes us to be 
under a moral law. 

While, then, we cannot do better than obey 



72 MORAL SCIENCE. 

conscience ; yet if conscience is erroneous, 

we do not fulfil our duty by such, obedience, 

but may commit grievous sin. 

Duty not fulfil- 
led by obeying erro- For, following the dictates of con- 

neous conscience. 

science, is only one circumstance 
essential to a good action. When we do wrong 
while obeying the dictates of conscience, the 
error does not consist in that obedience, but in 
not following the right rule, with which rule the 
accountable moral agent should be acquainted. 



CHAPTER X. 

WHETHER THEEE IS IN THE MIND A LAW OR RULE, BY 
WHICH MAN JUDGES OF THE MORALITY OF PARTICU- 
LAR ACTIONS? 

If such, a rule existed in the mind prior to the 
observation of particular acts of a moral nature, 
we should be conscious of it : no- 

Mental rules are 

thing of the nature of a law or objects of conscious- 
ness, 
rule can have existence in the 

mind, without the knowledge of the mind 

itself. 

There seems to be a common mistake as to 

the process of the mind in regard to general 

principles. It seems to be thought 

. . The actual process 

that m order to judge whether an of the mind in mor- 

al judgments. 

action be right or wrong, there 

must be something like a general rule or law, 

which the mind applies, as the workman does 



74 MORAL SCIENCE. 

his rule, to ascertain whether the quality of the 
action be good or bad. But as we are conscious 
of no such process as the application of a gene- 
ral rule, there seems to be no evidence whatever 
of its existence. The real process of the mind is 
very simple. "When a moral action is viewed, 
if its nature is simple and palpable, the mind 
intuitively perceives its quality, and is conscious 
of no other mental process. Suppose a man, 
created as Adam was, in the full possession of 
his rational faculties : until some occasion offer- 
ed, to elicit its exercise, he would not be con- 
scious of any moral faculty or feeling. But 
suppose an act of flagrant injustice to be perpe- 
trated before him, he would at once have his 
moral faculty brought into exercise. He would 
see that the action had in it a moral turpitude, 
that it ought not to have been done, and that 
the agent deserved to be punished. So long as 
this was the only moral act observed or thought 
of, there would be in the mind nothing but 
the judgment, with the accompanying feeling 
that such an act, and of course every other act 
of the same kind, was evil. As such an observ 



THE INTERNAL LAW. 75 

er would, however, soon observe a multitude 
of acts, of different kinds, which, were judged to 
be good or bad, a general rule or law would be 
obtained, by degrees, out of these particulars. 
The process of the mind, in all cases, is from 
particulars to generals, and the tendency in the 
mind to put into classes those things which 
resemble each other, exists also in regard to 
moral actions. After observing a great number 
of acts, of different kinds, all of which are 
morally good or evil, these particulars are classi- 
fied, and form a general rule or law ; and when 
a new act is observed, it is referred to its proper 
class. But how can we know an action to be 
good or bad, without a rule with which to com- 
pare it, in the first instance? The answer is, 
that it is as easy to conceive of a facult} 7- by 
which we can at once perceive the moral charac- 
ter of an act, as of the power of judging of the 
rectitude of a general rule. 

There is a sense in which it may be said, that 
reason, or the moral faculty having the power of 
discerning the moral quality of actions, has the 
rule in itself. If this is all that is intended by 



76 MORAL SCIENCE. 

a general rule of right and wrong in the mind; 
there can be no objection to it. 

"Whether the moral 

faculty has the This is saying no more than that 

rule in itself, 

the mind has a faculty by which 
it judges intuitively of many moral acts, as soon 
as they are observed. The idea may be thus 
illustrated: here is a straight line, as soon as I 
see it, I perceive it to be straight; there is a 
crooked line, which at once I perceive to be 
crooked. There is no need of a rule in the 
mind, by the application of which I know that 
the one is straight, and the other crooked. The 
quality of the lines is seen at once. So of many 
moral actions, the moment the mind apprehends 
them, their moral character is perceived. 

Here are some boys going to school. I ob- 
serve one, who is large and strong, forcibly 

taking from another, who is small 

A case stated. 

and weak, some fruit which the 
latter has with much pains gathered for a sick 
mother. I need no general rule to guide my 
judgment. I need only to know the real cir- 
cumstances of the action. That a large and 
strong boy should by force take away from one 



THE INTERNAL LAW. 77 

weaker tlian liimself, property to which, he has 
no right, and to which the other has a right, is 
so evidently immoral, that every mind sees the 
vil at once. 

The general law or rule of morals is there- 
fore made up by the observation 

General law of 
and classification Of particular acts J morals from par- 
ticular acts. 

just as the general law of gravity 

is formed by observation of particular facts. 

All our knowledge relates originally to par- 
ticular cases ; and general ideas 
and general rules and laws, are ^^^ a 
formed by a process of the mind, 
which may be called generalization or classifica- 
tion. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE MORAL FEELING WHICH ACCOMPANIES EVERY MORAL 
JUDGMENT. 

Whether our judgments and feelings are dis- 
tinct and separate mental exercises, or whether 
what we call feeling or emotion is 

Feelings of appro- 
bation and disappro- only an idea of a more vivid kind, 

bation. . m , 

is a question which we need not 
discuss, a$ the decision of it is not necessary to 
our purpose. All men make a distinction be- 
tween acts which are purely intellectual, and 
those exercises of mind called emotions ; and no 
practical error can arise from observing this dis 
t motion — whether philosophically correct or not. 
In every case where a moral object or relation 
comes before the mind, there is a feeling of ap- 
probation or disapprobation, according to the 
moral character of the object, of which we are 



■* » 



THE MORAL EMOTION. 79 

immediately conscious. This approbation or 
disapprobation will not be equal in all cases, but 
exceedingly different in degree. While some 
moral actions elicit, when perceived, a very 
slight degree of approbation or disapprobation, 
others excite strong emotion ; the disapproval 
arising to indignation, and the approval to ad- 
miration. 

In every instance where a good act is ob- 
served, there is a feeling of esteem for the agent, 
as well as approbation of the act. 

A disposition, tOO, is felt to be- The idea of merit. 

stow some reward on the person 
who performs a good action. If we see a man, 
at the imminent risk of his own life, plunge into 
the sea to save a stranger who has fallen over- 
board, we approve the action, and feel that he 
deserves a reward. We therefore call it a meri- 
torious action ; for the simple idea of merit is 
that which deserves a reward. 

On the other hand, when we are witnesses of 
a wicked act of an enormous kind, as, for ex 
ample, a man murdering a good parent or a 
kind benefactor, without any provocation, but 



80 MORAL SCIENCE. 

instigated by avarice or resentment — we feel in- 
stantaneously a degree of disap- 
fee5. VilidiCat0r7 probation which may properly be 
called indignation. This feeling 
would be accompanied by a strong desire that 
condign punishment should be inflicted on the 
wicked perpetrator of such a deed. If there 
were no other means of executing justice, we 
should feel disposed* to aid in punishing the cul- 
prit ; and the idea of such a person escaping 
without punishment, is painful to the impartial 
mind, and revolting to the moral feelings. 

These moral emotions are, however, of very 
different degrees of intensity in different per- 
sons, and in the same person at different pe- 
riods of his life. Persons who 
ai emTions. m m ° r " have been l° n g accustomed to see 
atrocious crimes committed, lose 
in time their moral sensibility, and become ac- 
customed to scenes of blood and robbery. In 
proportion as the minds of men are enlightened 
by the truth, and their hearts upright, will be 
the sensibility of the moral faculty. But by 
committing sin, as well as by observing it, the 



THE MORAL EMOTION. 81 

mcral sensibilities are blunted. This want of 
right feeling in the conscience is what is called a 
" seared conscience," which expression is bor- 
rowed from the effect produced on any part of a 
living body, by the repeated application of a 
heated iron. The result is, that, by degrees, the 
skin thickens, and the sensibility of the seared 
part is lost, or rendered obtuse. . 

Besides this feeling of approbation or disap- 
probation of moral acts, good or evil, there is a 
peculiar emotion, in relation to 
moral acts, according to their na- Emoti011 ta ««** 

° to acts as our own. 

toe, when performed by ourselves. 
In this case, the emotion is much more vivid than 
when we contemplate the same action as per- 
formed by another. When a person is conscious 
of having performed a truly good action, and from 
the proper motives, he experiences an emotion 
of pleasure, of a very peculiar and exalted nature 
For this emotion, we have no distinctive name-, 
it may be called the pleasure of a good or ap- 
proving conscience. It must not be confounded 
with self-complacency, or a proud opinion of our 

own worth, which may also arise from the per- 
4* 



82 MORAL SCIENCE. 

formance of a meritorious action. Tlie feeling 
of which mention has been made, is a simple 
emotion arising in the mind, from the principles 
of the human constitution, upon the performance 
of a good action. One reason why it has not 
been more noticed is, that it has no distinctive 
name. The emotion experienced on the per- 
formance of a wicked action is well known to 
every one. It has a distinctive appellation — re- 
morse. It is a feeling distinguishable from all 
others, and more intolerable than any other spe- 
cies of pain. When violent, it often drives the 
unhappy subject of it to the most desperate acts. 
It is like a scorpion, stinging the soul in its ten- 
derest part. No language can exaggerate the 
misery of a soul abandoned to the torture of this 
feeling. And though in time it may seem to 
be allayed by forgetfulness of the crime, yet 
when any circumstance or association brings the 
evil action distinctly before the conscience, th6 
torment is renewed. Thus, acts of iniquity com 
mitted in heedless gayety, often produce sensible 
remorse in the time of solitude and reflection ; 
and the sins of youth embitter old age. This 



THE MOEAL EMOTION. 83 

feeling often accompanies the sinner to his times 
of decline, and is the pain which most annoya 
him on his bed of death. As the feeling accom- 
panies the guilty unto the last moment of their 
earthly existence, there is much reason to think 
that it will cause the bitterest anguish of a 
future state. 



CHAPTER XII. 

&ELIEF IN GOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE OPEEATION OF 
CONSCIENCE. 

The question is, whether an atheist is completely 
rlivested of the feeling of moral obligation. To 
those who suppose that speculative 
The question sta- atheism is impossible, Jbhis ques- 
tion will appear irrelevant ; for it 
would be useless to inquire what would be the 
effect of a state of mind which never can exist. 

As, however, the evidences of the actual ex- 
istence of atheism are as strong as those of most 
other fundamental errors ; and as 
The atheist per- the doctrine of certain ideas being 

ceives right and 

wrong. impressed on the mind in its crea- 

tion (on which the opinion that 
men could not become atheists was founded), is 
now generally exploded, it may be here taken as 
admitted that there are atheists in the world. 



BELIEF UST GOD. 85 

The question proposed is therefore a proper sub- 
ject for consideration. Bishop Warburton in his 
"Divine Legation of Moses," seems to adopt the 
opinion, that a belief in the being of God, is re 
quisite to the exercise of conscience, or the sense 
of moral obligation. But his reasonings on the 
subject are by no means satisfactory. If we may 
refer to the experience of the atheist himself, he 
will assure us, that he perceives the difference 
between right and wrong, as plainly as others, 
and that he is conscious of being under a moral 
obligation to pursue a virtuous course. This, 
however, they consider an instinctive or consti- 
tutional principle, which should be obeyed, just 
as our appetites and other natural propensities 
should be obeyed. 

If there are intuitive perceptions of moral 
relations, when actions of a certain kind are pre- 
sented to the view of the rational 
mind, then it is certain that con- intuitive percep 

tions not dependent 

science may and will operate, what- on other knowledge 
ever may be the opinions of the 
person on other subjects. No one, when he con- 
templates an act of flagrant injustice, is conscious 



86 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

of a reference to the existence of a moral Gov 
ernor, prior to his moral judgment of the quality 
of the action. The perception of its moral evil is 
as immediate as that of the colour of the sky, or 
the grass. But how can a man feel a moral obli- 
gation, unless he admits that there 

Objection and J g a SU p er i or to whom he is bound ? 
answer. x 

how can he feel himself under a 
law, unless there is a law-giver? The answer 
is, that this part of the human constitution fur- 
nishes a conclusive argument in favour of the be- 
ing of God. We have a law written within us, 
and from the sense of obligation to obey this law, 
we cannot escape. The great Creator has not 
left himself without a witness, in the breast of 
every man. It is possible that a man may be so 
abandoned as to believe in lies, and that he may 
come to disbelieve in the God that made and 
supports him. But he cannot obliterate the law 
written on his heart ; he cannot divest himself 
of the conviction that certain actions are mo- 
rally wrong ; nor can he prevent the stings of 
remorse, when he commits sins of an enormous 
kind. Men may, indeed, spin out refined meta« 



BELIEF IN GOD. 87 

physical theories, and come to the conclusion 
that there is no difference between virtue and 
vice, and that these distinctions are the result of 
education. But let some one commit a flagrant 
act of injustice toward themselves, and their 
practical judgment will give the lie to their the- 
oretical opinion. 

As those speculatists who argue that there is 
no external world, will avoid running against a 
post, or into the fire, as carefully 

Moral distinc 

as other men; so they who en- tions cannot be rea- 
soned away 

deavour to reason themselves into 
the belief that virtue and vice are mere notions, 
generated by education, cannot, nevertheless, 
avoid perceiving that some actions are base, un- 
just, or ungrateful, and consequently to be dis- 
approved of, whether committed by themselves 
or others. 

The inferences from what has been said are, 
that by no arts or course of conduct can men so 
eradicate the moral faculty, that 
there shall no longer be any sense ^S^T" 
of right and wrong. And again, 
it is evident that, although the belief of the ex- 



88 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

istence of God is not necessary to the operations 
of conscience, yet from the existence of this fa- 
culty the existence of God may be inferred. 

And finally, that although the atheist cannot 
destroy the moral faculty, yet the firmer the be- 
lief of God's existence, and the 

Dictates of con- 
science modified by clearer the knowledge of his attri- 

beliefin God. 

butes, the more distinct and for- 
cible will be the dictates of conscience. More- 
over, while the blindness of atheism continues, 
there will of course be no perception of the 
moral duties which arise out of our relation to 
the great Creator; and thus the largest and 
most important class of moral actions will be 
out of view. And this is true, to a great degree, 
in regard to the practical atheist, who forgets 
God habitually; he feels very little sense of 
obligation to worship and serve him. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

MOEAL AGENCY, AND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO IT. 

As actions of moral agents are the proper and on- 
ly objects of moral approbation or disapprobation, 
it becomes necessary to institute an 

The question to 

inquiry into the nature 01 moral be determined by 

experience. 

agency ; or into what are the con- 
stituents of a moral agent. The decision of this 
question must depend entirely on experience, 
and can never be determined by reasoning on 
abstract principles. The process is simply this : 
we contemplate a great variety of acts, which by 
the moral faculty we judge to possess a moral 
character. "We next examine the circumstances 
in which those acts were performed, and we con- 
clude those things which are found in all of 
them, to be necessary to moral agency. Or, to 
render the examination more simple, we may 



90 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

suppose some one condition of the action to be 
absent, and then another, and then viewing the 
action as thus changed in its circumstances, we 
may bring it before the mind, and if the moral 
quality of the act appear unchanged, we conclude 
that that which has been removed from it is no 
essential circumstance in moral agency. But if 
the change in the circumstances of the action, 
leads all men to take an entirely different view 
of its nature, then we conclude that this circum- 
stance is essential to moral agency. 
ir^XnT' Toi «™te this principle, let us 
suppose the following case : If we 
see a man suddenly, without any apparent provo- 
cation, raise his hand and strike another, believ- 
ing that it was freely done, by a man compos 
mentis^ we feel a strong disapprobation of the 
act, as immoral and deserving punishment. But 
if on inquiry it is ascertained that the person 
who committed the assault was utterly destitute 
of reason, we may blame his keepers or friends 
who left him at liberty, but we no longer feel 
any moral disapprobation of the act. For it is 
the intuitive judgment of all persons, that a man 



MORAL AGENCY. 91 

flestitute of reason is not a moral agent, nor ac- 
countable for his actions, whatever evil may 
be produced. We consider such a man as ex- 
actly in the same predicament as a wild beast 
which does an injury. This is the common 
judgment of men; for in all courts of justice, 
when a man is arraigned for an assault, if it can 
be proved that he was a maniac at the time, he 
is acquitted, and all men approve the judicial 
decision which exempts him from punishment. 
Hence it is apparent that the ex- 
ercise of reason is essential to ^SS^fbiT 
moral agency. We may bring 
before our minds a thousand acts, under different 
circumstances, but all performed by agents with- 
out reason, and no man can believe that such 
actions are of a moral nature, or of good or ill 
desert. 

It may seem to be an objection to this broad 
assertion that there are some who entertain the 
opinion that infants are moral 

No objection liea, 

agents from their birth, and com- from the case of in. 

fants. 

mit actual sin. But these persons 

do not suppose that an irrational being can be a 



92 MORAL SCIENCE. 

moral agent, but they think that infants have an 
obscure exercise of reason. Their mistake is 
not in the general principle which has been laid 
down, but in the fact that infants have reason in 
exercise. 

Again, let the case supposed be varied. Let 

it be that the person committing the assault 

had the full exercise of reason, 

Another instance. 

but that the stroke was not volun 
tary, but the effect of a spasmodic, diseased, 
action of the muscles; or that the hand was 
moved by another. Every one, at once, judges 
that the person giving the stroke, whatever he 
might be in other matters, was no moral agent 
in this assault. It was a mere physical opera- 
tion, and not proceeding from the will, could 

not be a moral act. Here we have 
« J^!- ary acti ° n a second circumstance or charac- 

necessary. 

teristic, essential to moral agency, 
namely, that the action be voluntary. No in- 
voluntary action can be of a moral nature. 

Some distinguish the liberty of the agent 
from voluntariness, but to us they appear to be 
the same, or to involve one another. If an act 



MOKAL AGENCY. 93 

is voluntary, it is free ; and if free, it must be 

voluntary. The highest conceiv- 

able degree of liberty in a depen- J^*** "* 

dent being, is the power of doing 

as he wills or pleases. But as this subject has 

by metaphysical controversy been involved in 

perplexity, something may be said hereafter, 

respecting what is called the freedom of the 

will. 

When it is said that the actions of moral 
agents are the only proper objects of moral ap- 
probation or disapprobation, two 
qualifications of the assertion must JJSf" ma7be 
be taken into view. The first is, 
that the omission to act when duty calls, is as 
much an object of disapprobation as a wicked 
action. Should we see a number of persons 
sailing on a river in a boat, and while we sur- 
veyed them, should a child near them fall into 
the river, and no hand be stretched out to rescue 
it from drowning, we could not help feeling a 
strong disapprobation of the conduct of the per* 
sons who were near enough to render the neees- 
sary help. If, however, it should be ascertained 



94 MORAL SCIENCE. 

that one or more of the persons were fast bound 
and pinioned, so that they could not possibly 
stretch out their hands to rescue the child, we 
should exempt them from all blame : for no man 
is bound to do what is physically impossible. 
The second qualification of the statement is, 

that when we disapprove an ex- 
t o" f " ed ternal act, we always refer the 

blame to the motive or intention. 
But if we have evidence that the agent possesses 
a nature or disposition which will lead him often 
or uniformly to perpetrate the same act when 
the occasion shall occur, we not only censure the 
motive, but extend our moral disapprobation 
to the disposition or evil nature, lying behind. 

If we suppose the case of an agent acted on 
by a superior power, so that the nature and 

direction of the act depend not 
Acts under control, upon the agent himself, but upon 

the power by which he is govern- 
ed, we shall consider the immediate agent as not 
free, and the acts brought forth, as not properly 
his acts, but those of the governing power. A 
demoniac or person possessed by an evil spirit 



MORAL AGENCY. 95 

who had power to direct his thoughts and 
govern his actions, would not be an accountable 
agent. 

There are some who maintain that all human 
actions proceed from God, as their first cause, 
and that man can act only as he is 
acted upon. Upon this theory, it ^ST* 
does not appear how man can be 
an accountable moral agent ; for though his ac- 
tions may be voluntary, and performed in the 
exercise of reason, yet as he does not originate 
them, they can scarcely be considered his own. 

We will now suppose the case of a man pos- 
sessing reason, freedom, and will, and originating 
his own actions, but destitute of a 

Moral faculty ne- 

moral faculty, or unable to per- cessary to moral 

agency. 

ceive a difference between right 
and wrong. Can such a person be considered a 
moral agent? We think not. That being; — 
how much soever of reason he may possess — 
who has no perception of moral relations, and 
no feeling of moral obligation, would be incapa 
ble of a moral law, or of performing moral acts. 
But the case is an imaginary one. There are, I 



96 MORAL SCIENCE. 

believe, none, who possess reason, and yet are 
destitute of all moral sense ; but though we con- 
ceive of the intellect of a dog or an elephant in- 
creased to any degree, yet, as being destitute of 
a moral faculty, we do not regard them as moral 
agents. 



CHAPTER XIV. 



MAN A MORAL AGENT. 



Very few have entertained the opinion that man 
is a mere machine, governed by 
physical influences. It will not be The <i uesti <> n un- 
necessary, therefore, to occupy 
time in refuting an opinion contrary to reason 
and universal experience. 

But there are many who entertain the opinion 
that man is the creature of necessity; that in the 
circumstances in which each man 
is placed, he could not be different Fataikm. 

from what he is. This theory of 
fatalism is plausible, because a slight observation 
of the history of man shows that the moral 
characters of most men are formed by the edu- 
cation which they receive, and by the sentiments 
and conduct of those with whom they associate. 



\)8 MORAL SCIENCE. 

It has, therefore, been maintained — and the 
opinion has in our day been industriously propa- 
gated — that man is not a free and accountable 
agent ; that he is what he is, by the operation of 
causes over which he has no control ; that no 

man should be censured or pun- 
e— c e e7° fCir ' i^d for his conduct, since those 

who censure him, if placed in the 
same circumstances, would act in the same man- 
ner. In short, that no man is responsible for his 
conduct ; because his actions — whether good or 
bad — are the effect of necessary causes. It is 
held by the same persons that the only possible 
method of meliorating the condition of the hu* 
man race, is to educate them in such a manner as 
to avoid those prejudices which have hitherto 
proved inimical to the happiness of men ; and 
to remodel society, rejecting those institutions 

which are supposed to cause most 
Socialistic scheme, of the misery which is found in 

the world. This theory has not 
only been embraced with confidence, but at- 
tempts have been made to carry it out in prac- 
tice. Societies founded on the principles above 



MAN A MORAL AGENT. 99 

stated, have been formed botli in Great Britain 
and America. But thus far the experiment has 
been attended with small success. Still the ad- 
vocates of the Social system, as it is called, have 
not been discouraged. They are instituting new 
societies upon an improved plan, and the most 
sanguine hopes are entertained by those con- 
cerned in these new associations, that a far better 
and happier state of society than any hitherto 
enjoyed, is practicable and will be realized. 

In answer to all arguments brought to prove 
that man is not a free moral agent, we appeal to 
the consciousness of every rational 
being. No arguments, however ^XT 
plausible, are of any force against 
intuitive first principles. Whether we can 01 
cannot answer arguments against liberty, we 
know that we are free. In regard to some ac- 
tions, we feel that we are under a moral obliga 
tion to perform them, and in regard to others, 
that we ought not to perform them, and if we 
are induced to violate this obligation, we feel 
that we are to be blamed, and are deserving of 
punishment. 

l.ofC. 



100 MORAL SCIENCE. 

Some philosophers have been persuaded by 

their reasonings that man is not free, but under 

necessity in all his actions. But as they could 

not deny that every man is intimately conscious 

of being free, they have adopted 

This consciousness .i w « • „• j/l ±. i j?t f 

not deceptive. the opinion that man's feeling of 
liberty is a deceptive feeling, and 
contrary to fact. A far more reasonable conclu- 
sion is that there must be some error in the rea- 
soning from which the conclusion that man is 
not a free agent, is deduced. When a chain of 
reasoning brings us to conclusions repugnant to 
our intuitive convictions, it is certain that there is 
a flaw in some link of it, whether we can discover 
it or not. We are as certain that we are free, 
as we can be ; a revelation from heaven could 
not render us more so. As in other instances 
where speculative men have been led to adopt 
conclusions at variance with self-evident princi- 
ples, so here, men act, in common life, in con 
formity with the common notions of mankind. 
They can by no effort divest themselves of this 
assent to certain fundamental truths* 



CHAPTER XV. 

MAN NOT UNDEE A FATAL NECESSITY. 

Although our consciousness of freedom ought 
to satisfy us, whatever reasonings to the contrary 
may be adduced ; yet it may be 
useful to inquire whether, indeed, J^ m,flnl8afF * 
there are any arguments of force 
against the free agency of man. It is certain 
that one truth cannot be in opposition to any 
other truth. If, therefore, the deductions of rea- 
son and the evident principles of common sense 
and experience seem to stand in opposition to 
one another, it must arise from some misappre- 
hension, or abuse of terms. As our understand- 
ing is given us to enable us to apprehend truth, 
no proposition clearly perceived to be true, 



102 MORAL SCIENCE. 

whether intuitively or by ratiocination, can 
possibly be opposed to any other truth. 

It becomes necessary, therefore, in the first 

place, to have distinct ideas of what is meant 

by liberty, and what by necessity. 

wSZSST Here tte reference must be not *> 

metaphysical reasoning, but to 
the common judgment and clear conviction of 
all impartial men. It has already been stated 
that that liberty which is. necessary to moral 
agency, can be nothing else than the liberty of 
doing what we will, to the extent of our power. 
It is freedom of action in conformity with our 
desire and will. When a man is compelled by 
force to strike another (I mean not by the force 
of strong motives, but by actual physical force), 
we say he is not accountable, because not free to 
do as he willed. When we think of that liberty 
which is necessary to free agency, and to the 
performance of a moral act, this is the kind of 
liberty which we have in our minds. In judg- 
ing of the moral quality of an act, we never 
attempt to go further back than the spontaneous 
inclination of the mind, and never think it ne- 



FATALISM. 103 

cessary to know in what way this disposition 
was acquired. If the action proceed from will, 
so far as liberty is concerned it is a moral act. 
We cannot conceive of any greater or more de 
sirable liberty than this. Dependent creatures, 
indeed, cannot possess that independent liberty 
which is the prerogative of the Deity. The 
creature, notwithstanding his liberty, is still 
under the government of divine providence. 

It is also important that we entertain distinct 
and accurate ideas of that necessity which is in- 
consistent with free agency. There 
is what has been termed moral or The necessity 

which precludes free 

philosophical necessity, which is agency, 
not incompatible with human lib- 
erty. This is no other than the certain opera- 
tion of moral causes, producing moral effects, 
according to the power which they possess. 
Such necessity, it has been shown, must belong 
to God, because he cannot act in opposition to 
truth, wisdom, and justice. But this does not 
hinder him from acting freely. So the angels in 
heaven and glorified saints are so confirmed in 



104 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

holiness that they cannot sin ; but still in loving 
and serving God they act most freely. 

But as in the common use of terms, and ac- 
cording to the common apprehension of men, 
liberty and necessity are diametri- 
incorrect use of ca ]2y opposite : when the name 

the term necessary. */ x x i 

necessity is applied to any exer- 
cise, the prejudice immediately arises that it can- 
not be free ; especially if there be some points in 
which it coincides with real necessity. Here, it 
is probable, we have the true source of the diffi- 
culty and perplexity in which this subject has 
been involved. The word necessary should 
never have been applied to any exercises which 
are spontaneous or voluntary, because all such 
are free in their very nature. When we apply 
this term to them, although we may qualify it 
by calling it a moral or philosophical necessity, 
still the idea naturally and insensibly arises, thai 
if necessary they cannot be free. It is highly 
important not to use a term out of its proper 
signification ; especially when such consequences 
may arise from an ambiguous use. An event 
may be absolutely certain without being neces 



FATALISM. 105 

sary. It was absolutely certain that God, in 
creating the world, would act most 
wisely. It is a matter of absolute c J?£ aiQt7Ji0tn *' 
certainty that the holy angels will 
continue to love and serve God incessantly ; but 
this certainty is not inconsistent with liberty. 
If a man possess good principles, and all temp- 
tation to do wrong be removed, it is morally cer- 
tain that, in any given case, he will do right ; 
and if a man be of corrupt principles, and all vir- 
tuous considerations be foreign from his thoughts, 
and strong temptations be presented to his rul- 
ing passion, it is certain that he will yield to 
temptation and commit sin. But in all these 
cases there is no necessity, because there is no 
coercion or compulsion. If the mere certainty 
of an event were inconsistent with freedom, 
then there could be no such thing as liberty in 
God or the creatures. As God knows all things 
most certainly, every thing, in his view, what- 
ever may be its cause, is equally certain; the 
divine prescience cannot be mistaken. There is 
no good reason why uncertainty should be con- 
sidered essential to that liberty which is necessary 

5* 



106 MORAL SCIENCE. 

to moral actions. All causes operate according 
to their nature and force. The reason why one 
effect is necessary and another free is not that 
the one takes place without an adequate cause, 
or that the same cause may produce different 
effects ; for both these are contrary to common 
sense. The true reason is that the one is pro- 
duced against will, or without will, whereas the 
other is a voluntary act. 

Let the distinction between what is certain 
and what is necessary be fully comprehended 
and attended to, and a great part 
^c£r e0fthe of the darkness which, in the view 
of many, has obscured this subject 
will be dissipated. Although, then, it should be 
demonstrated that the will is as certainly gov- 
erned by motives as the scale of the balance is 
by weights, yet there can be no legitimate infer- 
ence from the one to the other, as if that would 
prove that the will is not free but under a neces- 
sity. The difference lies not in the difference of 
certainty in the two cases, but in the difference 
in the nature of the causes of that certainty. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

MAN'S DIRECTION AND GOVERNMENT OF HIS ACTIONS, 
AND HIS CONSEQUENT RESPONSIBILITY. 

Thebe are two extremes to be avoided here. 
The first is that which considers man as, in some 
sense, a passive recipient of influ- 
ences from without. He is repre- avo ^ emes to be 
sented as placed in certain circum- 
stances and surrounded by certain objects, in the 
selection of which he has had no choice ; and as 
he is susceptible of certain impressions which 
these circumstances and objects are fitted to 
make upon him, he cannot be considered a free 
and accountable agent. 

In opposition to this false hypothesis we as- 
sert that the whole force which governs man is 
within, and proceeds from himself. ^External 
objects are in themselves inert. They exert no 



108 MORAL SCIENCE. 

influence ; no power emanates from them. T he 
only power and influence which 
fhTST Wdl7 the 7 can Possibly have over any 
man they derive from the active 
principles of his nature. We are, indeed, accus- 
tomed in popular language to say that external 
objects excite and inflame the mind; but in 
philosophical accuracy they are but the passive 
objects on which the affections and desires of 
the mind fasten, and their whole power of mov- 
ing to action depends upon the strength of the 
inward affections of the soul. To render this 
perfectly plain to every mind, it will only be 
necessary to attend to a few familiar illustrations. 
To a man who is under the influence of hun- 
ger or thirst, bread and water are said, when 
seen, greatly to excite him, so that 

w^°oXl in0Ut ' te is stroagty Spelled to appro- 
priate these objects to the craving 
wants of his nature. But every one sees at once 
that both the bread and the water are merely 
passive objects on which the appetite fixes. The 
real force which impels to action, is not, there- 
fore, the external object, but the inward desire 



SELF-DIRECTION . 109 

which is in the soul itself. For where no appe- 
tite of hunger or thirst exists, the bread and 
water, however presented and urged upon the 
sense, produce no effect; there is no motive to 
action experienced. 

Take another case. A man comes into a room 
where lies a pile of gold. Avarice urges him 
to seize the beloved object, and 
appropriate it to himself. Two ' J^££J" 
desires or motives counteract the 
tendency of avarice ; one is a sense of duty or 
regard to the dictate of conscience, which he 
knows ought to be obeyed ; the other is a regard 
to reputation, or the good opinion of men. Be- 
tween these two antagonistical principles, there 
must of course be a conflict. If avarice be 
strong, and the power of conscience and desire 
of the good opinion of men be comparatively 
weak, the consequence will be that the man will 
put forth his hand and take the gold, and at the 
same time will feel conscious that he is doing 
wrong. But if conscience be fully awake, and 
especially if a love of moral excellence and a 
hatred of iniquity have a place in his mind, 



110 MORAL SCIENCE. 

this motive alone will be sufficient to induce him 
to reject at once the thought of appropriating 
what belongs to another. In this case it is evi- 
dent that the gold on the table is altogether pas- 
sive ; there is no secret emanation from the inert 
metal. The whole power of gold to seduce the 
mind to evil depends on the strength of the prin- 
ciple of avarice within ; and in a mind rightly- 
constituted, or under the influence of good 
moral dispositions, it could never so prevail as 
to induce the person to do an unlawful act for 
the sake of obtaining it. 

From these cases it is evident that a man is 

not governed by any influence from without or 

separate from himself, but that the 

iyob" Sare0n " true s P rin S of his actions lies en ' 
tirely in his own inclinations and 
will, external things having no other influence 
than as they furnish objects suited to his appe- 
tites and other desires. 

Some writers on the will, in speaking of the 
governing power of motives, have expressed 
themselves in a manner which leads to the opin- 
ion that the motives by which the will is de- 



SELF-DIRECTION. 1 1 2 



termined exist without us, or separate from 
ourselves, whereas those motives 
which possess an active power and J^^^ 
govern our voluntary actions, are 
within us, and are our own active powers ana 
affections, for which we are as responsible as for 
any other acts or operations of the mind. Hence J 
it may truly be affirmed that every man pos- 
sesses a self-determining power by which he 
regulates and governs his own actions according j 
to his own inclinations. 

The other extreme in regard to this subject 
is, that the will possesses a self-determining 
power in itself, independent of all 
motives, and uninfluenced by any p J e f " determining 
inclination. And it is maintained 
that such a self-determining power is essential to 
freedom, and to the existence of an accountable 
moral agent. If, indeed, this last opinion were 
correct we should admit the self-determining 
power of the will, whether we understood its 
nature or not ; for we lay it down as a first prin- 
ciple — from which we can no more depart than 
from the consciousness of existence — that MAN 



112 MORAL SCIENCE. 

IS free ; and therefore stand ready to embrace 
whatever is fairly included in the definition of 
freedom. But it is not yet made evident, or 
even probable, that such a power exists, or that 
it is at all necessary to free moral agency, or that 
the possession of such a power would be valua- 
ble or desirable. 

All that is wanted is to make man the mas- 
ter of his own actions, and this is completely 

effected by giving him the power 
Not necessary. to will and act in accordance with 

his own inclinations. Certainly a 
man is not the less accountable for his actions 
because they are in accordance with his desires. 
Every rational being acts with a view to some 
end, and his regard or affection for that end is 
the motive which governs his will and influences 
his conduct. 

It cannot be justly denied, and is generally 

admitted, that in most cases the 

Denial of such 

power does not con- determinations of the will are in- 
flict with liberty. 

fluenced by strong desires ; and 
when such desires exist, and there are none lead- 
ing a contrary way, the decisions of the will are 



SELF-DIRECTION. 113 

in fact determined by the previous state of the 
mind. Now if the prevalence of these desires 
in such cases is not found to interfere with free 
agency, there is no reason to think that the be- 
lief that the will is invariably determined by 
the strongest existing desire will lead to any 
conclusion unfavourable to liberty. If the self- 
determining power in question is exerted only 
in trivial cases where motives to action are weak, 
or when there is an equipoise of motives, it cannot 
be a power of any great consequence, since most 
of our moral acts are performed without its aid. 
Let us first take an impartial view of the acta 
of a man in the exercise of the 

... Instances examined. 

power which all admit he pos- 
sesses, and then of this imaginary power which 
some think essential to moral agency. 

In the first case the man exercising his rea- 
son, apprehends objects which appear to him, on 
some account, good and desirable. 

First case. 

These objects he desires to ob- 
tain, and puts forth those volitions which pro- 
duce the actions requisite to the accomplishment 
of his object. 



114 



MORAL SCIENCE. 



In the second case the man feels an inclina- 
tion leading him with more or less force to a 
certain object ; but he has a power 

Second case. 

which he can at any time exert to 
arrest his action in the line of his inclinations, 
and by exerting this power of willing he can 
counteract any desire, and act in opposition to 
it. Or if two desires exist, he can by this power 
give the prevalence to that which is the weaker. 
The best way to bring this matter to the test of 
experience is to suppose a case in which such a 
power is exerted. Suppose the case of a man in 
whom, by habit and indulgence, the appetite for 
intoxicating drink is strong ; but he is induced 
by weighty reasons derived from a sense of duty 
and a regard to his health, reputation, family, 
and temporal prosperity, to determine not to ex- 
pose himself to temptation. An old companion 
calls and solicits him to go with him to a convi- 
vial meeting. His appetite strongly pleads for 
indulgence, if only for this one time ; but con- 
science remonstrates, and a regard to health, 
reputation, and the like, operates strongly 
on the other side. Suppose the influence felt 



SELF-DIRECTION. 115 

from these two opposite sources . to be almost 
equally balanced ; suppose even a perfect equi- 
poise. Such, a state of mind, though possible 
and frequently experienced, can never last long, 
for the states of the mind change in some re- 
spects every moment, and the least difference in 
the views of the subject would destroy the bal- 
ance. But now is the time for the exercise of 
the power which determines without regard to 
motive. Suppose, while the scales are thus in 
equipoise, this power to be exerted, and the man 
determines in favour of self-denial. Why he 
did thus determine, seems to be a reasonable in- 
quiry ; but if this power exists, such a question is 
entirely irrelative. There was, according to the 
supposition, no reason or motive which influ- 
enced the determination. Here then is a case 
for our consideration : Is an action prompted by 
no motive, and performed without a view to any 
end, an accountable moral act ? If this self-de- 
termining power exists, it may be exerted in op- 
position to the highest and best motives, and 
neither the person himself nor any body else can 
tell why it was exerted. If a man under the in- 



116 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

fluence of love to his Creator, should be about 
to engage in the performance of some plain and 
important duty, tlie exertion of this power at 
the most unseasonable time might arrest his ac- 
tion and lead him to a contrary determination. 
Why would he exert such a power at such a 
time? That, indeed, is the question. But if 
any reason of any kind could be given it would 
destroy the hypothesis, which is that a man has 
power to determine in opposition 

No power to de- 
termine against aii to all existing motives, and where 

motives. 

there is a competition can act in 
conformity with the weakest. Surely such a 
power is irrational and dangerous in the ex» 
treme, and has no tendency to increase that free- 
dom which is requisite to a moral agent. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIFORM INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. 

One of the most plausible objections to the 
■uniform influence of motives on the will is, the 
intimate conviction every man has, 

Objection from 

when he has done what he regrets, regret at wrong ac- 
tions, 
that he could have done other- 
wise; whereas, upon the hypothesis laid down 
above, the man could not possibly, with the 
same motives, have acted differently from what 
he did. And it is alleged that no man ever 
would or could repent of his most criminal 
conduct, were he persuaded that he could not 
have willed and acted differently from what he 
did. 

This objection brings out the true issue in 
this inquiry. The real question in dispute in 
regard to the will is, whether, all things external 



118 MORAL SCIENCE. 

and internal being the same to any voluntary 

agent, the volitions will be the 
J^ eqiiestion same. That is, whether a man in 

the same state of mind and Tinder 
the influence of the same desires and motives, in 
kind and degree, will not always will and act in 
the same way. This we affirm ; and the advocates 
of the self-determining power of the will, deny. 

It is admitted that when a man has done 
wrong and is convinced of his error, he is deeply 

conscious that he might and should 
4ed— n h6 Have acted differently. But when 

this conviction is analyzed, it is 
found to be, not that he might have willed and 
acted differently with the same feelings that in- 
fluenced him at the moment of doing wrong, 
but that he might and should have had a differ- 
ent state of feeling, or a more considerate atten- 
tion to those things which were forgotten, but 
which if recollected would have prevented hrm 
from doing that which he now regrets. 

Take a case. A man in an hour of levity, 
ana under the influence of a degree of envy, 
speaks disrespectfully of a person whose charac* 



MOTIVES. 119 

ter is worthy of esteem, and to whom he is under 
pecial obligation. Upon reflec- 

Example. 

fcion he is truly sorry for what he 
said, candidly confesses his fault, and says that 
were he again placed in similar circumstances, 
he would not be guilty of the same fault. But 
suppose he should be asked whether, if the same 
degree of inattention, and the same envious feel- 
ing should again exist which characterized the 
state of his mind when he spoke unadvisedly, 
and no considerations should occur which were 
not then present to his mind, he is of opinion 
that he would act differently from what he did. 
Under such a view of the matter, few persons 
dare profess that they would act differently 
when placed in precisely the same circumstances. 
When we feel that we would and could act dif- 
ferently from what we have done in certain 
specified circumstances, it is always on the sup- 
position that our views and feelings should be 
different. If the person speaking disrespectfully 
of a friend is asked what would induce him 
to act differently, if the thing were to be done 
again, the natural and reasonable answer is, "I 



120 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

should think of the impropriety of the thing, and 
should recollect my obligations to the person ; 
and other the like considerations." This shows 
that men feel accountable, not only for their 
volitions and actions, but for the views and 
feelings which precede volition. Indeed if 
there is one point above all others on which 
responsibility rests, it is on the motives, that is, 
the active desires or affections of the mind from 
which volition proceeds, and by which it is gov- 
erned. The murderer could easily abstain from 
murder, if he would repress his malignant feel- 
ings ; but with the same spirit of malice and 
revenge which induced him to shed his brother's 
blood, and with the same absence of all other 
views and feelings than those which he had at 
the time, there is a moral certainty that he would 
commit the same crime again. Nor has this 
certainty, that unrestrained malice and revenge 
would again lead to the perpetration of the same 
horrid crime, the slightest tendency to alleviate 
the guilt of the murderer. The true ground of 
his culpability, lies in his having and indulging 
such malignant tempers, and in voluntarily 



MOTIVES. 121 

turning away his mind from all considerations 
ol piety and humanity, whicli would restrain 
him from the cruel act. And here a question 
might arise respecting a man's desires and affec- 
tions, and the power which he has over them ; 
but this is not the proper place for a discussion 
of that point. 

Another objection which has been repeatedly 
urged, and which by many is considered unan- 
swerable, is, that according to this 

Objection from im- 

iiypothesis, when two things ex- possibility of choos- 
ing between equals. 

actly equal, and viewed to be so, 
are presented to the choice of a rational being, 
it would be impossible to choose either. But 
every man (say the objectors) feels that he has 
the power, if two loaves of bread or two eggs 
exactly alike be presented, of choosing between 
them ; and as there exists confessedly no motive 
for preferring one loaf or one egg to the other, 
therefore it is possible for the will to determine 
without a motive. 

To this plausible objection it may be an 
swered, that if the self-determining power of the 
will, independent of motives, be confined to 



122 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

cases in which, there are no motives to turn the 
balance, it is a power of very little 

Answer. 

importance, and not worth disput- 
ing about. Let it be admitted that in such an 
equipoise of motives, the mind can determine in 
favour of either of the objects. But perhaps 
this will admit of a different solution, and one 
in accordance with the theory maintained. And 
let it be remarked, that it is not the similarity of 
external objects which should here be consid- 
ered, but the view which the mind takes of them. 
We know how a fertile imagination may cast a 
grain into one of the balanced scales, and cause 
it to preponderate. But further, the state of 
mind supposed to be produced by objects of 
equal value, is really felt for a moment. Between 
two things we hesitate, not being able to come tc 
a decision ; but this indecision arises not from a 
belief that the objects proposed are equal, but 
from a doubt which is preferable. When we are 
sure there is no difference, this hesitation is not 
experienced. The explanation which seems 
correct, is the following: two guineas are laid 
before a poor man, and he is told to take which 



MOTIVES. 123 

one lie pleases. It cannot be necessary thrt he 
should think one better than the other. If such 
a preference were necessary, he would be unable 
to take either, and his situation would be com- 
parable to the ass of the old Greek sophists, 
held immovable between two bundles of hay. 

The difficulty supposed to exist in the case of 
two equal objects proposed for our choice, is 
perfectly imaginary : no difficulty 
or perplexity is ever experienced, J*^"?™' 
when the things presented to oux 
choice are known to be equal. It is only when 
we apprehend that there may be a difference be- 
tween the objects offered, that we hesitate. As 
if a person should offer to our choice two cas- 
kets, the contents of which are unknown; we 
find it difficult to choose, for the very reason 
that we suspect the one to be more valuable 
than the other, but are ignorant to which the 
greatest value attaches. And if we should be 
informed that one contained jewels of great 
price and the other nothing but baubles, our 
hesitancy would be accompanied with solicitude. 
But when we are certain that the things pro- 



124 MORAL SCIENCE. 

posed to our choice are perfectly alike, in all 
respects, we experience no difficulty whatever. 
Suppose it to be first a single guinea which is 
offered to a needy beggar ; he is moved 
by his feeling of want to take it. If instead 
of one, two guineas are offered, he experiences 
no difficulty in choosing, knowing them to 
be alike. But this furnishes no example 
of an action produced without a motive. 
The question is, whether the man shall act 
or not; and the motive for action is strong, 
namely, the desire of relief. As he is at liberty 
to take but one, and there is no difference 
between them, he seizes that, which from one 
or more of a thousand slight reasons of nearness 
or convenience, it happens to him to choose, 
without any preference properly so called. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

SUMMARY VIEW OF LIBEETY. 

Max is conscious of liberty, and nothing can 
add to the certainty which he has that he is a 
free agent. Objections to self-evi- 

Man intuitively 

dent principles, however plausible, certain that he is 

free. 

should not be regarded; for. in 
the nature of things, no reasonings can over- 
throw plain intuitive truths, as no reasonings can 
be founded on principles more certain. Though 
we may not be able to understand or explain 
with precision wherein freedom consists, yet this 
ignorance of its nature should not disturb our 
minds. We experience the same difficulty in 
regard to other truths of this class without any 
diminution of our assurance. I am conscious 
that I have life — but what is life ? neither I nox 
any other human being can tell. But do we, 



126 MORAL SCIENCE. 

because of this ignorance, doubt whether indeed 
we live ? Not in the least. We know that we 
are free precisely in the same manner that we 
know that we are living beings, and no plausi 
ble reasonings should disturb us in the one case 
more than in the other. 

Again, if in attempting to explain what is 

essential to free agency, we should fall into any 

mistake, or conclude that some- 

This certainty un- 
disturbed by errors thing does not belong to it, which 

of reasoning. 

does, let it not be said that we 
deny the freedom of man ; for while we may err 
in regard to our conception of its nature, we 
know that we cannot err in regard to the actual 
existence of freedom. 

We are willing to attribute to man every 
kind and degree of liberty which can properly 

belong to a dependent creature 
^TLaX and a rational being; and if we 

deny what some think essential to 
free agency, it is because in our view it would 
be no real privilege to possess such a power, as 
not being compatible with the laws by which 
rational creatures are governed. 



J 



LIBERTY 127 

1 

It is admitted that man has power to govern 
his own volitions, and does govern 
them, according to his own desire. Postulates. 

He has the liberty, within the lim- 
its of his power, to act as he pleases ; and greater 
liberty, in our judgment, is inconceivable. 

To suppose, in addition to this, a power to 
act independently of all reasons and motives, 
would be to confer on him a power 
for the exercise of which he could Libert 7 J 8 » ot 

power to act inde- 

never be accountable. It would p»*«iflr <*»»«»■ 

sons. 

be a faculty which would com- 
pletely disqualify him from being the subject of 
moral government. In the nature of things, it 
would be impossible that a creature possessed of 
such a power could be so governed that his ac- 
tions could be directed to any end. 

One hypothesis makes man the master of 
his own actions, but a creature 
governed by understanding and First hypothesis, 
choice. He may be misled by 
false appearances, and influenced by wrong mo- 
tives, but is always governed by some reasons or 
motives. 



128 MORAL SCIENCE. 

On the other hypothesis a man may and does 
act without any inducement, and without being 
influenced by any reasons, to do 
Second hypothesis, what is contrary to all his inclina- 
tions and feeling. I cannot but 
think that, after all, the abettors of this scheme 
retain in their minds a certain obscure but lin- 
gering persuasion that the free agent feels some 
reason for acting as he does ; and if so, the dis- 
pute is at an end, for whatever may be the con- 
sideration which induces a man to act in oppo- 
sition to strong desires, it must be something 
which is felt by the mind to have force, and to 
be such a consideration as ought to influence a 
rational being. 

Let us for still further elucidation again sup- 
pose a case in which this self-determining power 
is exerted. 

A young man entrusted with the property 
of his employer, has by undue 

Case supposed in diligence in amusements, con- 
fer self-determining 

power. tracted debts which he is unable to 

pay. He sees a way by which 

he can appropriate to his own use some of the 



LIBERTY. 129 

money in his hands without the possibility of 
discovery. His wants are urgent, his reputation 
fa at stake, and he feels himself impelled, by a 
powerful motive to the deed ; and there are no 
motives to draw him in an opposite course but 
such as are derived from conscience and the fear 
of Go 1. At the moment when about to perpe- 
trate the felonious act, he pauses and resolves 
that he will not do it. The question is, has he 
not power to act thus ? Is he not the arbiter of 
his own acts of will ? Are we not all conscious 
that we possess such a power? There is no 
dispute about the power, if it only pleases the 
agent to exercise it. He is as free to abstain 
from gmbezzling what belongs to another, as to 
do it. The only question is, will he do it unless 
some reason, motive, or moral feeling influence 
him ? If so, then indeed it would be the exem- 
plification of the power in question. But when 
we examine the case carefully, we shall be satis- 
fied that where there is a powerful motive on 
one side, there must be a preponderating mo- 
tive on the other to prevent a volition in ac- 
cordance with the first. Suppose the young 



130 MORAL SCIENCE. 

man under the temptation mentioned to havs 
his mind free from all moral considerations, and 
to have no fear of injuring his reputation, what 
would restrain him ? Or, if without any moral 
influence, or any other consideration, he should 
abstain, would there be any virtue in the act ? 
To know whether an act is virtuous, we properly 
ask, why was it done ? what was the motive of 
the agent? But here there is none, and con- 
sequently the act can have no moral character. 
And if we suppose some faint remonstrance of 
conscience, and some slight fear of discovery, 
even these would not prevent the act where the 
contrary motives were urgent. 

But suppose, now, this young man to have 
had a religious education, and to have been 
brought up to regard his reputation, and when 
the temptation is most powerful and he is in 
danger of yielding, conscience should utter her 
voice with power, and dictate imperatively that 
this is a deed which should not be done ; and at 
the same time, a lively apprehension of disgrace 
should operate with a combined influence on 



« LIBERTY. 131 

his mind, would the operation of these mo- 
tives in preventing the crime be less rational 
or less virtuous than if he should act without a 
motive ? 



CHAPTER XIX. 

M 

THE KIND OF INDIFFEEENCE WHICH HAS BEEN CONSII> 

EEED ESSENTIAL TO FEEE AGENCY. 

In every act of choice or will, it is implied that 
the person willing might, if he pleased, act in a 

different way from what he does, 
aretea. ° f ^ for otherwise he would be under 

a necessity of acting in one way 
only, and there coiild be no freedom in such an 
action. There is no freedom in the pulsations of 
the heart, for they are not voluntary, but go on 
whether we will it or not. In all actions where 

the will is exercised there must be 
Liberty of con- a t least two things which may be 

traduction and of 

contrariety. done. This liberty was by the 

ancients distinguished into two 

kinds, the liberty of contradiction, and the liberty 

of contrariety. In the first we have the choice 



INDIFFERENCE, 133 

of doing or not doing some proposed act. In 
the second, we have the liberty to do one thing 
or another, or one thing or several others. In 
regard to such objects of choice, there was said to 
be indifference, by which it was not meant that 
the mind was indifferent at the moment of choice. 
This would be a contradiction, because indiffer- 
ence towards an object, and the choice of an ob- 
ject, are opposite and irreconcilable states of 
mind. But the meaning was, that, abstractly 
from the feelings of the agent, the contrary or. 
different actions were indifferent. It was in the 
power of the agent, if he were disposed, to do or 
not do, to do this or that ; but it was never un- 
derstood to imply, that with the inclination in one 
direction a choice might be made in the opposite 
direction. A man may do what he pleases, but 
it is absurd to suppose that he can will to do 
what it does not please him to do. 

The doctrine of a power of contrary choice, 
as the thing has been now ex- 
plained, is a reasonable doctrine, Power of c n * 

x 7 trary choice. 

and in accordance with all expe- 
rience, if with the volition you include the mo- 



134 MORAL SCIENCE. 

tive, if with the choice you take in the desire 

But to suppose a volition contrary 

Volition cannot to the prevailing inclination is in- 

contravene preva- 
lent inclination, consistent with all experience; 

and, as has been shown, such a 
iberty or power would disqualify a man for be- 
ing an accountable moral agent. 

In the last century an able metaphysical wri- 
ter, convinced that the common doctrine of the 
self-determining power of the will 
Theory of Abp: cq-q]^ no jj stand, invented a new 

King. J 

hypothesis. His leading idea is, 
that we do not choose an object because we de- 
sire it, but desire it because we choose it. Ac- 
cording to this view of Archbishop King, in his 
work on the " Origin of Evil," there must be a 
state of absolute indifference prior to an act of 
choice ; for all love or attachment to an object 
and all desire of possessing it, are produced by 
he act of the mind in choosing it. This is a 
complete inversion in the order of the exercise? 
of the mind. Though recommended by higi 
authority, and ingeniously defended by its au 
thor, it seems strange that it should have found 



INDIFFERENCE. 135 

any respectable abettors. But Dr. "Watts, in his 
Essay on the " Freedom of the 
will in God and the creatures," ^^ by 
adopts the outlines of the Arch- 
bishop's scheme, and defends its principles by 
many arguments. This led President Edwards, 
in his celebrated work on the 
Will, to take particular pains wa f d e f tedt>7Ed " 
to refute this false theory. The 
indifference of which he treats is that which 
appertains to this scheme. Many, however, 
have been led, from an acquaintance with the 
work of Edwards, to suppose that the doctrine 
of indifference, as refuted by this great man, is 
common to all who maintain the opinion of the 
self-determining power of the will ; which is far 
from being the case. 

It is deemed unnecessary to give a refutation 
of this theory in this place. Those who wish to 
see this effectually done may consult the several 
sections of the work of Edwards, to which re- 
ference has been made.* 

* Edwards's Works, ed. New- York, 1844. Vol. ii. pp. 17-« 
39. Part L, §§ 1-7. 



CHAPTER XX. 

WHETHER MEN AEE ACCOUNTABLE FOE THEIR MOTIVES; 
OB WHETHER DESIRES AND AFFECTIONS WHICH PRE. 
CEDE VOLITION, HAVE A MORAL CHARACTER. 

There are two maxims on this point, which we 
•, must endeavour to reconcile, as 

Maxims which 

•eem conflicting. there is an apparent repugnance 

between them. 

The first is, that every action takes its charac- 
ter from the motive from which it proceeds. 
The second is, that every moral act 

^h"^: ^ voluntary, and therefore, that 
i a s C ULtIry. aCt desires and feelings which pre- 
cede volition, cannot be of a moral 

nature. This difficulty seems to have perplexed 
the perspicacious mind of Dr. 

Chalmers. Chalmers ; for, pereiving that our 

desires and affections do possess a 

moral character, he labours, through a number 



MORALITY OF MOTIVES. 137 

of pages, to prove that, in as far as they are 
such, they are influenced by the will. The 
truth, however, is, that many of them are un- 
influenced by preceding volition, and the whole 
reasoning of the learned author is unsatisfactory. 
The true solution is to be found in the ambi- 
guity of language. When it is asserted that 
all moral actions are voluntary, the meaning 
is, either that by actions only external actions 
are meant, or that under the word ' voluntary, 
the affections of the mind which precede vo- 
lition are included. No act of the body 
can take place without an action of the will 
preceding it; so that the maxim is true, as 
it relates to external acts. But it is also true in 
relation to mental acts, if we give a certain 
degree of extension to the word "voluntary," 
that is, if we use it as synonymous with sponta- 
neous. Our desires are as free and spontaneous 
as our volitions, and when it is said that every 
moral act must be voluntary, the word is used 
in this comprehensive sense. There is no need, 
therefore, to prove that our affections must have 
received their complexion from a preceding vo- 



138 MORAL SCIENCE. 

lition. The judgment of the moral faculty in 
regard to the moral character of the desires and 
affections, is as clear and undoubted as of the 
volitions. Nay, the volitions receive their moral 
character from the quality of the motives which 
produce them ; so that the very same volition 
may be good or bad, according to the moral 
character of the motives by which it is produced. 
The volition requisite in order to pull a trig- 
ger and let off a gun, is the same, let the motive 
be what it may. It is a determination to per- 
form that specific act, and if it be performed by 
an insane person, there will be no morality in 
the volition. If the same volition be put forth 
by a person acting in his just defence, the vo- 
lition and ensuing act will be good ; but if the 
volition to shoot a man, arise from malice or 
avarice, the volition prompting the act will be 
wicked. 

We do not, therefore, trace actions to their 

true moral source when we ascer. 
We thTyItiof er tain ihe volition from which they 

proceed ; we must always go one 
step higher, and ascertain the motives. 



MORALITY. OF MOTIVES. 139 

When an investigation is made into the 
character of an act of which some one is accused, 
the main point, which by wit- 
nesses the court and jury wish to ^^^ must ba 
ascertain, is, from what motives 
the accused acted. Accordingly as this is deter- 
mined, so is he judged to be innocent or guilty. 
It hence appears, that the true and ultimate 
source of the morality of actions, is not found 
in the will, but in the desires and affections. 
The simple act of volition, namely, a determina- 
tion to do a certain act, is always the same, 
whatever be the motive. And to ascertain that 
an action proceeds from an act of will, only de- 
termines that it is the act of a particular agent, 
but gives us no knowledge respecting the true 
moral quality of the act. This will be found 
universally true. Two men are seen giving mo- 
ney to the poor ; the acts are the same, and the 
volitions preceding the acts and prompting them, 
are the same ; and as we cannot see the heart, we 
naturally judge that both acts are alike good. 
But if it should be revealed to us, that one of 
the persons was influenced entirely by a love for 



140 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

the praise of men, and the other, by a sinceie 
regard for the welfare of the poor, we should 
immediately make a wide difference between the 
acts, in our moral judgment. We should still 
be convinced, however, that the volitions lead- 
ing to the acts were the same, the only difference 
being in the motives. 

It is clear then that men are more account- 
able for their motives than for 
any thing else; and that, primarily, 
morality consists in the motives; that, is the 
affections. 



Man accountabte 
for his motives. 



CHAPTER XXL 

THE DIVISION OF MOTIYES, INTO EATIONAL AND ANIMAI* 

Dr. Thomas Eeid, in his work on the Active 

Powers, endeavours to maintain his doctrine 

that the will is not always gov- 

Eeid's distinction. 

erned by motives, by a reference 
to a certain distinction. Animal motives act by 
a blind impulse on the will, without regard to 
remote consequences. Eational motives operate 
by the force of reasonable considerations. Dr. 
Eeid asserts that these classes of motives are so 
widely different, that their influence can never 
be compared : that what may be the strongest of 
one class, may be the weakest of the other, 
and that the mind must determine between 
them. 

The distinction is no doubt just. There are 



142 MORAL SCIENCE. 

principles in tlie human constitution, which act 
on the will with great force, by a 
real™ 6 differeDCe blind impulse. Such are the ap- 
petites and passions, and the de- 
sire of happiness, and especially the desire to 
escape pungent pain, at present experienced. 

The appetite of hunger urges the subject of it to 
eat, whether it can be done lawfully and consist- 
Appetite, ently with health, or not. This in- 
fluence is sensibly present, and it 
requires some strength of purpose to resist it, when 
the agent is convinced that the act cannot be done 
with propriety. Here then is the simultaneous 
operation of an animal and a rational motive; 
and ifc is evident that they counteract each other, 
and that according to the strength of one or the 
other, the will is determined this 

^"p-I ™7 or that ™7- I* ^ not true, 
therefore, that these different kinds 
f motives cannot be compared as to their effect- 
ive force. The fact is, they are brought into 
comparison every day, and every day victories 
are obtained by one over the other, accord- 
ing to the strength or influence which they re- 



MOTIVES TWOFOLD. 143 

spectively possess, at the moment. Hunger im- 
pels a man to eat ; reason tells him that it will 
be injurious to health. Here is a fair trial of 
trength between the force of blind appetite, and 
rational regard for health. If the appetite be 
very strong, it will require a strong resolution to 
oppose it. In such cases, however, appetite 
commonly prevails; but not without resistance. 
In every case of the kind, there is a trial of 
strength between these different motives. Sup- 
pose food to be placed before a 

t >n ,1 i Case of hunger and 

hungry man ; if there be no con- 5e if-prese£ration. 
siderations of duty or utility to 
prevent, he will of course indulge his appetite. 
But if he should be informed that the food is 
poisoned, although he be still impelled by his 
appetite to eat, yet the love of life or fear of 
death, will be sufficient to induce him to refrain. 
Suppose, again, that the food is the property 
of another, whose consent to use it cannot be 
obtained. Here the moral feel- 
ings stand in the way of indul- and c d a u s t e 7 of hnDgfcr 
gence ; and upon the comparative 
strength of his appetite and of the vigour of his 



144 MORAL SCIENCE. 

conscience, will depend his determination. So 
far is it from being true, then, that animal and 
rational motives cannot be compared, in regard 
to their influence on the will, that there is no- 
thing in human life more common than the ex- 
perience of the struggle for mastery between the 
higher and lower principles of our nature. 

When it is said that the mind determines be- 
tween these contending motives, it is true, but 
not in the sense intended. It is 

The determina- 
tion accords with true that the mind determines, and 

prevalent desires. 

of course the volition is on one side 
or the other ; but this determination is not indepen- 
dent of the strength of the contending motives, 
being always in accordance with the strongest 
existing desires. 

There is this important difference between 
animal and rational motives, that a sensible im- 
pulse of the former as merely felt, 
the T ^ GTenCQ0t is not of a moral nature. The 
hunger of a man is no more 
moral than the hunger of a beast. These animal 
feelings are unavoidable and constitutional. The 
point at which such feelings begin to partake of 



MOTIVES TWOFOLD. 145 

a moral quality, is when they require to be 
governed and directed. It was not wrong for 
the hungry man when he saw bread before him 
to desire it. But when he knew it to be the 
property of another, it would have been wrong 
to take it ; and when he knew that the food 
would injure him, it became his duty to for- 
bear. 

We cannot extinguish the animal feelings by 
an act of the will ; they arise involuntarily, and 
therefore cannot be in themselves of a moral 
nature. Yet as man has other principles and 
powers by which he should be governed, he be- 
comes faulty when he neglects to govern these 
lower propensities in accordance with the dic- 
tates of reason and conscience. But in regard to 
other desires and affections, they are good or bad 
in every degree in which they exist. For ex- 
ample, not only are malice and envy sinful 
^hen ripened into act, but the smallest conceiv- 
able exercise of such feelings is evil; and as 
they increase in strength, their moral evil in 
creases. It does not require an act of volition, 
consenting to these feelings, to render them evil; 



146 MORAL SCIENCE. 

their very essence is evil, and is condemned by 
the moral sense of mankind. 

A clear understanding of this distinction 
might have prevented or reconciled an old dis- 
pute, viz. whether concupiscence* 

Concupiscence. 

was of the nature of sin, in the 
first rising of desire, prior to any act of the 
will. 

* It may remove ambiguity to say that the word concupis- 
cence is here used not in its popular and modern, but its theo- 
logical acceptation. The controversy to which allusion is 
made began early in the schools, and was actively waged at 
the time of the Reformation. The following references will 
enable the reader to inquire further : Augustini, Opp. x., ed. 
Benedict, pp. 387, 1029, 1828, 1881, 1955.— Catechismus Gone, 
Trident, ed. Lips. 1851, pp. 385, 386. — Chemnitii Examen. ed. 
Genev., 1641, pp. 88, 89, 90, 94, 95.—Turretlini Instt. P. ii 
Qu. 21. — Bretschneider, Syst. Entwickelung ; 4 ed. 1841, pp. 
540, 541. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

WHETHER MORALITY BELONGS TO PRINCIPLES AS WELL 
AS ACTS, OR IS CONFINED TO ACTS ALONE. 

It seems to be generally agreed, that in the hu- 
man soul there exist certain principles from 
which actions proceed, as streams 
from a fountain ; and that the cha- pri "S pleS 
racter of the actions corresponds 
with that of the principle. Those, however, who 
maintain that the will possesses a ^elf-determining 
power, independent of motives, deny the exist- 
ence of any such principles lying back of the 
acts of the mind, especially in moral exercises. 
They hold that the evil of an act arises entirely 
from the exercise of free will, and that there is 
no propriety in referring it to any thing previous- 
ly existing in the mind. They allege that nothing 
can be of a moral nature but that which is volun- 



148 MORAL SCIENCE. 

tary, and therefore that virtue or vice can be predi- 
cated of nothing but actions. They argue, how- 
ever, that to make virtue and vice consist in the 
occult qualities of the soul, is to conceive of the 
essence of the soul as corrupt; and that this 
would be to make sin a physical quality, exist 
ing without any relation to the will. It would 
be entirely out of place, here, to consider the 
bearing of this controversy on certain theological 
points, concerning which polemics have waged 
an interminable war. We have, at present, no- 
thing to do with any principles or questions but 
such as may be learned from reason and expe- 
rience. 

In the first place, let it be observed, that we 
know nothing of the soul but by its acts. We 

have no consciousness of any 
t^T^ tMng but acts of different kinds; 

yet we know as certainly that we 
have a soul, as that we think and feel. So, 
also, we are not conscious of the existence of 
what is called disposition, temper, principle ; 
but we as intuitively believe in the existence 01 
these, as in the existence of the soul itself. If 



MORAL PRINCIPLES. 149 

we see one man doing evil whenever he has the 
temptation, and another as habitually doing good, 
we cannot help considering that the one is actuated 
by an evil disposition which dwells in him, and 
that the other is influenced by a good disposition. 
Whether moral good and evil may with pro- 
priety be predicated of these hidden tempers of 
the mind, must be determined by 
an appeal to the common judg- J^K?* 
ment of mankind ; and this, I 
think, is manifestly in favour of the affirmative. 
When a man is observed to manifest wicked, 
malignant passions as often as occasion serves to 
elicit them, all men agree that he possesses a ma- 
lignant temper. The soul of such a man, when 
his acts of iniquity are finished, cannot be free 
from every taint, until he again put forth a volun- 
tary act. The doctrine of a uniform series oi 
evil acts, is irreconcilable with the doctrine that 
all evil consists in self-determined acts, unless the 
will itself be corrupt , for why should all acts be 
of one kind, when no cause exists why they 
should be one thing rather than another ? We 
might suppose such a power would act as fre- 



150 MORAL SCIENCE. 

quently one way as another. But if there be 
any causes without the will, which give a uni- 
form character to its acts, then the will cannot 
be free. It is determined by something without 
itself, which is incompatible with the hypothesis. 
Again: the fountain must partake of the 
quality of the streams. If these are uniformly 

evil, it is fair to conclude that the 
JSSff f°™tam i s polluted. Voluntary 

wickedness is nothing else but 
bringing into act what before existed in 
principle in the soul. If malice in act is sinful, 
surely malice in principle must be evil. 

No man can bring himself to believe that the 

wretch who has perpetrated thou- 

Crime infers a gandg of bage cr i meg an ^ gtail( J s 
bad principle. > 

ready to commit others of the same 
kind, has no evil inherent in his soul, by which 
he is distinguised from the most innocent person. 
Another evidence that men do judge some- 
thing to be sinful besides sinful acts, is that men 
who palpably omit important duty, are consi- 
dered equally guilty with those who offend by 
positive act. That man who neglects to rescue 



MORAL PRINCIPLES. 151 

" from death a human being, when it is easily in 
his power to do so, is by all men 

i i 'i> n j. Proof from omi3 

reckoned guilty of a great crime, Bion ofduty. 
though he performs no act of any 
kind. Suppose a helpless woman or infant to 
fall overboard from a boat, in which there is a 
strong man who might afford relief, but makes 
no attempt to do so. Is there a person in the 
world who would not view such a neglect as a 
great sin ? Now, on what principle do we cen- 
sure the person who has committed no act oi 
transgression? Evidently on the ground thaf 
he ought to have felt a regard for the life of a 
fellow-creature. "We blame his indifference to 
the welfare of his neighbour. 

As to the maxim, that nothing is sinful 
which is not voluntary, it relates to positive 
acts, not to dispositions of the 

Disposition, in 

mind. But as was explained be- what sense voiun 

tary. 

before in regard to desires and 
affections, so in regard to dispositions, - we say 
they are in a sense voluntary. They properly 
belong to the will, taking the word in a large 
sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary 



152 MORAL SCIENCE. 

acts, the principle from which they proceed is 
always included in our view, and comes in for 
its full share of the blame. Thus Bishop Butler, 
in his excellent essay on the u Nature of Vir- 
tue," says, in speaking of the moral faculty, " It 
ought to be observed that the object of this 
faculty is actions, comprehending under that 
name active or practical principles." This saga- 
cious man saw that it would not do to confine 
virtue to positive acts, but that principles must 
come in for their full share of approbation or dis- 
approbation. 

The character which a man acquires by a 

series of acts, is not merely the estimation of a 

person who has performed such 

racter^ fr ° m ^^ aC ^ S > ^Ut ^ * S °^ a P erson possess- 
ing dispositions or principles which 
gave rise to such acts. Our notion of a bad man 
is of one who not only has perpetrated wicked 
acts, but is still disposed to do the same ; and 
we disapprove the principle as much as the 
acts. The notion that corrupt principles must 
vitiate the essence of the soul, is without founda- 
tion. The soul is the subject of many affections 



MORAL PRINCIPLES. 153 

which are not essential to it. Natural affections 
may be extirpated, and yet the soul remain un- 
changed. Moral qualities may be entirely chang- 
ed, without any change in the essence of the 
soul. The faculties remain, while the moral 
principles which govern them may be changed 
from good to bad, or from bad to good. The 
same faculties which are employed in the per- 
formance of virtuous actions, may be occupied as 
instruments of wickedness. That inherent moral 
qualities may exist in the soul, has been the be- 
lief of all nations, and is the sentiment of every 
common man whose judgment has not been 
warped by false philosophy. 

Who can believe that the soul of a cruel 
murderer, whose heart cherishes habitual hatred 
and revenge towards his fellow- 
mertT^lJ^t creatures, is, when asleep, or occu- 
pied with indifferent matters, in 
the same state of purity or exemption from evil, 
as the soul of the most virtuous man in the 
world ? It cannot be believed. We cannot help 
thinking, when we see a uniform course of action 
whether it be good or bad, that there must be 



154 MORAL SCIENCE. 

corresponding dispositions which lead to such 
actions. Every effect must have an adequate 
cause. Let it be granted, for the sake of argu- 
ment, that the self-determining power is an ade- 
quate cause for any single act of any kind ; yet 
it can be no sufficient cause for a series of acts 
of the same kind. This, however, must be left 
to the intuitive belief of every man. It is a sub- 
ject for the judgment of common sense, rather 
than reason. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

MOEAL HABITS 

Habits differ from principles, or constitutional 
desires, in that they are adventitious. Every 
habit is acquired by repeated acts. 
The human constitution possesses Habits. 

a wonderful susceptibility of form- 
ing habits of every kind. Indeed, we can- 
not prevent the formation of habits of some 
kind or other. Still, a man has much in his 
power as it regards the kind of habits which he 
forms, and is highly accountable for the exercise 
of this power. A man's happiness and useful- 
ness depend very much on the character of his 
habits. Yea, a man's moral character derives 
its complexion, in a great degree, from his 
habits. In this place, it is not necessary to go 
into the philosophy of the formation of habits. 



156 MORAL SCIENCE. 

Our object is to consider habits and habitual 
actions as they partake of a moral character, or 
as they are the object of moral approbation, or 
disapprobation. If we should remove from the 
list of moral actions all those which are prompted 
by habit, we should cut off the larger number of 
those which men have agreed in judging to be 
of a moral nature. 

That there are virtuous habits and vicious 
habits, will scarcely be denied by any conside- 
rate person. A habit of lying, of 
for h^tT ntablht7 swearing, of slandering, of cheat- 
ing, of irreverence, of indolence, 
of vainglory, with many others, are, alas, too 
common. There are also virtuous habits, such 
as of industry, temperance, kindness, veracity, 
diligence, honesty, &c. To be sure, these vir- 
tues commonly flow from principle, but the 
practice of them is greatly facilitated by correct 
habits. Two considerations will show that men 
are properly accountable for those actions which 
proceed from habit. The first is, that in the 
formation of his habits, man is voluntary. The 
acts by which they are formed are free acts, and 



MORAL HABITS. 157 

the agent is responsible for all their conse- 
quences. The other consideration is, that habits 
may be counteracted and even changed by the 
force of virtuous resolutions and perseverance. 
Where habit has become inveterate, it may be 
difficult to oppose or eradicate it; but the 
strength of moral principle has often been found 
sufficient to counteract the most confirmed hab- 
its. When it is asserted that men long enslaved 
by evil habits cannot make a change, it is on 
the ground, that no principle of sufficient power 
exists in the mind of the agent; but for that 
deficiency, the man is responsible. Yet a power 
from without may introduce a new principle po- 
tent enough, to overcome evil habits. The 
importance of possessing good habits, is admit- 
ted by all moralists. Aristotle makes the es- 
sence of virtue to consist in " practical habits, 
voluntary in their origin," and agreeable to right 
reason. Dr. Thomas Eeid, in his " Essay on the 
Active Powers," defines virtue to be " the fixed 
purpose to act according to a sense of duty," 
which definition Dugald Stewart modifies, by 
observing, "It is the fixed purpose to do what 



158 MORAL SCIENCE. 

is right, which evidently constitutes what we 
call a virtuous disposition. But it appears to me 
that virtue, considered as an attribute of char- 
acter, is more properly defined by the habit 
which the fixed purpose gradually forms than 
by the fixed purpose itself." Dr. Paley lays it 
down as an aphorism, that " mankind act more 
from habit than reflection." " We are," says he, 
"for the most part, determined at once, and by 
an impulse which has the effect and energy 
of a pre-established habit." To the objection, 
"If we are in so great a degree passive under 
our habits, where is the exercise of virtue, or 
the guilt of vice?" he answers, "in the form- 
ing and contracting of these habits." "And 
hence," says he, " results a rule of considerable 
importance, viz, that many things are to be done 
and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit." 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

THE NATUEE OF YIKTUE, 

The theories on this subject have been numer* 
ous, and contrary to one another. It is now 
proposed to mention some of the 

principal of them. We shall first Various theories. 

mention the theory of Mr. Hobbes 
and his followers, who deny that there is any 
natural distinction between virtue 
and vice, and maintain that by na- Hobbea. 

ture all actions are indifferent, 
and that our ideas and feelings on the subject of 
morality are altogether the effect of education 
and association. Mr. Hobbes did indeed main- 
tain that men are bound to obey the civil gov- 
ernment under which they may happen to live, 
and to conform to the religion established by 



160 MORAL SCIENCE. 

law, however contrary to their own private 
judgment. All moral duty, according to this 
theory, was resolved into the au- 
Law of the land. thority of the law of the land. As 
no natural moral rule existed, it 
was held that, except so far as a man was re- 
strained by civil authority, he had a right to do 
what he pleased ; and while he confined himself 
within these bounds, he need feel no concern 
about the consequences of his conduct. 

Perhaps the most extraordinary system of 
virtue ever promulgated was that of Mandeville, 
who maintained that all preten- 
MandeYiUe. sions to virtue were mere hypo- 

crisy, which men assumed from 
the love of praise. This writer forgot that hy- 
pocrisy assumes it as true that that 
The defect of the which is counterfeited is an obi ect 

hypothesis. ° 

of esteem and approbation among 
men. That virtue consists in the mere pursuit 

of pleasure, or of our own inter- 
Epicurus, est, is a system as old as Epicurus, 

and has had many abettors up to 
this time. The arguments in favour of this the- 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 161 

ory are exhibited in their most plausible dress 
by Nettleton in his " Treatise on Virtue." 

But the whole plausibility of the arguments 
depends on the pre-established connexion be- 
tween happiness and a virtuous 
course of life. That true happiness The Happinew 

■*■ x theory considered. 

is the natural effect of virtue, falls 
entirely short of proof that the essence of virtue 
consists in the tendency of certain actions to the 
person's true interest; whereas, when we per- 
ceive an action to be virtuous, we are conscious 
that it is not from any view of the connexion of 
the action with our own happiness that we 
approve it; but our judgment is immediate, 
founded on a moral character perceived in the 
act itself. And in many cases virtue requires us 
to deny ourselves personal gratification for the 
sake of others. A man supremely governed by 
a regard to his own interest, is never esteemed a 
virtuous man by the impartial judgment of man- 
kind. According to this theory, the only thing 
censurable in the greatest crimes is, that the 
guilty person has mistaken the best method of 
promoting his own happiness. Upon this prin- 



162 MORAL SCIENCE. 

ciple a man is at liberty to pursue his own inter- 
est at the expense of the happiness of thou- 
sands, and if he is persuaded that any action 
will tend to his own interest, he is at liberty 
to do it, whatever may be the consequences to 
others. 

Dr. Paley adopts the principle that all virtue 
consists in a regard to our own happiness, tak- 
ing into View the whole Of OUr ex- 
Archdeacon Paley. ... 

istence. His definition is, how- 
ever, a very complicated one, and deserves to be 
analyzed. 

" Virtue," says he, "is the doing good to 

mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for 

the sake of everlasting happiness," 

Paiey's definition accor ai n g to which definition the 

of virtue. ° 

good of mankind is the object, 
the will of (rod the rule, and everlasting hap- 
piness the motive of human virtue. If the 
question be asked, why we should seek the good 
of mankind, the answer is, from a regard to our 
everlasting happiness ; and if the question be, 
why we should make the will of God the rule 
of our conduct, the answer must be the same ; 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 163 

so that really all virtue is resolved into a regard 
to our own happiness. 

Now every man desires to promote his own 
happiness, and according to Dr. 
Paley's theory, the only difference Consequent dif- 

J j *j ference between a 

between an eminently good man good and a bad man. 

and one of the opposite character 

is, that the one pursues a wiser course than the 

other ; but they are both actuated by the same 

motives. 

This theory loses sight of all intrinsic differ- 
ence between moral good and evil, 
and admits the principle that hap- Neglects intrfn. 

sic moral differ- 

piness is the only conceivable ences. 
good, and that any thing is virtu- 
ous the tendency of which is to promote our 
greatest happiness. 

A theory the opposite of that which makes 
a regard to private interest the ground of virtue, 
is the one which makes all virtue 
to consist in a regard to the public Cumberland, 

good. This is the theory of Bishop 
Cumberland in his work, De Legibus, and is not 
essentially different from the scheme of those 



164 MORAL SCIENCE. 

who make all virtue to consist in disinterested 

benevolence. No doubt, much that deserves the 

name of virtue consists in good 

Disinterested be- w {\\ to others, and in contribu- 

nevolence. 7 

ting to their welfare ; but it is not 
correct to confine all virtuous actions to the ex- 
ercise of benevolence. We can conceive of be- 
nevolence in a being who has no moral constitu- 
tion. Something of this kind is observable in 
brute animals, and atheists may exercise benev- 
olence to their friends. The indiscriminate ex- 
ercise of benevolence to creatures, without any 
respect to their moral character, might appear to 
be an amiable attribute, but it could not pro- 
perly be called a moral attribute. 
Eegardfor one's j± p ru dent regard to our own wel- 

own welfare. x ° 

fare and happiness is undoubtedly 
a virtue. It has been considered so by the wis- 
est of men, and we know that prudence was one 
of the four cardinal virtues of the heathen. As 
the whole is made up of parts, it is evident that 
if it is a virtue to promote the well-being of the 
whole, it must be so of each of the parts. The 
pursuit of our own happiness where it does not 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 165 

infringe on the rights of others, has nothing evil 
in it, but is approved by every impartial mind. 
Some who maintain that all virtue consists in 
benevolence, admit that we may seek our own 
happiness just as we seek that of our neighbour ; 
but the human constitution is not 

p -, . . .-, . , . Abstract impar- 

tormed to exercise that abstract tiaiity not to be ex- 
impartiality. While we are bound pec 
to promote the welfare of our neighbour and of 
strangers, our obligation is still stronger to en- 
deavour to secure our own happiness ; and if a 
friend and a stranger stand in equal need of a 
benefit which we have it in our power to bestow, 
it is evidently our duty to consult first the wel- 
fare of our friend, other things being equal. 

What Bishop Butler has said on this subject 
in his short treatise on " Virtue," is worthy of 
consideration : "It deserves to be 

Butler's remarks 

considered whether men are more on the disinterested 

scheme. 

at liberty, in point of morals, to 
make themselves miserable without reason, than 
to make others so ; or dissolutely to neglect their 
own greater good for the sake of a present lesser 
gratification, than they are to neglect the good 



166 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

of others whom nature has committed to thei* 
care. It should seem that a due concern about 
our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable 
endeavour to secure and promote it, is, I think, 
very much the meaning of the word prudence in 
our language — it should seem that this is virtue, 
and the contrary behaviour faulty and blama- 
ble ; since in the calmest way of reflection, we 
approve of the first and condemn the other con- 
duct, both in ourselves and others. This appro- 
bation and disapprobation are altogether differ- 
ent from mere desires of our own and their hap- 
piness, and from sorrow in missing it." 

Again, " "Without inquiring how far and in 

what sense virtue is resolvable into benevolence, 

and vice into the want of it, it 

*XT£l ma 7 be FK*« to ob9erve that 
benevolence and the want of it, 

singly considered, are in no sort the whole of 
virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in 
the review of one's own character, or that of 
others, our moral understanding and moral sense 
would be indifferent to every thing but the de- 
grees in which benevolence prevailed, and the 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 167 

degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we 
should neither approve of benevolence to some 
persons rather than others, nor disapprove injus- 
ice and falsehood, upon any other account, than 
merely as an overbalance of happiness was fore- 
seen likely to be produced by the first, and 
misery by the second. But now, on the con- 
trary, suppose two men competitors for any 
thing whatever, which would be of equal advan- 
tage to each of them, though nothing indeed 
would be more impertinent than for a stranger 
to busy himself to get one of them preferred to 
the other, yet such endeavour would be virtue, 
in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted 
from all consideration of distant consequences ; 
as that examples of gratitude and friendship, 
would be of general good to the world. Again, 
suppose one man should by fraud or violence 
take from another the fruit of his labour, with 
intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, 
would have as much pleasure from it as would 
balance the pleasure which the first possessor 
would have had in the enjoyment and his vexa- 
tion in the loss; suppose that no bad conse- 



168 MORAL SCIENCE. 

quenees would follow, yet such an action would 
surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, 
violence and injustice, no otherwise vicious than 
as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of 
misery to society, then, if in any case, a man 
could procure to himself as great advantage by 
an act of injustice as the whole foreseen incon- 
venience likely to be brought upon others by it 
would amount to, such a piece of injustice would 
not be faulty or vicious at all." " The fact then 
appears to be, that we are constituted so as to 
condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, and 
injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some 
rather than others, abstracted froiii all considera- 
tion of which conduct is likely to produce an 
overbalance of happiness or misery." 

The danger of this theory is not by any 
means so great as that of the selfish scheme, be- 
cause it comprehends a large part 

Defective defini- # # 

tions of virtue are of actions which are truly virtuous. 

dangerous. 

But all definitions of virtue which 
are not so comprehensive as to embrace the 
whole of moral excellence, are injurious; not 
only by leaving out of the catalogue of virtues 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 169 

such actions as properly belong to it, but by 
leaving men to form wrong conceptions of what 
is right and wrong, by applying a general rule, 
which, is not correct, to practical cases. Whei 
jt is received as a maxim that all virtue consists 
in seeking the happiness of the whole, and when 
a particular act seems to have that tendency, 
men are in danger of overlooking those moral 
distinctions by which our duty should be regu- 
lated. This effect has been observed in persons 
much given to theorize upon the general good 
as the end to be aimed at in all actions. 

President Edwards has a treatise on Virtue, 
in which he enters very deeply into speculation 
on the principles of moral con- 
duct. His definition of virtue has Edwards on Virtue. 

surprised all his admirers: it is, 

"the love of being as such." When, however, 

this strange definition comes to be explained, 

by himself and his followers, it amounts to the 

same as that which we have been considering, 

which makes all virtue to consist in disinterested 

benevolence. 

Dr. Samuel Hopkins, who was his pupil, and 



170 MORAL SCIENCE. 

well understood his principles, gives this as his de- 
finition of virtue, and has it as a radical principle 
of his whole system. It will not 

Hopkins. 

therefore be necessary to make 
any distinct remarks on President Edwards's 
theory, 



CHAPTER XXV. 

*HE NATURE OF VIETUE, CONTINUED. DIFFEEENT H*¥ 

POTHESE3. 

Aristotle's idea of the nature of virtue was 
that it was a mean between two extremes. Vir- 
tue, according to him, consisted in 
the moderate and just exercise of 
all the affections and passions ; and vice, in de- 
fect or excess. It would be easy to show that 
this definition or description is not complete. It 
is not sufficiently comprehensive, and includes 
many things not of a moral nature. But it is 
unnecessary to dwell on the subject, as the defi- 
nition is no longer used. 

Dr. Samuel Clarke, who has a long estab- 
lished character as a profound 

Clarke. . n , 

thinker, attempted to give a the- 
ory of virtue, which should be free from ex« 



172 MORAL SCIENCE. 

ception. He makes virtue to consist in acting ac- 
cording to the fitness of things. Whatever is fit 
and suitable to be done, taking in all circum- 
stances, is right. But really, this gives us nc 
conception of that peculiarity which renders an 
action virtuous. It is true, all virtuous actions 
are fit to be done, and are actions suitable -to the 
circumstances of the agent. But every fit action 
is not a virtuous action, and the fitness of many 
actions depends on their moral character. Their 
fitness, therefore, does not render them vir- 
tuous, but their being virtuous is the very thing 
which renders them fit. 

Wollaston, in his " Eeligion of Nature Deli- 
neated," refines upon this system, and makes all 
virtue to consist in a conformity 

Wollaston. . 

to truth. A virtuous action is one 
in accordance with the truth of things ; which 
when it comes to be explained, amounts to much 
the same as Dr. Clarke's " fitness of things." 
Both of them include, no doubt, all virtuous ac- 
tions, as they are all fit, and all in accordance 
with truth ; but these definitions do not lead us 
to a conception of that quality in actions which 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 173 

is moral. Certainly all virtuous actions must be 
in accordance with truth and reason, but this is 
no definition of the nature of virtue ; it is only a 
circuitous method of saying that some actions 
are virtuous because they have a fitness to pro* 
duce a good end. This theory supposes the 
idea of virtue already to exist ; for if the end be 
not good, mere fitness cannot be of the nature of 
virtue. There are other things which have a 
fitness to produce certain ends, as well as virtue. 
It is not mere fitness which renders an action 
virtuous, but adaptedness to a good end. And 
unless by truth we understand the same as vir- 
tue, it does not appear that a mere conformity 
to truth gives any conception of a moral qua- 
lity, and there is as much reality in a vicious 
action as in one that is virtuous. On this sub- 
ject Dr. Thomas Brown well observes, " Reason, 
then, as distinguishing the conformity or uncon- 
formity of actions with the fitness of things, or 
the moral truth or falsehood of actions, is not the 
principle from which we derive our moral senti- 
ments. These very sentiments, on the contrary, 
are necessary, before we can feel that moral fit- 



174 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

ness or moral truth, according to which we are 
said to estimate actions as right or wrong. 
All actions, virtuous and vicious, have a tendency 
or fitness of one sort or other ; and every action 
which the benevolent or malevolent perform, 
with a view to a certain end, may alike have a 
fitness for producing that end. There is not an 
action, then, which may not be in conformity 
with the fitness of things ; and if the feelings of 
exclusive approbation and disapprobation, that 
constitute our moral emotions, be not presup- 
posed, in spite of the thousand fitnesses which 
reason may have shown us, all actions must be 
morally indifferent. They are not thus indiffer- 
ent because the ends to which reason shows cer- 
tain actions to be suitable, are ends which we 
have previously felt to be worthy of our moral 
choice ; and we are virtuous in conforming our 
actions to these ends, not because our actions 
have a physical relation to the end, as the wheels 
and pulleys of a machine have to the motion 
which is to result from them ; but because the 
desire of producing this very end, has a relation, 
which has been previously felt, to our mora] 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 175 

emotion. The moral truth, in like manner, 
i/hich reason is said to show us, consists in the 
agreement of our actions with a certain frame of 
mind which nature has previously distinguished 
to us as virtuous, without which previous dis- 
tinction, the actions of the most ferocious tyrant, 
and of the most generous and intrepid patriot, 
would be equally true, as alike indicative of the 
•real nature of the oppressor of a nation, and of 
the assertor and guardian of its rights." The 
fitness and the truth, then, in every case, pre- 
suppose virtue as an object of moral sentiment. 
The system of Dr. Adam Smith, 

Adam Smith. 

contained in his " Theory of Moral 
Sentiments," is very plausible, as stated by its 
ingenious author, and has captivated many 
minds, by leading them to believe that the origin 
of our moral feelings is to be found in the prin- 
ciple of sympathy. According to this able 
writer, we do not feel the approbation or disap- 
probation, immediately on the contemplation of 
virtuous or vicious actions. It is necessary first 
to go through another process, by which we 
enter into the feelings of the agent, and of those 



176 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

to whom the actions are related, in their conse- 
quences, beneficial or injurious. If, on consi- 
dering all the circumstances in which the agent 
was placed, we feel a complete sympathy with 
the feelings by which he was actuated, and with 
the gratitude or resentment of him who was the 
object of the action, we approve of the action as 
right ; or disapprove it as wrong, if our sympa- 
thies are of the opposite kind. Our sense of the 
propriety of the action depends on our sympathy 
with the agent, and our sense of the merit of the 
agent, on our sympathy with the object of the 
action. In sympathizing with the gratitude of 
others, we regard the agent as worthy of reward ; 
in sympathizing with the resentment of others, 
we regard him as worthy of punishment. When 
we judge of our own conduct, the foregoing 
process is in some measure reversed ; or rather, 
by a process still more refined, we imagine 
others sympathizing with us, and sympathize 
with their sympathy. We consider how our 
conduct would appear to an impartial spectator ; 
we approve of it if we feel that he would ap- 
prove; we disapprove it if we think that he 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 177 

would disapprove. According to Dr. Smith, we 
are able to form a judgment as to our own con- 
duct, because we have previously judged of the 
moral conduct of others ; that is, have sympa- 
thized with the feelings of others. And but for 
the supposed presence of some impartial specta- 
tor, as a mirror to represent us to ourselves, we 
should as little have known the beauty or de- 
formity of our own moral character, as we 
should have known the beauty or ugliness of 
our own features without some mirror to reflect 
them to our eye. 

That a principle so irregular and capricious 
as that of sympathy should be made the origin 
of all our moral distinctions and 
feelings, is indeed wonderful. One The h n>othesia 

° ' fanciful. 

might be tempted to suspect that 
the gifted author intended to select a subject 
merely for the display of his ingenuity in fram- 
ing and defending a plausible hypothesis, and 
playing on the credulity of his readers, 

The great error of this hypothesis is one which 
is common to most others on this subject: it 
takes for granted the existence of those moral 



178 MORAL SCIENCE. 

feelings which are supposed to flow from sym- 
pathy — yea, their existence pre- 
Untenabi©, vious to that very sympathy in 

which they are said to originate. 
When we suppose this previous moral feeling, it 
is easy to understand how we are led to approve 
of actions when we feel sympathy with the agent ; 
but the most complete sympathy of feeling is not 
sufficient to account for the existence of moral 
approbation or disapprobation. When there is 
nothing more than a sympathy of feelings, with- 
out the previous moral sentiment, no such ex- 
ercise as that which Dr. Smith supposes could 
ever arise; so that the process which he de- 
scribes as originating'our moral sentiments, never 
could take place, unless there existed previously 
a moral feeling in the mind. In contemplating 
the beauties of nature or art, we may have a 
complete feeling of sympathy with 
Assumes what another person, our feelings may 

Is sought to be ex- 
plained, be in the most exact accordance, 

and yet no moral approbation of 

his sentiment of the beautiful be experienced. 

But if mere agreement in our emotions would 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 179 

give rise to moral feeling, it ought to arise viv- 
idly in this case, where the emotions may be 
strong and in perfect accordance. " Why is it," 
says Dr. Brown, " that we regard emotions which 
do not harmonize with our own, not merely as 
unlike to ours, but as morally improper? It 
must surely be because we regard our emotions 
which differ from them as proper. And if we 
regard our own emotions as proper before we can 
judge the emotions which do not harmonize with 
them to be improper on that account, what in- 
fluence can the supposed sympathy and compar- 
ison have had in giving birth to that moral sen- 
timent which preceded the comparison? The 
sympathy, therefore, on which the feeling of 
propriety is said to depend, assumes the previous 
belief of that very propriety. Or, if there be no 
previous belief of the moral suitableness of our 
own emotions, there can be no reason from the 
mere dissonance of other emotions with ours to 
regard these dissonant emotions as morally un- 
suitable in the circumstances in which they have 
arisen." 

The theory of Dr. Smith not only includes? 



180 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

the sympathy which we feel with the agent of 
an action, but also with the feel- 
defe°tiye. aUate and i n S s 0; f gratitude or resentment in 
the object of the action, as it may 
affect others with benefit or injury. If we feel 
that in similar circumstances our emotions would 
p sympathize with theirs, we regard the agent in 
the same light in which they regard him as wor- 
thy of regard in one case, and of punishment in 
the other ; that is, as having moral merit or de- 
merit. It is evident that this is an inadequate 
and defective account of merit and demerit; for 
it confines these qualities to actions which relate 
to the welfare of others ; but all impartial men 
judge that actions of a different kind may have 
merit or demerit. If a man, from a sincere de- 
sire of improvement in virtue, is led to deny 
himself habitually such gratification of his senses 
and appetites as would interfere with his pro- 
gress, and to submit to a course of discipline to 
overcome evil habits, which is both difficult and 
painful, and yet perseveres in the midst of nu- 
merous temptations to relax, until he has ob* 
tained a complete victory over himself; whc 



MATURE OF VIRTUE. 181 

would say that there is nothing in all this to 
call forth moral approbation ? But the actions 
have no respect to the happiness of others; 
there is no gratitude or resentment with which 
the observer can sympathize. 

That theory which considers conformity to 
the will of God to be virtue, is undoubtedly cor- 
rect ; for that faculty in us which 

approves Of virtUOUS actions WaS Theory of con- 
formity to the will 

implanted by Him, and is an in- of God. 
duction of his will. As soon as 
we get the idea of a God we cannot but feel that 
it is the duty of all creatures to be conformed to 
his will. But if the question be whether, in 
judging an action to be virtuous, it 'is neces- 
sary to consider distinctly of its conformity to 
the will of God, we are of opinion that this con- 
ception is not necessary to enable us to perceive 
that certain actions are morally good and others 
morally evil. In order to this judgment nothing 
is required but a knowledge of the circumstances 
and motives of the action. Even the atheist 
cannot avoid the conviction that particular ac- 
tions are praiseworthy, and others deserving 



182 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

blame. But though belief in the existence of 
God is not necessary to the exercise of the moral 
faculty, yet this belief adds great- 
Dictates of con- force to the dictates of conscience, 

science strengthen- 
ed by Theism. an d enables us to account for the 

existence of a faculty by which 
we discern qualities so opposite in the actions of 
moral agents. Indeed, to know that our con- 
duct should be conformed to the will of God, 
supposes the existence of a moral faculty, of 
which this is one of the intuitive judgments. If 
we had no moral faculty, the obligation to be 
conformed to the will of God would not be felt. 

It is true, undoubtedly, that it 
But intuitive may be inferred from clear data, 

moral perceptions 

have not this basis, that ultimately all duty and all 
virtuous actions may be referred 
to the will of God as the standard by which they 
should be tried. Our original intuitive percep- 
tion of the moral character of certain actions 
does not, however, take in this idea, but is 
an immediate judgment of the mind upon ob- 
serving such actions. Morality is a quality seen 
in the actions themselves. 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 183 

If the question be asked, why we should be 
conformed to the will of God ? the 
answer is, because it is right,- ££%"»» 
morally right. We must thefr 
have a faculty of judging respecting moral obli- 
gation before we can know and feel that con- 
formity to the will of God is right. 



f 



CHAPTER XXVL 

THE NATURE OF VIKTUE. CONTINUED. 

Virtue is a peculiar quality of certain actions 

of a moral agent, which, quality is perceived by 

the moral faculty with which 

Virtue. 

every man is endued; and the 
perception of which is accompanied by an emo- 
tion which is distinct from all other emotions, 
and is called moral. This quality being of a 
nature perfectly simple, does not admit of being 
logically defined, any more than the colour of 
the grass, the taste of honey, the odour of a rose, 
or the melody of tune. 

As some actions are morally good, which are 
virtuous; so there are other ac- 
tions which are morally evil, or 
vicious. The perception of these, also, is accom- 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 185 

panied by a feeling of a moral kind, but very 
different from that which accom- 
panies the view of virtuous ao- J^ dgment 
ions. 

Virtue, then, may be said to be that quality 
in certain actions which is perceived by a ra- 
tional mind to be good ; and vice, or sin, is that 
which a well-constituted and well-informed mind 
sees to be evil. Whatever may be the rule or 
standard of virtuous actions, the 
immediate judgment of the' moral The moral faculty 
faculty on contemplating the act is 
necessary. Without a moral faculty we never 
could have the least idea of a moral quality, good 
or bad; therefore all actions must he brought 
before this faculty, and its judgment is ultimate. 
We can go no further. While the good or evil 
of some actions is self-evident, much discrimina- 
tion and reasoning are requisite to arrive at a 
clear view of the true moral character of others. 
But the end of these processes is to bring the 
true nature of the action in question fairly be- 
fore the mind, when it is judged by the mora) 



186 MORAL SCIENCE. 

faculty. Those actions, then, which a sound and 
well-informed mind judges to be morally good, 
are virtuous, and those which such a mind 
judges or feels to be evil, are sinful. 

As has already been explained when treat- 
ing of conscience, the judgment of the mind re- 
specting moral qualities, is the 
m r4p^ii! dS " judgment of the understanding, 
and differs from other judgments 
only by the subject under consideration. The 
mind must possess the faculty of moral percep- 
tion, of which all the inferior animals are desti- 
tute. To see that an action is useful, and will 
produce happiness to him that performs it, or to 
others, is .one thing ; but to perceive that it is 
morally good, is quite a distinct idea ; and vir- 
tue and mere utility should never be confounded. 
It may be thought that this account of virtue 
makes the moral faculty the only standard of 
moral excellence. In one sense, this is true. It 
is impossible for us to judge any action to be 
virtuous, which does not approve itself when 
fairly contemplated by our moral sense. To 
suppose otherwise, would be to think that we 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 187 

lad some other faculty by which to -judge cf 
noral actions than the moral faculty. As no 
judgment of colours can be formed 
but by the eye, nor of sounds but w ™ er inM " 
by the ear, nor of odours and tastes 
out by the senses of smelling and tasting ; so no 
judgment can be formed on moral subjects, but 
by the moral faculty. It may be asked, then, 
whether the judgments of this faculty are infal- 
lible, and if so, how it is that we have so many 
discrepant opinions, respecting the morality of 
actions. To which it may be answered, that 
when the mind is in a sound state, and any 
moral action is presented to it, with all the cir- 
cumstances which belong to it, the judgment of 
this faculty is always correct and uniform in all 
men. As an eye in a sound state judges infal- 
libly of colours, in which judgment all in pre- 
cisely the same circumstances will agree in their 
perceptions ; so it is in regard to moral qualities. 
If in looking at an object, one man has more 
light than another, or if one occupies a more fa- 
vourable point of observation, the object will ap- 
pear differently to the persons thus situated; 



188 MORAL SCIENCE. 

but this does not argue that their eyes are di£ 
ferently constructed, or that there is any othei 
faculty than the eye, by which the object may 
be surveyed. So, in regard to moral qualities, 
when they are presented to different minds with 
precisely the same evidence, the moral judgment 
will be the same. The differences observable in 
the dictates of the consciences of 

mS^J^' men > ma y be a11 traced t0 some 

cause which prevents the object 
from being perceived in its true light ; such as 
ignorance, error, or prejudice. In regard to sin 
and duty, the ultimate appeal must be to con- 
science. We may bring considerations of va- 
rious kinds to bear on the conscience, or to en- 
lighten the mind, so that the moral faculty may 
be rightly guided; but still our ultimate rule 
must be the judgments of our own moral 
faculty. 

And here it may be remarked, that con- 
science will recognise every new 

New relations oc- . . 1 

casion views of new relation into which a moral agent 
enters, and will dictate the obliga- 
tion to perform the duties obviously arising out 



NATUKE OF VIRTUE. 189 

of such relations. Or, if such an agent should 
for a time be ignorant of its relations, and after- 
wards discover them, it would, upon such disco- 
very, feel an obligation not before experienced. 
Let us then suppose the case of a child educated 
in a cave, who, while the intellectual powers 
were cultivated, and the faculties developed, had 
never been informed respecting the existence of 
its parents and the relation it sustains to them. 
Of course, while in this state of ignorance, there 
would be no sense of obligation to them ; but so 
soon as the nature of this relation should be 
clearly made known, the obligation to the ob- 
vious duties arising out of this relation, would 
immediately be felt. Let it be supposed, also, 
that this human being, until grown to maturity, 
had never heard of God, and of course possessed 
no idea of such a being. While in that state of 
ignorance, it could have no sense of the obliga- 
tion to reverence, love and serve its Creator; 
but as soon as the mind should 
take in distinctly, the conception tm f^ B °* K a crea " 
of God as the Author of its being, 
and as possessed of every adorable attribute, the 



190 MORAL SCIENCE. 

duties arising out of this newly-discovered rela* 
tion, would be felt to be obligatory. A just con- 
sideration of this relation would 
The win of God lead to the conclusion that, in 

seen to be obliga- 
tory, every thing, the will of such a Be- 
ing, standing in such a relation to 
the creature, should be obeyed. Thus the im- 
portant principle would be learned, that the will 
of God, so far as made known by reason or re- 
velation, should be the supreme rule of moral 
conduct. Conscience, henceforth, would act 
under the influence of this truth. And making 
the will of God — so far as made known — the 
supreme and only rule of moral conduct, would 
not be found at all inconsistent with the obliga- 
tion to obey the dictates of conscience; for it 
would now become evident that God, being the 
author of our minds, had constituted them with 
this moral faculty, to admonish them of duty, 
so that the dictates of an enlightened conscience 
are the clear indications of the law or will of 
God. It is the law written on the hearts of all 
\men. 

- Nothing can be considered as partaking of 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 19i 

the nature of virtue which does not meet with 
the approbation of the moral faculty. This will 
by some be thought a dangerous 
principle, merely from a misappre- ble ^of P ohS 
hension of its nature. They al- £ ™ ral approba " 
lege that the will of God is the 
only perfect and immutable standard of moral 
rectitude. They allege, moreover, that to define 
virtue to be only such actions as the moral fac- 
ulty in man approves, is to make it a very un- 
certain and fluctuating thing, depending on the> 
variable and discrepant moral feelings of men. 

This objection confounds two things which 
should be kept distinct, viz., the quality of an 
object and the light or medium 
through which it is viewed. The jec ^ wer t0 ob * 
colour of an object can be per- 
ceived only by the eye ; but in order to have 
the object fairly before the eye, there must be 
light, reflected from it, and that light on entering 
the pupil, must be reflected so as to be conveyed 
to a focus on the retina. But without an eye 
it would be useless to descant ever so long or so 
learnedly on the nature of colours, or the laws 



192 MORAL SCIENCE. 

by winch, light is reflected and refracted. In 
the case of sight, it is evident that all the per- 
ception which is experienced, must be by the 
eye. If the light is insufficient, it must be in- 
creased, and if any cause hinders it from being 
duly refracted, vision will not take place; but 
still, it is only by the eye that we can have any 
perception of colours. 

Perhaps an illustration, drawn from the 
faculty of taste, may be more appropriate. 
A beautiful landscape is presented ; I am 
charmed with its beauty. This emotion or 

feeling of the beautiful depends 
Analogy of taste, on the faculty of taste. If that 

were absent, I might see all the 
objects as they stand, and perceive nothing of 
the beautiful. Beauty in the works of nature 
or art can be perceived only by taste, and the 
emotion will depend on the perfection of the 
faculty, provided the object is presented in a 
favourable light. A person of cultivated taste 
sees beauties where a rude savage sees none. 
Thus also in regard to moral acts, or a connected 
series of moral actions, every idea and feeling of 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 19b 

a moral kind must as necessarily be through the 
moral faculty as colours through the organ of 
vision. We have no other faculty which takes 
cognizance of moral qualities. The judgments 
and emotions which are produced by the con- 
templation of such actions, are always infallibly 
correct, when the mind is duly enlightened and 
the faculty itself in a sound and healthy state. 
There is no inconsistency between this opinion 
and that which considers the will of God as the 
real standard and ultimate rule of moral con- 
duct. 

For, as has been shown, although conscience 
ean act within a narrow sphere without even the 
knowledge or belief of a God; yet 
so soon as this knowledge is ob- pe ™^dt 

, • -i -t , i i • tates of understand- 

tamed, and the mind recognises ^ 
its relation to its Creator, a new 
field is opened for the operations of conscience. 
It is soon perceived that the clear dictates of 
conscience, in cases of self-evident truth, are 
nothing else than the indication of the law of 
God written on the heart of every man, as was 
before taught. We can refer to the will of God 






u 



194 MORAL SCIENCE. 

as a rule of moral conduct no other way than by 
the exercise of the moral faculty, by which it is 
clearly perceived that our Creator and Preserver 
has a just claim on our obedience, and ought in 
all things to be obeyed. But4f conscience did 
not thus dictate, all appeals to the will of God, 
to show what is morally right, would be in vain. 
The certainty and immutability of our moral 
standard of rectitude will then be in proportion 
to the knowledge which the mind possesses of 
the existence of God and the creature's relation 
to Him. Instead, therefore, of making our 
moral feelings mere instinctive emotions, as is 
done by Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, we make 
them depend on the clear dictates of the under- 
standing; for, as we have often explained, the 
judgments of conscience are no other than the 
understanding judging on moral subjects. 

If that, and that alone is virtue, which is ap- 
proved by a mind duly enlightened, and in a 
sound state, then the attempt to 

EtiI of attempt- n ..., . 

ing undue simpiin- reduce all virtuous actions to some 

one kind — as to benevolence, for 

example — is not the way to arrive at the truth 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 195 

For while benevolent actions generally meet 
with the approbation of the moral faculty, we 
can easily conceive of an exercise of benevolence 
which, instead of being approved, would be 
viewed as morally indifferent, cr merely amia- 
ble — as a natural affection, or even as evil. We " 
never ascribe morality to the kind feeling of 
brutes to one another. The natural affection of 
parents, called storge by the Greeks, is no more 
of a moral nature than the same affection in in- 
ferior animals. The natural affection of our re- 5 
latives, our neighbours, and countrymen, in / 
amiable and useful, but not of a moral character. 
If a judge should feel a strong benevolence to- 
ward all criminals, so as to avoid inflicting on 
them the penalty of the wholesome laws of the 
country, we should judge it wicked. It might 
be said that a benevolence which counteracts a 
greater good, is not virtuous but sinful ; yet it is 
an exercise of benevolence, and serves, on the 
concession of those who make all virtue to con- 
sist in benevolence, to show that all benevolence 
is not virtue, which is the very thing to be 
proved. Again, there are acts of moral agents, 



196 MORAL SCIENCE. 

which, have nothing of the nature of benevo- 
lence, yet which the moral faculty judges to be 
morally good. For example, if a man for the 
sake of moral improvement, denies himself some 
gratification which, would in itself be pleasing 
to nature, we judge such self-denial to be vir- 
tuous. 

A thousand acts of prudence which have re- 
gard to our own best interests, without inter- 
fering with the interest of others, 

Prudence a Vir- ■, •, *. _ .. . 

tue# nave always been reckoned vir- 

tuous. Indeed, among the ancient 
sages, prudence was one of the four cardinal 
virtues. The attempt, therefore, to reduce all 
virtue to the simple exercise of benevolence, 
must be unsuccessful. It is so evident that some 
actions which have our own welfare as their ob- 
ject, are virtuous, that rather than give up their 
theory that all virtue consists in benevolence, 
they enlarge the meaning of the word, so as 
to make it include a due regard to our own wel- 
fare. But this is really to acknowledge that all 
virtue does not consist in benevolence, accord- 
ing to the usual meaning of that word. Any 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 197 

term may be made to stand for the whole of 
virtue, if yon choose to impose an arbitrary 
meaning npon it. Benevolent affections, how- 
ever, is a phrase which has as fixed and de- 
finite a meaning as any in the language, and 
by all good writers is used for good will to 
others. Benevolent affections are, therefore, con- 
stantly distinguished from such as are selfish. 
If, however, any one chooses, contrary to uni- 
versal usage, to employ the words in a sense so 
comprehensive as to include self-love, be it so. 
We will not dispute with such a one, about the 
meaning of the word, provided he agree that 
the judicious pursuit of our own improvement 
and happiness is virtuous. 

To determine how many different kinds of 
actions are virtuous, we must pass them in re- 
view before the moral faculty, and then classify 
them ; being in the whole process 

-in ,-, i • -i . r». Actions to be cl*&» 

governed by the light of true 6ifie d. 
knowledge, and taking into view 
all the relations in which the human race, oi 
any portion of it, is placed. Something of this 



/ 



198 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

kind we may attempt in the sequel of this work ; 
in which we shall endeavour to survey the 
moral duties incumbent on men, in their vari- 
ous relations, 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

WHETHER VIRTUE AND VICE BELONG ONLY TO ACTIONS. 

It has repeatedly been brought into view that 
moral qualities are found only in actions of moral 
agents, and not in all actions, but 
only in those performed under cer- con ^^f acts are 
tain circumstances. But when we 
consider those actions which are of a moral na- 
ture, we find that they are complex, consisting 
of an external and internal part. At once we 
can determine that a mere external or corporeal 
action can possess no morality, except as con- 
nected with the internal or mental exercise 
which produced it, and of which it is the expo- 
nent. But here again there are several acts of 
the mind clearly distinguishable from one an- 
other, and it is of importance to determine in 
which of these the moral quality exists. On 



200 MORAL SCIENCE. 

this subject there is a diversity of opinion. It 
seems commonly to be taken for granted, that 
the act of volition is, so to speak, the responsible 
act, and this has led to the maxim almost uni- 
versally current, that "no action is of a moral 
nature which is not voluntary." 
iuntaxy. al *** V °~ Accordingly, writers of great emi- 
nence have entertained the opin- 
ion, that to render oux desires and affections 
moral, they must directly or indirectly proceed 
from volition. But here arises a serious diffi- 
culty. Our desires and affections 
J*i* are not subject to our volitions. 
We may will with all our energy 
to love an object now odious, and our will pro* 
duces no manner of effect ; except to show us 
our inability to change our affections by the 
force of the will. On the contrary, we find by 
constant experience that our volitions are influ- 
enced uniformly by our prevailing desires. No 
man ever put forth a volition which was not 
the effect of some desire, feeling, or inclination. 
Now, after the most attentive examination of 
our minds, we find that certain affections which 



MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 201 

are neither produced by volitions nor terminate 
in volitions, are, in the judgment 
of all reflecting men, of a moral „„£££**" 
nature. For example, envy at 
the prosperity of a neighbour is not the result 
of any volition, and it may be cherished inward- 
ly without leading to any volition, the will 
being controlled by other feelings which pre- 
vent action ; yet all must admit it to be a mor- 
ally evil disposition. The truth then appears to 
be, that our affections are properly the subject 
of moral qualities, good and evil. 
Volitions take their character en- ^^T™ 
tirely from the internal affections 
or desires from which they proceed. The voli- 
tion, viewed abstractly, is always the same, 
when the external action is the same ; but the 
moral character of the acts, where the volitions 
are the same, may vary exceedingly. If I will 
to strike a man with a deadly weapon, the sim- 
ple volition which precedes and is the immedi- 
ate cause of the action, is the same whether I 
give the stroke in self-defence, in execution of 
the law, or through malice prepense. Indeed, 

*9 



202 MORAL SCIENCE. 

the volition of an insane person to strike a blow 
is exactly similar to the volition of a sane per* 
son striking a similar blow. Hence it is evident 
that the proper seat of moral qualities is not in 
the will, considered as distinct from the affec- 
tions, but in the affections themselves, which 
give character to the volition as much as to the 

external action. These internal 
of a^tkms™ Sprmg affections or desires are properly 

the springs of our actions, and our 
wills are the executive power by which they are 
carried into effect. They are commonly called 

motives, and very properly, as 
Motives. they move us to action ; but I 

have avoided the use of that word, 
because it is ambiguous, and has occasioned 
much misconception on this subject. By mo- 
tives, many understand reasons or -external 
qualities in the objects of our desires; that 
which excites or moves our affections. Then 
when it is asserted that the will is governed by 
the strongest motives, some understand the 
meaning to be the strongest reasons, or those 
qualities in an object best adapted to excite our 



MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 203 

affections. In this sense the proposition is not 

true. Minds are often in such a 

state that they are not governed whether gov- 
erned by the strong- 
by that reason which in their own est reasons. 

view is the strongest; that is, 
which in their better judgment seems wisest and 
best. And often our minds are not influenced 
or governed by those external objects or consid- 
erations which in the judgment of impartial 
reason are most weighty. But if by motives be 
understood the desires themselves, 
actually in exercise at the time, in what sense 

will follows the 

however produced, then it may be strongest motives, 
truly said that the will is always 
determined by the strongest motives, that is, the 
strongest desires. But even this proposition 
needs qualification. The strongest single desire 
does not alwaj^s govern the man, but the strong- 
est combination of desires, as may be thus ex- 
emplified. A man in returning from a journey 
on a cold day has a strong desire to reach home 
without delay; but passing a house where he 
knows he can enjoy a warm fire, and good re- 
freshment, and the company of a friend, though 



204 MORAL SCIENCE. 

his desire to reach home is stronger than his de« 
sire to see his friend, stronger than his desire to 
enjoy the fire, or his desire for food or drink, 
yet all these combined prove sufficient to induce 
him to stop. 

It is often said that the intention or end for 

which an action is performed, determines its 

moral character; and as our de- 

Morality of an act ^ ... n . 

from ite intention, sires always point to some object 
which is the end of the action, 
this account of the matter coincides with the 
view already given. As if a man gives money 
to another, though we see the action, and are 
sure that it was voluntary, yet that determines 
nothing respecting the moral character of the 
action. Before we can judge any thing correct- 
ly, we must know the intention with which the 
act was performed. If it was to pay a just debt, 
we approve it as a moral act, but of small merit. 
If it was to supply the wants of a poor suffering 
family, unable to help themselves, we still ap- 
prove, but our approbation is much stronger; 
the act is more meritorious than the former. But 
if we are informed that the person on whom the 



MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 205 

benefit was conferred was an enemy who had 
sought every opportunity to injure him who 
is now his benefactor, we esteem it the high- 
est degree of Christian virtue. But if it should 
appear that the money was given to a common 
drunkard, to enable him to procure intoxicating 
drink ; though the external act and volition are 
the same, instead of approving the action, we 
censure it as culpable. And finally, if it should 
appear that the intention was to hire an assassin 
to murder an innocent person, and that person a 
benefactor, our emotion rises to the highest de- 
gree, and we reprobate the action as evil in the 
extreme. In all these cases, the action and 
the volition producing it, are the same. The 
only difference is in the end or intention with 
which it was done. The intention 
will serve to characterize actions ^u™**** 
very well, but is not comprehen- 
sive enough to take in all the exercises of mina 
which possess a moral character. I feel habitu- 
ally a kind disposition to my fellow-creatures, 
but for much of my time I have not the oppor- 
tunity of performing any particular acts of kind- 



206 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

v 

ness. All impartial persons will say that this 

habitual feeling is of a virtuous character ; but 
there is no intention in the case. It is merely a 
feeling which terminates in no volition or ac- 
tion. 

My neighbour, who has been a bad man, un- 
dergoes a real change of character, and from 
being profane and quarrelsome, 

Intention not 

comprehensive e- becomes pious and peaceable. I 

nough. 

rejoice in the change. This joy 
is a virtuous emotion, though it has no intention 
accompanying it. This will serve to show that 
making the intention the sole characteristic of 
morality, is correct in regard to actions, but is 
not comprehensive enough to take in the whole 
of morality. 

It may seem that in what has been said, we 
contravene the maxim, that all moral actions are 

voluntary, a maxim which has re- 
objection. ceived the sanction of ages, and 

may be considered an intuitive principle : where- 
as it is now maintained that there are exercises 
of mind which do not involve any exercise of 
will; and that our volitions themselves have 



MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 207 

nothing of a moral nature but what they derive 
from the motives from which they proceed. 

The maxim, rightly understood, is no doubt 
just, and we should never affect the wisdom of 
being wiser than the common 
sense of mankind, where we meet m ™ d ° maxim ad ' 
with truths in which all men of 
sober reflection have been agreed. It is safer to 
take them for granted, as believing that univer- 
sal consent in such matters furnishes the best 
evidence of truth. 

But the explanation is easy. The maxim 
applies primarily to actions, which must be volun- 
tary to have the character of mo- 
rality. If the action is not volun- J* e / tjection r * 
tary, it is not properly the action 
of the person who seems to perform it, for we 
can act in no other way than by the wilL 

But again, the word voluntary as employed 
in the maxim under consideration, includes more 
than volition ; it comprehends all 
the spontaneous exercises of the Ambiguity of term 

± voluntary. 

mind ; that is, all its affections 

and emotions. Formerly all these were in- 



208 MORAL SCIENCE. 

eluded Tinder the word will, and we still use 
language that requires this lati- 
tation°orTr^ aCCeP " tu( ^ e i n *he construction of the 
term. Thus it would be conso- 
nant to the best usage to say that man is perfect- 
ly voluntary in loving his friend or hating his 
enemy ; but by this is not meant that these af- 
fections are the effect of volition, but only that 
they are the free spontaneous exercises of the 
mind. That all virtue consists in volition, is not 
true — as we have seen ; but that all virtuous ex- 
ercises are spontaneous, is undoubtedly correct. 
Our moral character radically consists in our 
feelings and desires. These being the sponta- 
neous actings of certain latent principles or dispo- 
sitions, this hidden disposition is also judged to 
be morally evil, because it is productive of such 
fruit. And of good dispositions we judge in 
like manner. 



CHAPTER XXVffl. 

THE AUTHOE OF OUE BEING CONSIDEEED IN EELATIOfl 
TO MOEAL SCIENCE. 

It has already been intimated, tliat tlie very ex- 
istence of conscience seems to indicate, that man 
has a Superior to whom he is ame- 
nablefor his conduct. The feel- J^j££ 
ing of moral obligation which ac- *£ a supreme Be- 
companies every perception of 
right and wrong, seems to imply, that man is 
under law ; for what is moral obligation but a 
moral law ? And if we are under a law there must 
be a lawgiver, a moral governor, who has incor- 
porated the elements of his law into our very 
constitution. This argument for the existence ol 
God, is solid, and independent of all other argu 
ments ; and it goes further than arguments de- 
rived from the evidences of design, which abound 
in the world around us ; for these prove no more 



210 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

than that the Author of our being is intelligent 
but this argument proves that he is a moral Be- 
ing, and exercises a moral government over us. 
The Atheist, when he feels, as he must, remorse 
for some great crime, can scarcely help believ- 
ing, that there is a God who is displeased with 
his wicked conduct, and who will punish him 
hereafter ; for the keen anguish of remorse seems 
to point to a punishment which is future. Hence 
it is that when Atheists come into those circum- 
stances which have a tendency to awaken the 
conscience, they for the time become believers 
in the existence of God. Thus in a storm at sea, 

even the most confirmed Atheist 
i y tlf "d PraCtiCal " has been found calling upon God, 

for deliverance ; and when death 
is suddenly presented to them, they often find, 
that their atheistical theories cannot withstand 
the power of an awakened conscience. Certain- 
ly the existence of an accusing conscience cannot 
in any way be so well accounted for, as by the sup- 
position that man is the creature of a Being who 
intended to form him in such a manner, that he 
should have a control over his actions, and who 



DIVINE BEING. 211 

has left an indelible proof of his authority in the 
mind of every man. 

But omitting to press this argument further 
at present, let us attend to some of the other 
evidences of the existence of a 
God. No one can contend that A £*T nt again8t 
there is any ihing absurd in 
the idea of an eternal, all-powerful, intelligent, 
First Cause, from whom all things have re- 
ceived their being. No one can doubt that 
the supposition of the existence of such a Being 
seems to account for the phenomena of nature ; 
and it is equally certain, that they cannot be ra- 
tionally accounted for on any other hypothesis. 

To deny that in animals and vegetables there 
are evident marks of design, would be as unrea- 
sonable as to deny that any thing 
exists. Thus the eye was formed ^f*™ ^ ~" 
to see, the ear to hear, the mouth 
to masticate our food, the stomach to digest 
it, the various internal organs to separate the 
particles suited for nutrition from the mass, 
and by a wonderful and inexplicable process to 
convert, or assimilate these particles into the 



212 MORAL SCIENCE. 

various forms and organs which, constitute the 
human body. For any man to affirm that in all 
these contrivances and operations, there is no 
evidence of design, is certainly to contradict the 
intimate conviction of his own reason. It may 
on many accounts be expedient and highly pro- 
fitable, to accumulate arguments from design, as 
manifested in the rational, animal, vegetable, and 

mineral world; but for mere ar- 
t££:^Zr { gumentand demonstration, these 

details are unnecessary. A man 
cast away on a desolate shore, would be as 
certain that some rational beings had been 
there, if he found one watch, or one quad- 
rant, as if he should see a thousand of such like 
or other works of art, strewed along the shore. 
His mind is soon satisfied with the force of this 
evidence, as observed in a few particulars, and 
the conviction of the truth, that these things are 
the effect of a designing cause, is as perfect as it 
can be, by the contemplation of ever so many in- 
stances. It may, I think be taken for granted, 
and even Atheists will admit, that we cannot 
conceive of any works, or contrivances, which 



DIVINE BEING. 213 

would more clearly evince design, than those 
which are found in the human, and other animal 
bodies. Though it is said that some ancient 
Atheists attributed every thing to 

Chance. 

chance, yet it seems unnecessary 
to take up much time in combating such a the- 
ory. Atheists no longer resort to this very ab- 
surd notion. As then design manifest in any 
effect, leads necessarily to the conclusion, that 
intelligence exists in the cause ; there is no 
escape from the conclusion, that the cause of 
the existence of animals and vegetables is 
a wise and powerful Being, but by one of 
the following suppositions. 1. That every"! 
thing in which design is manifest, has existed 
from eternity; or, 2. That there are in the mate- 
rial universe, causes possessing power and intel- 
ligence to produce these effects, but no one great 
intelligent person ; or, 3. That there has existed 
from eternity a succession of these organized be- 
ings, producing one another in a continued 
series ; so that while the individuals in the 
series perish, the succession is eternal. 

The first supposition is too extravagant, wo 



214 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

should think, to have any advocates. Indeed ; 
as it relates to the bodies of animals and vegeta- 
bles, we have a certain demonstration, that their 

organization has a beginning. And 
mLTse rait7 ° fthe if every thing was from eternity, 

every thing would be immutable 
and imperishable ; but we see every kind of 
organized bodies tending quickly to destruction. 
Our souls also had a beginning, for their gradual 
increase and development is a matter of daily 
observation. We have no remembrance of an 
eternal existence, nor any consciousness of inde- 
pendence, which must be an attendant of an 
eternal being. We are conscious that we can- 
not cease to be, nor control our own destiny. 
Nothing is more certain in the mind of all think- 
ing men, than that we who now live are crea- 
tures of yesterday. But it is unnecessary to re- 
fute an error which perhaps no one is so unrea- 
sonable as to hold. 

Let us then consider that atheistical, or ra- 
ther pantheistical scheme, which attributes all the 
appearances of design in the world to the world 
itself; that is, to certain causes existing in the 



DIVINE BEIKG. 215 

world which produce beings of various species, 
not by creation out of nothing, 
which they hold to be impossible, thesis ofevohTtion!* 
but by an evolution or development 
of principles contained in the world itself. Ac- 
cording to this theory the world is God, and all 
things are parts of this one being. 

This theory would avoid the name of Athe- 
ism, which has ever been odious; but it re- 
tains the virus of the poison of 

Denies a personal 

Atheism under another name. It God. 
admits a cause, or rather multitude 
of causes, capable of producing these marks of 
design ; but denies that this cause, considered as 
one or many, is a person. The cpestion neces- 
sary to be determined is, what is necessary to 
constitute a person? Here we 
have intelligence in the cause, in Pe**onaiity. 

the highest conceivable degree. 
But the structure of the body of man is not mere 
intelligence ; there is an adaptation of means to 
an end. This supposes the exercise of choice or 
selection, which is obviously an exercise of will. 
Every instance of contrivance therefore evinces 



216 MORAL SCIENCE. 

the exercise of an intellect and will ; and tliat 
being in which, these two properties are found, 
we are accustomed to denominate a person. 

It would be difficult to find a better defini- 
tion of a person. But we need not dispute about 

the name ; when there is manifest 
demanS 1 " *""* evidence of wise contrivance in 

the effect, there must be an intelli- 
gent cause to produce such an effect. Where, 
we ask, is that cause ? Is it in the individual 
which exhibits these signs of design? That 
would be to make the same thing cause and 
effect. Is there then for each individual in 
which wise contrivance appears a particular 
cause ; or is nature or the world to be consid- 
ered one general cause, operating in a multitude 
of ways? To suppose a particular cause for 
every one of these effects, would be to multiply 
deities beyond the wildest mythology of the 
heathen ; for these causes being intelligent be- 
ings, possessing a wisdom beyond our concep- 
tion, each is properly considered a separate deity. 
But even this supposition comes utterly short of 
furnishing a satisfactory account of the pheno- 



DIVINE BEING. 217 

mena of the universe ; for the admirable contri- 
vances in the natural world consist very often 
in the adaptation of things which are entirely 
distinct, to each other, as of the light to the 
eye, the air to the ear and to the lungs, the food 
to the stomachs of the various species of ani- 
mals, &c. The same adaptation is equally obvi- 
ous in the vegetable world. That cause, there- 
fore, which produced the eye must have produced 
the light; and the cause of the curiously-con- 
trived apparatus of hearing must have formed 
the air ; and the author of the stomach must have 
adapted it to various kinds of food, &c. The 
hypothesis of an infinite number of separate, in- 
telligent causes, will not be maintained. All 
these effects must be attributed to one cause, and 
that cause must be infinitely wise and po^rful, 
to give existence to so many wonderful works. 

If, then, there is one cause of all these differ- 
ent species of beings, which could not exist with- 
out wise contrivance, that cause 
must be powerful, intelligent and ^^S 
benevolent; but power, wisdom, 

and intelligence can exist only in some being, 
10 



218 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

and that being which possesses them must be a per 
son. The Pantheist will allege that these attri- 
butes belong to the universe itself, and therefore 
there is no need to suppose any being to exist 
separate from, and independent of the world. 
All these phenomena arising, are only the devel- 
opments of this one substance, in which the 
attributes before mentioned have their seat. 

Before we receive such an opinion, let us in- 
quire what constitutes the universe, as far as our 

knowledge can extend. We be- 
rep ?— f a ° come acquainted with the world 

without us by our senses. Trust- 
ing to the information of these inlets of knowl- 
edge, we find that the universe consists, as far as 
known to the senses, of peculiar objects, com- 
bined together in various ways. These material 
things, though subject to peculiar laws, appear 
entirely destitute of intelligence. In this, all 
men agree. The light, the air, the water, the 
rocks, the earth, the metals, &c, are not capable 
of thought. Indeed, every material thing with 
which we are acquainted consists of an infinite 
number of parts, even when of the same kind, 



DIVIDE BEING. 219 

and no otherwise related to each other than that 
• they are situated near to each other ; whether they 
are at all in contact, we do not know. If thought 
belonged to matter, each of these infinitesimal 
particles of matter would be a conscious being, 
and his consciousness be independent of every 
other particle. By what medium of communi- 
cation could these particles of matter agree on 
forming an organized body ? But the Panthe- 
ist does not believe that matter is endued with 
thought. His theory is, that in the world there 
exists not only external substance, but thought 
or intelligence in the same substance. But as 
this intelligence must have a subject in which it 
resides, and of which it is a quality, and as it 
cannot be an attribute of brute matter, there must 
exist a substance distinct from matter, of which 
it is a property. Matter being divisible, inert, 
and extended, cannot have intelligence as an at- 
tribute, which is active, indivisible, and unex- 
tended. Extension, and thought, therefore, can- 
not be properties of the same substance. If then 
the cause of the phenomena of nature which in- 
dicate design is in the world itself, the world 



220 MORAL SCIENCE. 

must, besides the gross matter winch we see and 
feel, be possessed of a soul, or spiritual substance, 
in which, this intelligence resides. This would 
bring us to the old Pagan theory of the Soul of 
the World. Under the material part, but under 
this only, there is a spiritual substance, a soul ; 
just as in a man, we can see and feel the body, 
but we know that within this case, there exists a 
spiritual substance or soul. This theory, then, 
admits the existence of a great spirit, possessing 
the attributes necessary to account for all the ap- 
pearances of wisdom in the world. It differs 
from the common theistical doctrine only in this, 
that it would confine this being to the world ; but 
for this, there could be assigned no valid reason. 
A being possessing such power over matter as to 
mould it into every organized form found in ani- 
mals, vegetables, and minerals, must have a com- 
plete control over matter, and be perfectly ac- 
quainted with all its most hidden properties and 
capabilities, and must be independent of matter, 
and must exist every where, to carry on the pro- 
cesses of nature. And as we do not know the 
extent of the material universe, we can set no 



DIVINE BEING. 221 

limits to the presence of this spiritual, intelligent 
and omnipotent being. The object of Pantheism 
is to get clear of the idea of a personal God, who 
gives laws to creatures, and superintends and 
governs them according to their natures. But 
the hypothesis, if it could be established, does 
not answer the purpose for which it was devised. 
Still, even according to the hypothesis, we must 
have a personal God, who knows all things and 
rules over all. 

The only other atheistical method of account- 
ing for the phenomena of the world, as indicat- 
ing the most consummate wisdom, 

-.-, ,t , . 3. Eternal succes- 

as well as the most omnipotent S i 0n . 
power, is the hypothesis, that the 
universe in its present form has existed from 
eternity, and that all the various species of ani- 
mals and vegetables now observed have always 
existed, and have communicated existence to 
one another in an endless series. And as an 
eternal series has no beginning, it can have no 
cause. There is therefore no need of supposing 
any first cause, from whom every thing has pro- 
ceeded. As we must suppose some being to ex- 



222 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

ist from eternity, we may as well suppose that 
the world which we see is that eternal being. 

This has always been the stronghold of athe 

ism, and therefore deserves a more special atten 

tion. The only reason, however, 

Fortress of Athe- 
ism, which gives an advantage to this 

theory is, that it carries us back into the unfath- 
omable depths of eternity, where our minds are 
confounded by the incomprehensibility of the 
subject. It is also to be regretted that some truly 
great men, in attempting to refute this theory, 
have adopted a mode of reasoning which is not 
satisfactory. This, we think, is true with respect 
to Bentley, who possessed a gigantic intellect; 
and, as might have been expected, many are his 
followers. Dr. Samuel Clarke has also pursued 
a course in his reasoning on this point, which, 
to say the least, is not entirely free from objec- 
tion. The same may be said of many others, 
and especially of some who have attempted a 
mathematical demonstration of the falsehood of 
an infinite series of living organized beings, in- 
eluding the celebrated Stapfer. 

It will be an object, therefore, to free the 



r 



DIVINE BEING. 223 

subject as much, as possible from intricacy and 
obscurity, and to present argu- 

-, . -, t n i t t , Argument against 

ments which shall be level to any eternal series. 
common capacity accustomed to 
attend to a train of reasoning. We may certain 
ly assume it as an admitted principle, that every 
effect must have not only a cause, but an ade- 
quate cause. If wise contrivance and evident 
adaptation of means to an end be found in the 
effect, to ascribe it to an unintelligent cause, is 
as unsatisfactory as to assign no cause. 

This then being assumed, we would take 
this position as incontrovertible, that if de- 
sign manifest in one effect re- 

An adequate 

quires an intelligent cause, the cause stm indispen. 

sable. 

same necessity requires the same 
kind of a cause for any number of similar effects; 
and the conclusion must be the same, whether 
the number is finite or infinite. This evident 
truth has been often and happily illustrated, by 
supposing a chain suspended before our eyes, 
but reaching beyond the sphere of our vision. 
The lowest link requires a support, and so does 
the second, and there is no less need of support 



224 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

for every successive link as you ascend the chain ; 
and if you suppose as many links beyond your 
sight, as there are atoms in the universe, still the 
same necessity of a support is presumed to exist. 
There must ultimately be a support for all these 
suspended links. But suppose some one to 
allege that the chain is of infinite length, and 
has no beginning, we immediately 

No relief from 

making series of ef- begin to experience some confu- 

fects infinite. 

sion of ideas. We attempt to 
grasp infinity, and finding ourselves baffled in 
the attempt, we are apt to lose sight of the pro- 
per logical conclusion in this case. The neces- 
sity of a supporting power has no dependence 
on the number to be sustained. If one, if one 
hundred, if one thousand require support, so 
does any number of links. The conclusion is 
not in the smallest degree affected by the number, 
except that the more links, the stronger must 
be the supporting power; but this has nothing to 
do with our present argument. The conclusion 
will be of the same kind, and will as necessarily 
follow, in the case of effects which have in them 
the marks of design. The number canicot affect 



DIVINE BEING. 225 

the conclusion. If one such, effect cannot exist 
without an intelligent contriver, an infinite 
number of ' great effects cannot. If multiplying 
one cipher, or zero, by any number in arith- 
metic, produces nothing, and the same is the re- 
sult of multiplying a thousand ciphers, the con- 
clusion is inevitable, that an infinite number of 
ciphers multiplied by any number cannot result 
in any positive quantity. Indeed, if all the indi- 
viduals in the supposed infinite series are of the 
same kind, all are effects, and it is absurd to 
conceive of an effect without a cause. Cause 
and effect are correlative and imply each other ; 
and if an effect cannot exist without a cause, 
much less can an infinite number of effects exist 
without an adequate cause. 

My next argument will leave out of view 
altogether the idea of infinity, 

i • 1 , , o t ,i Cause must be ex- 

Which IS SO apt tO COnfound the isting and operative 

mind. It is this. Every effect 
must not only have a cause, but that cause must 
be in existence and operation ; for it would be 
absurd to think of a cause operating, when it no 
10* 



226 MORAL SCIENCE. 

longer had an active existence. Let us then take 
that individual of a series of organized beings 
which came last into existence. Let it be an 
animal — a dog or horse. This individual we 
know came recently into being ; when produced 
there must have been an adequate cause in ex- 
istence and in operation. What was that cause ? 
The hypothesis confines us to the preceding se- 
ries of animals of the same species, supposed to 
have come down in uninterrupted succession 
from eternity. But whether the series be long 
or short, finite or infinite, is of no consequence 
as it relates to our present argument. What we 
are inquiring after is a cause in existence at the 
time this curiously organized and animated be- 
ing came into existence. ' Now at that time, the 
individuals of the series had all ceased to exist, 
except the immediate progenitors. Whatever 
cause existed, cannot therefore be looked for in 
them ; and if the effect is such as manifestly to 
be beyond any power and skill which they pos- 
sessed, the contriving and efficient cause cannot 
be found in the series. There must be a higher 
cause. 



DIVINE BEING. 227 

But lest some persons should have a vaguo 
notion that some hidden power might be com- 
municated through the series, al- 

. , i , p n • i • The whole power 

though not found in the progeni- f the cause must be 

n , ., , . .. carried through tho 

tors of the animal under consider- s er ies. 
ation, I will lay down a princi- 
ple which is admitted in mechanical powers, and 
is equally applicable to all causes. It is this. 
In all cases where any power is communicated 
through a series of individuals, the whole power 
necessary to produce the effect, must not only 
be communicated to the first, but to every single 
thing in the series, until it reach the last, which 
is intended to be affected by the original power. 
Thus, suppose it to be required to communicate 
motion to a ball in a plane, by sending an im- 
pulse through a hundred balls, the principle 
known to all mechanicians is, that the force ne- 
cessary to give the desired motion must be com- 
municated to the first, and from the first to the 
second, and so on, until it reaches the ball in- 
tended to be moved. And this principle is 
equally applicable to all causes which operate 
through a succession of particulars. If at the 



228 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

commencement of a series, an intelligent cause 
operated, and then ceased, or stopped short of 
the last effect, no sign of intelligence could exist 
m this, which brings us back to the same obvious 
principle with which we commenced, viz., that 
when any effect is produced, an adequate cause 
must exist, and be in operation at the time of 
its production. The simple inquiry then, is, had 
the progenitors of this dog, or horse, when the 
animal came into existence and became ani- 
mated, the skill necessary to conturae the ani- 
mal frame, with all its curiously contrived parts, 
and power and skill to give to this individual 
that constitution of instincts, appetites, and pas- 
sions suited to its condition in the world, which 
it possesses. I leave the atheist to answer this 
question? The same course of reasoning will be 
equally forcible as applied to fruits and vegeta- 
bles. Every one of these organized beings fur- 
nishes an irrefragable argument for the being of 
a God ; for in any one of these is evidence of 
the existence of a wisdom and power which cer- 
tainly do not exist in the several particulars of 
which the series consists. 



DIVINE BEING. 229 

The only modern attempt to invalidate the 
argument for the being of God founded on the 
appearance of design in the uni- 
verse, is that of Mr. Hume, which ob ™° n o t™ 
is substantially this, that this argu- 
ment supposes that we have seen similar works 
performed, from which, by analogy, we conclude 
that an intelligent cause is necessary to account 
for them ; as if we find a watch we believe it to 
have been made by an artist, because we have 
before observed such works made by skilful 
men ; but in relation to the world, it is a singu- 
lar work, entirely unique. We have never seen 
any world produced, and, therefore, the reason- 
ing which would hold in regard to the conclu- 
sion that the watch was made by an artist does 
not apply. 

More importance has been given to this ob- 
jection, especially by Dr. Chalmers, than it de- 
serves. The objection of Hume 
is a mere sophism, and can unset- Eepiy 

tie no mind which understands 
the nature of the argument in question. Ac 
cording to Mr. Hume's argument we could not 



230 MOEAL SCIENCE. m 

infer from any work of art that it had an intelli- 
gent author, unless we had seen a work of the 
very same kind by an artist. Suppose a boy 
who has never been away from his father's farm, 
where he has seen nothing superior to ploughs, 
carts, and harrows, to be conducted to a seaport, 
and to see a steam-frigate. As he has never 
seen on the farm any thing formed like this, 
according to Mr. Hume, he could not infer that 
this stupendous work was produced by an intel- 
ligent cause. To the boy it would be a singu- 
lar effect, the like of which he had never wit- 
nessed, and, therefore, he could infer nothing 
respecting it. Now every child knows better 
than this. Any boy of common sense will con- 
clude in a moment that this steam engine must 
have been the work of a skilful artificer. 

In order to apply the argument from design, 
it is not at all necessary that we should have 
seen an artist engaged in produ- 
,in«er ta cing its like. All that is necessary 
is, that there should immediately 
appear an adaptation of means to produce a cer- 
tain end ; and it matters not as to the argument 



DIVINE BEING. 231 

whether we ever conceived of a similar work, or 
knew any thing of the artist, the certain appear- 
ance of design, or a skilful adaptation of means 
to an end is always sufficient to produce the cer 
tain conclusion that there has been a designing 
cause at work. The works of nature are not 
a singular effect, as far as the argument a poste- 
riori is concerned. The adaptation of means to 
an end in these is similar to the works of design 
among men. The difference between a telescope 
and the eye of an animal is not so great as be- 
tween a plough and a steam engine. If there 
was any difference between the inference from 
seeing a steam-frigate or a complicated spinning 
engine, which have never been seen before, and 
another plough or cart, it would be in favour of 
the contrivance not before witnessed. The ar- 
gument seems to be a fortiori in this case. And 
as the whole argument in regard to the works 
of man is founded simply on observing an adap- 
tation of means to accomplish an end, and not 
the adaptation to produce some particular end 
which we had before seen effected by similar 



232 MORAL SCIENCE. 

means ; and as the adaptation of means to an 
end is as evident in the works of nature as in 
the works of man, the argument is as conclusive 
in one case as in the other. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

THE PHENOMENA OF THE TJNIVEESE. 

Let us now suppose that a Great Intelligent 
First Cause exists, and lias existed . . _,. „ 

7 Accords with pie- 

from eternity ; are not all the ap- nomena - 
pearances of the universe correspondent with the 
existence of such a being ? 

Again we may demand of an Atheist what 
other evidences of the existence of God he would 
require. Let him suggest some- 
thing, which, in the form of evi- J££»£ 
dence, would be more satisfactory 
to him, and he will not find it easy to fix on 
any evidence which is stronger or more suitable 
than what we already possess. 

It may appear strange to some that we 
challenge the Atheist to demand any clearer or 



234 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

stronger evidence of the existence of a Supremo 

Being than that which is already 

Atheist chaiieng- before us. But let the attempt be 

ed to propose any 

stronger. made to conceive of some evidence 

of this truth which would be more 
satisfactory, and better adapted to be a standing 
proof to all nations, and we have mistaken the 
matter, if the result will not be that the existing 
evidence is as good as any which they could ask. 
It will be worth while to spend a little time 
in considering this point, for if we cannot satisfy 
the Atheist of the truth of our position, the dis- 
cussion may be satisfactory to others who have 
not been accustomed to view the subject in this 
light. 

It is true we do not see God, and the reason 
is, he is a spirit ; and a spirit, from the very na- 
ture of the case, is invisible. We 

visibility of God cannot see the souls of our nearest 

not requisite. 

friends ; we know that they exist, 
not by any direct perception of the intelligent 
substance, but by the actions which they perform 
through the instrumentality of the body. If 
God were not a spirit he could not be an active, 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVEKSE. 235 

intelligent, powerful, and perfect being ; but be- 
ing a spirit he must be invisible. Nothing is 
visible but material substances, and these only 
by means of light reflected from them to the 
eye. 

It is not forgotten that most Atheists, being 
materialists, deny that there is any such sub- 
stance as spirit ; but they do not 

and cannot deny that there is invisible exist- 
ences are believed 

something within us which thinks in - 
and feels and wills, and has power 
to originate bodily motion. Call the substance, 
of which thought is a property, by what name 
you please, still it is an invisible substance. 
Who can pretend to see a thought or a volition ? 
or who would say that he can see the mind, 
and describe its shape and give its magnitude 
and dimensions ? Let it be supposed then that 
the cause of all intelligence has a nature resem- 
bling this intelligent nature of which we are 
every moment conscious, but far more excellent, 
as it must be supposed that every excellence ex- 
ists in a higher degree in the cause than in the 
effect. 



236 MORAL SCIENCE. 

Now supposing such an intelligent being to 

exist, call him spiritual or material, only ]et him 

be a being of thought, will, and 

in no way could passion ; and that he is necessari- 

a spiritual Being be 

better revealed. ly from his nature invisible to 
eyes of flesh ; the question is, how 
could such a being make himself known to ra- 
tional minds such as ours. As we cannot by 
any direct perception look into the mind of 
another, and as such a being cannot make him- 
self visible without assuming a gross body, we 
can conceive of no way by which he can make 
himself known but by performing some act, or 
exhibiting to us some work which shall con- 
tain the impress of his character. For if he 
should assume a bodily shape, and thus make 
himself visible, it would not be the intelligent 
substance which we perceived, but a body, which 
was no part of his essence. If an intelligent 
creature could be so situated in the universe as 
to have no opportunity of contemplating any 
work of God, such a creature could never arrive 
at the knowledge of his existence. But the sup- 
position is impossible; for an intelligent creature 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 237 

could not exist without the consciousness of its 
own thoughts ; and in the mind itself, even if it 
were cut off from all perception of material 
things, there is sufficient proof of an efficient, in- 
telligent cause. The impress of the divine at- 
tributes is as clearly printed on the soul as 
on any of the works of God to which man has 
access. # 

As the First Cause, if there is one, must be 
from his nature invisible, the only way by which 
he can be conceived to make 

The First Cause 

known his existence, is by setting known b ? his 

J ° works. 

before us some work, in which his 
wisdom, power, and goodness may be manifested; 
and by the contemplation of which a rational 
mind may infer, that a being does exist, to whom 
these properties belong. If then in the various 
objects in the world, there is as much evidence 
of these attributes as we can conceive, and in 
fact far exceeding our most enlarged conceptions, 
we have the best proof of the existence of a 
Great First Cause, which we couldhave. The 
simple question then is, could there be exhibited 
stronger evidences of wisdom than we have in 



238 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

the structure of the body of man, and in the 
constitution of his mind? Could the various 
species of animals in the earth, air, and sea, "be 
formed with more consummate wisdom than 
they are, in relation to the climate in which they 
live, and the provision made internally and ex 
ternally for their subsistence, and the propaga 
tion of their kind. Examine also th^ vegetable 
world. Call in the aid of glasses to inspect the 
concealed structure of the vessels ; contemplate 
the leaf, the flower, and the mature fruit, and 
say whether you can conceive of contrivances 
more exquisite. If any man thinks that animal 
and vegetable bodies could have been construct- 
ed with more wisdom, let him point out in what 
respects these works of nature are deficient in 
wisdom. But even if it were possible to con- 
ceive of more perfect works, this could not in 
the least invalidate the argument from them, for 
he existence of an intelligent cause. If the 
question were of the degree of perfection in the 
wisdom exhibited, then the skill manifested in 
each work would be a proper subject for con- 
sideration. An imperfect time-piece proves the 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 239 

existence of an artist as fully as one that is per- 
fect. 

But there is here no need of this remark, foi 
the Atheist may be defied to conceive of any 
improvement in any of the works 

This manifests 

of God, in regard to the aclapta- tation needs no a 

mendment. 

tion of the means used to the end 
to be accomplished ; and these evidences of the 
wisdom of God are scattered profusely over the 
whole universe. We cannot turn our eyes to 
the heaven or the earth, to objects of great mag- 
nitude, or so small that they can be seen only by 
the microscope, but the same admirable perfec- 
tion of contrivance is manifest in them all. The 
internal structure of the gnat is as wonderful as 
that of the elephant ; and in the manifestation of 
wisdom in the creation there is a wonderful va- 
riety. jSTo two species are exactly alike; and 
the difference is exactly such as it should be 
to accomplish the special end in view. The 
more intricate our examination of the contri- 
vance and evident design in the organization of 
animal and vegetable bodies, the stronger will 



240 MORAL SCIENCE. 

be our conviction, and the greater our admi- 
ration. 

The only question then is, could the evi- 
dences of intelligence in the cause, if thus innu- 
merable, be exhibited in a clearer 
manifested. ° *** and stronger light than they are ; 
if not, then God could not make 
known his existence as an intelligent being more 
clearly than he has done. The number of in- 
stances in which design appears, is far greater 
than can be examined, and the degree of wis- 
dom in the various contrivances in organized 
bodies, transcends our conception ; how, there- 
fore, could we have by new works, greater evi- 
dence of an intelligent cause, than we already 
possess ? 

But there seems in most minds a lurking 

suspicion, that the existing evidence is not as 

convincing as it might have been. 

The evidence m . 

need not be as great Even if this were so, we have 



no right to complain, when it 
cannot be denied that we have very strong 
evidence. God is not obliged to give to his 
creatures the strongest possible evidence of his 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 241 

own existence. He may choose to leave scope 
for human industry, and also make the recep- 
tion of the truth a part of our moral proba- 
tion ; and the pleasure of discovering truth after 
laborious research, a part of the reward of vir- 
tue. No doubt this is the fact in regard to some 
truths of no small importance. The honest 
inquirer discovers them, while the proud and 
prejudiced mind, though more acute, misses 
them, and embraces in their stead dangerous 
error. In maintaining, therefore, that the evi- 
dence for the being of God is as convincing as it 
could be to an impartial, rational mind, it is not 
because such clearness is considered essential; 
but simply because the fact appears to be as 
stated. 

But since many may still sup- 

,-, ,, . , Can stronger 

pose that they can imagine much proof be proposed? 
stronger proof than any which ex- 
ists, let us consider what can be alleged in favour 
of this opinion. 

Could not God speak to us in a voice of 
thunder, and thus make himself known ? Un 

doubtedly he could ; and such a voice would 
11 



242 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

doubtless greatly terrify us ; but would it be a 
stronger proof of his wisdom and 

Supposition of , , 

address to the ear. power than the works ot nature, 
which we behold ? If this tremen- 
dous sound were heard very often, it would at 
length become familiar, and would cease to pro- 
duce the same impression as at first. If heard 
but seldom, it would leave a suspicion that it 
might have been no more than a disordered 
imagination. But how could we be sure that 
the voice proceeded from a being who would 
not deceive ? The mere hearing the noise 
could give us no certain evidence of the charac- 
ter and veracity of the speaker ? 

But perhaps it may be thought that a glo- 
rious visible appearance would place the matter 
beyond all possibility of doubt. 

A visible glory pp.-, ... n t 

not convincing. The majestic appearance of a di 
vine person, would, it may be al 
leged, satisfy every one. The same objections 
may be made to this species of evidence, as to 
the former; how could we know that this vi- 
sible appearance was that of the Great First 
Cause? Unnatural appearances prove nothing 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 24S 

respecting the character of the person who 
assumes them ; if such apparitions were only 
occasionally exhibited, we should be prone to 
doubt of their reality ; and if frequent, we 
should become too much accustomed to them 
to receive any impression. But whatever im- 
pression such appearances might make, consid- 
ered as evidence of an all-perfect Deity, they 
would not be comparable to that which we have 
in the works of nature. 

But if the Supreme Being exists, why could 
he not make himself known by working stupen- 
dous miracles ? Of course, if mi- 

Miracles. 

racles might be demanded by one, 
all have the same need ; and the same claims 
and miracles would become so common, that it 
would be difficult to distinguish them from na- 
tural events. And again, miracles require no 
more power to produce them than is required to 
produce common events. In many cases they 
would require no more than a cessation of the 
power by which natural events are produced. 
The standing still of the sun, or the stopping of 
the rotation of the earth, would be nothing else 



244 MORAL SCIENCE. 

than removing the impulse by which they were 
originally put in motion. 

In a miracle, we only see the effect of divine 
power. We may infer from this, that there is a 

Being who can change the laws of 
power nature; and a miracle taken by 

itself can prove nothing more. 
But in the works of nature, we have innumera- 
ble proofs of the wisdom and beneficence of the 
Author of the Universe. And the number, va- 
riety, and wisdom of these works are evident to 
every person of common sense. The proofs of 
a great intelligent cause are spread out, over the 
heavens and the earth, the sea, and the air. We 
are little affected by these objects, because they 
have ever been before our eyes since our earliest 
infancy. But as evidences of a Divine exist- 
ence their force is not diminished by the uni- 
formity of the laws of nature, by which they are 
continually produced, but greatly increased. 
The different species of animals and vegetables 
have successively been reproduced, according 
to laws that never vary ; and this shows that the 
plan of the Almighty is perfect, and that He 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 245 

can accomplish all his pleasure, and has given 
uniform laws to every kind of being which his 
wisdom and power have produced. 

It is not denied that miraculous displays are 
a decisive proof of a Great First Cause, who is 
possessed of omnipotence ; but 
what we maintain is, that the evi- ^^d nothing to 

proof of power. 

dence of omnipotence is not greater 
than in the natural effects which are constantly 
produced before our eyes. And as to the cha- 
racter and attributes of God, they are far more 
clearly exhibited in the various productions of 
nature, than they would be by a miraculous 
interposition. If another sun were placed in the 
heavens, which is as great a miracle as we 
can imagine, it would be a proof of mighty 
power, but not a stronger proof than the ex- 
istence of the natural sun ; and as to the wisdom 
and goodness of the Deity, there would be no 
comparison, for in the former case, nothing but 
the existence of Omnipotence could be inferred 
from the miracle, for there would be no appear- 
ance of wisdom in such a miracle. But in the 
existence of the natural sun, which gives light, 



246 MORAL SCIENCE. 

heat, motion, and life to all earthly living tilings, 
the wisdom and goodness of the Creator are most 
illustriously displayed. Who can enumerate 
the benefits which are derived from the influ 
ence of the sun ? and the same sun, which com- 
municates so many blessings to our world, 
dispenses blessings in the same way to other 
planets. 

If we saw the dead raised in a thousand in- 
stances, it would be a decisive evidence of the 
existence of a Being of almighty 

Result of the ar- n , ,i • t n -n 

gument. power ; but the evidence is iully 

as strong from the formation and 
vivification of innumerable animal bodies of 
many species. And no miracle can be conceived, 
which would furnish stronger evidence of the 
Divine existence, than the works of creation 
which are ever before our eyes and our minds. 
I think, after what has been said, that we cannot 
wish for more convincing evidence of the exist- 
ence of a Supreme Being, than we already pos- 
sess in the works of nature spread out before us; 
and even if we were shut up in a dark dungeon, 
we have this convincing evidence in our own 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 247 

persons, in the constitution of both our souls 
and bodies. 

The only thing which can be alleged further 
is 7 that this might have been made a self-evident 
truth as much as our own exist- 
ence, or the existence of the world 5e if_eviden<^. an 
without us; and many formerly 
entertained that opinion that the idea of God 
is innate, and that a speculative Atheist is a 
thing impossible. Some very learned and re- 
spectable philosophers and theologians have ex- 
pressly inculcated this opinion in their writings. 
Now, although we do not believe there are any 
innate ideas, and although the existence of God 
can scarcely be said to be self-evident, yet in the 
proof of it, there is but a single step of reason- 
ing. It is a self-evident truth that every effect 
must have an adequate cause ; and when there 
is evident design in the effect, the cause must be 
intelligent. The conclusion is so easily drawn 
from an intuitive truth, that it is not wonderful 
that it should be classed among self-evident 
truths. "We can scarcely conceive of the state 
of that mind which after seriously contemplating 



248 MORAL SCIENCE. 

the wonderful evidences of design in the human 
frame, can doubt the existence of an intelligent 
First Cause, and an intelligent cause producing 
effects by a wise adaptation of means to a defi- 
nite end, and the harmonious operation of thou- 
sands of parts in the vital functions must, aq- 
cording to every proper definition of the term, 
be a person. 

All the arguments by which the being of 
God is proved, involve the proof of some of his 

attributes. If the marks of design 
Attributes of God in creatures prove the existence 

of a Creator, it is by showing that 
he must be possessed of wisdom to cause so 
many wonderful contrivances as we behold in 
the world. As the operation of any cause is the 
exertion of power, so the creation of the world 
is the action of omnipotence. A greater power 
than that which brings something out of nothing 
cannot be conceived : this indeed we cannot 
comprehend, and, therefore, some who admit 
that the world is the work of God, as far as re* 
lates to the organization and moulding of mat- 
ter, yet cannot be persuaded that omnipotence 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 249 

itself can give existence where there was none 
before. But if God did not create the mattei 
that is in the world, whence came it? There 
are but two suppositions ; one is, that mattei 
existed from eternity, and is, therefore, self-ex 
istent and independent ; the other, that it is an 
emanation of the divine essence. The first is 
inadmissible ; it supposes two eternal beings 
independent of each, other, and the latter leads 
to pantheism, or that all things are a part of 
God ; as whatever emanates from him must be 
a part of his essence, for this is immutably the 
same. Though wisdom and power are the attri- 
butes which are first observed, they are not the 
only attributes of which we may learn some- 
thing by studying the works of nature. For 
when we attentively consider the nature of the 
end, to accomplish, which the innumerable con 
trivances are adapted, we cannot but observe 
that this end is beneficent. All the parts of ani- 
mals are connected with the vitality, enjoyment, 
and preservation, of the animal or species. The 
goodness of God is therefore as manifest in the 
creation, as his wisdom. There is not a part in 
11* 



250 MORAL SCIENCE. 

any animal body which, can be shown to be 
without its use. Every species is fitted by the 
bodily structure, and by the instincts and pas- 
sions with which it is endued, to enjoy in the 
most perfect degree that kind of life to which 
it is destined. Even the minutest animal- 
cule have bodies organized with as exquisite 
skill as those of the larger species. JSTo living 
creature exists for which food is not provided, 
suited to the appetite and nourishment of the 
species, and which it has the means of pro- 
curing. So every species is endowed with the 
instinctive ability to provide for itself and its 
progeny suitable places of residence ; and there 
are insects which, though they undergo a re- 
markable metamorphosis and change of appe- 
tites, are still able by their instinct to find the 
nourishment which is agreeable and necessary. 
And what is still more wonderful and indica- 
tive of far-seeing wisdom in the Creator is the 
fact, that these insects which were once in the 
chrysalis state, and afterwards assume the form 
and instincts of butterflies, are led by an invari- 
able propensity to deposit their eggs on plants 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 251 

necessary for the young grubs, but on which 
they themselves never feed. Were it not for 
this wise provision for the young, they would all 
perish. Between the animal and vegetable 
world there is a beautiful harmony ; the latter 
to a large extent supplies food for the former. It 
may be thought that the constitution of things 
by which one animal preys upon another, is an 
argument against the goodness of God ; but 
these animals are only intended for a transitory 
existence, and as they all must die, and are 
tormented with no apprehensions in regard to 
the future, and the pain indeed is momentary, if 
they enjoy much more pleasure than pain dur- 
ing their existence, there seems to be no solid 
objection against this law of nature. 

It has often been alleged as an atheistical 
objection against the goodness, and by conse- 
quence, against the existence of 
God, that pain or misery has a e ^% B J? 
place among his works. This per- 
haps is the most plausible of all objections which 
infidels have ever produced ; and yet it has 'no 
certain principles on which to rest. With a 



252 MORAL SCIENCE. 

system such as the present, where there is a gra 
dation of sensitive beings, it is impossible for us 
to conceive how all pain could be excluded. As 
far as we can see, the susceptibility of pleasure 
carries with it a liableness to some degree of 
pain. "What if the pain which animals endure 
arise out of the principle of self-preservation, and 
from the appetites, in the gratification of which 
consists their enjoyment? Without desire and 
appetite there could be no animal enjoyment, 
and when the safety of the animal requires it, it 
is wisely ordered that by uneasiness or pain it 
should be stimulated to seek its necessary food, 
or flee from danger. 

And as to man, while in the present world 
we cannot conceive how he could have any en- 
joyment, unless he was also sub- 
hu^nml° f th8 J ect to sucl1 feelings of uneasiness 
as rendered him capable of relish- 
ing his enjoyments. This remark relates to 
pains which cannot be avoided, such as the pain 
of hunger and thirst, and the pain arising from 
contact with some injurious body. The surface 
of man's body is the chief seat ■ of pain, because 



PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 258 

danger commonly approaches him from without. 
It does not appear, therefore, possible that such 
a system of creatures as exist in the world could 
be constituted so as to be exempt from all un 
easy feelings. To make creatures whose consti- 
tution would exempt them from all liableness to 
pain, would, as far as we can see, exempt them 
from all susceptibility to pleasure. And as to 
those evils which men bring upon themselves 
by imprudence, intemperance, injustice, or by 
disobeying the voice of conscience within them, 
they must be attributed to themselves and not to 
the constitution of the world. And as God is nofc 
obliged to make every creature as great and as 
happy as it could be made, it may seem to ex- 
hibit his wisdom and power to produce beings 
in whose existence there is a mixture of natural 
good and evil. 

It appears clear, then, that the Author of this 
universe is powerful, wise, and beneficent; but 
how does it appear that he is pos- 
sessed of a moral character? that of S s 7S 3 
he loves moral excellence, and dis- 
approves of moral evil ? This appears evidently 



254: MORAL SCIENCE. 

from the moral constitution of man. The law 
interwoven in his constitution proves that his 
Maker approves of moral excellence. Again, it 
would be absurd to suppose that the creature 
could possess an excellence, and one superior to 
all natural endowments, of which there was no 
prototype in the Great First Cause. We may lay 
it down as a maxim, that whatever perfection 
we can conceive of must exist in the most per- 
fect degree in the Creator, for all our ideas of 
perfection are derived from the contemplation 
of creation ; and whatever excellence there is 
in the creation must exist in the Creator. 

Besides, by the laws of nature, virtuous con- 
duct is generally productive of 

«on D o^ t r r0l>a ' P leaSOTe and P eaCe ° f mi * d ; and 

immoral conduct is generally a 
source of misery. These laws of nature are the 
laws of God, and manifest his approbation of 
virtue and disapprobation of vice. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

DUTIES OF MAN TO THE CEEATOR AS THUS MANIFESTED. 

Haying given, in a summary, the proofs of the 

existence and character of God, so far as reason 

can guide us in the inquiry, we 

Foundation of ^ 

lawr are now prepared to consider 

the relation in which man stands 
to God, and the obligations which arise out 
of this relation. As man himself, in the wise 
and wonderful constitution of his mind and 
body, has been supplied with the most striking 
and convincing evidences of a powerful, wise, 
and beneficent Author of the universe ; we are 
led at once to see, that God, as being the Creator 
of man, and the Giver of all his remarkable en- 
dowments, has a perfect right to claim his obe- 
dience, to the utmost extent of his powers. And 
on taking an impartial survey of the origin of 
his being, of the goodness of the Creator in his 



256 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

various beneficent endowments, and of his con 
tinual dependence, not only for the continuance 
of his being, faculties, and susceptibilities, but 
also for all those gifts of divine Providence ne- 
cessary to his health and comfort, man cannot 
but feel that he is under the strongest moral 
obligation to obey, honour, and glorify his 
Maker, with his best affections and most stre- 
nuous exertions. This is the foundation of 
what is called the law ; that moral law which is, 
as it were, written on the heart of every man ; 
for what man is there, who has come to the ex- 
ercise of reason, who does not perceive a clear 
distinction between right and wrong? And 
where can be found a human being, who, upon 
having his relation to God as his Creator set be- 
fore him, does not feel in his conscience, that he 
is under a moral obligation to be subservient to 
his will ? 

The general obligation on all moral agents, 

General obiiga- to serve tlieir Creator, is evident 

enough. It will require some 

time, and careful consideration of this relation 

in which man stands to his Maker, to ascertain 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 257 

the particular duties which are obligatory on all 
men. 

This We Shall nOW attempt, SO Particular obliga- 
tion. 

far as reason can guide us in this 
matter. 

Here it may be proper to remark, that the 
essence of all obedience is internal ; that is, con- 
sists in the dispositions, affections, 

Obedience internal. 

and purposes of the heart. Out- 
ward actions partake of a moral nature^ only so 
far as they proceed from these internal affections. 
Human laws must be satisfied with external obe- 
dience, because human lawgivers cannot search 
the heart, nor scrutinize the motives of those who 
owe obedience. But even earthly judges, in ad- 
ministering justice, endeavour as far as human 
judgment can go, to discover from what internal 
motives any action under examination was per- 
formed ; and their decision of acquittal or con- 
demnation is grounded on the opinion which 
they form of the intention and motives of the 
person under arraignment. Much more then 
does the moral Governor of the World require 
of his creatures the obedience of the heart ; for 



258 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

he possesses a perfect knowledge of what is in 
the heart of every one ; and a most perfect esti- 
mate of the nature of moral good and evil as 
those qualities exist in the human heart. It 
seems evident, therefore, that the laws of na- 
ture demand the highest degree of excellence of 
which the mind of man is capable. And as God 
possesses every moral attribute in the highest 
perfection, it is reasonable to infer, that man, as 
he came •from the hands of his Creator, was en- 
dued with the seeds and principles of every 
moral virtue. And if the nature of man is not 
now found adorned with these moral excellen- 
cies, he must in the exercise of his free will have 
departed from his primeval state. Our present 
inquiry, however, is not whether man has fallen 
from his original integrity, but what are the du- 
ties arising out of man's relation to God as his 
Creator, Benefactor, and Preserver. Although 
the obligation to obedience arises 

Infinite excellency. ° 

primarily from the relations just 
mentioned, yet it is necessary to take into view 
the supreme excellence and majesty of the 'cha- 
racter of God ; for if pious and devout sentiments 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 259 

towards God be required, it is because there is 
in the character of God as exhibited in his works, 
something to call forth such affections, from ra- 
tional and rightly disposed minds. If God were 
not supremely excellent, it would not be reason- 
able to demand supreme fove from his creatures, 
and so of other things. But as we know that 
God is possessed of every excellence in an infi- 
nite degree, there exists an object for every 
affection and sentiment toward him, of which the 
human mind is capable. From what has been 
said it is evident, that in order to perform any 
other duties to the Creator, some knowledge 
of his true character is requisite. Without know- 
ledge the rational mind cannot exercise right 
affections. 

Supposing then a rational mind, such as it is 
reasonable to think man possessed, when he pro- 
ceeded from the hands of his 

AdoratioD 

Maker, and possessing that know- 
ledge of his attributes which may be learned 
from his works, what would be the first thoughts 
and feelings of the newly created soul ? In our 
judgment, the first feeling would be an emotion 



260 MORAL SCIENCE. 

of profound veneration, or perhaps the word 
adoration would more strongly indicate the state 
of the mind, absorbed in the contemplation of a 
Being so august, so powerful, and so immense. 
This feeling, then, is one which ought to exist 
in every rational min$ toward the Almighty. 
This is the true foundation of divine worship. 
It is the deep and solemn emotion which is the 
essence of the worship, which holy beings in all 
worlds offer unto God. 

And this feeling would lead to a reverence 

of every thing which has any relation to God. 

His very name would be sacred. 

Eeverence. 

We have read of men of great 
eminence who never mentioned that name with- 
out a solemn pause, or some external token of 
reverence. 

The duty which most naturally arises from 
the relation which man sustains to God, as 

his Creator, Benefactor, and Ee- 

Thankfalness. . . 

deemer, is that of gratitude. This 
is when, strong a very lively and impulsive 
feeling. It draws men along as taken captive ; 
and yet the constraint is not painful, but 



DUTY TO CREATOR, 261 

pleasing. Under the influence of gratitude, 
men will engage in the most odious duties, and 
will voluntarily make the most self-denying sa- 
crifices. Under the influence of this affection 
men have been willing to lay down their lives. 
Gratitude is then an important principle of man's 
obedience. It is true, some have attempted to 
degrade this principle as one which scarcely can 
be said to partake of the nature of virtue, be- 
cause it has respect to self, and to our own in- 
terest. But though gratitude originates in the 
sense of benefits received by ourselves, it de- 
serves not to be classed with, mere selfish affec- 
tions. Its object is to make a return to a bene- 
factor for favour received. It is, therefore, an 
elevated species of justice ; for when a suitable 
and adequate return can be made for favours 
received, gratitude will not be satisfied until this 
is done. And in regard to the benefits received 
from our Creator, as an adequate compensation 
is utterly beyond our power, gratitude manifests 
itself^ "jcknowledgment of obligation in thanks- 
giving and in unceasing praises. There is, how- 
ever, no necessity to argue this matter ; the ap 



262 MOEAL SCIENCE. 

peal may safely be made to the feelings of every 
rightly constituted mind. All men who ac- 
knowledge the existence and Providence of God, 
feel that a debt of gratitude is due to their great- 
Benefactor. 

As the mind, when uncorrupted, is so consti- 
tuted as to love and esteem whatever is excel- 
lent, and as moral excellence is 

Love. 

superior to all other amiable ob- 
jects ; and as God possesses this excellence 
in an infinite degree, it is reasonable that he 
should be esteemed above every other object. 
Finite minds, it is true, can never exercise 
love proportionate to the excellence of this 
Glorious Being ; but as far as they possess the 
capacity of apprehending it, and the susceptibih 
ity of affection, they are under moral obligation 
to love God with all their powers. And this 
cannot be considered as demanding too much of 
the rational creature, for no other measure of 
affection can be fixed without supposing a wrong 
estimate of the object, or a defect of right feel- 
ing ; for what is more reasonable than to pro- 
portion the intensity of our affection to the ex- 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 263 

cellence of the object ? But in this also, the ex- 
cellency of the object infinitely surpasses our 
capacity of love, so that if the mind should be 
enlarged a thousand-fold, so as to possess a thou- 
sand times as great a power of love and esteem 
as at present, the obligation to love God with 
this increasing capacity would be complete ; and 
any less degree of esteem and care would be 
casting dishonour on God. And again, this ob- 
ligation would exist, even if it were painful to 
come up in our affections to this high demand ; 
but this is so far from being the fact, that man's 
happiness is perfect in the same proportion as his 
obedience is perfect. From every consideration, 
therefore, it is evident that man is bound by the 
law of his nature, and the relation which he sus- 
tains to God, to love him with his whole soul. 

As the will of God is always guided by wis- 
dom and goodness, whenever and 

Submission. 

however this will is manifested, it 
should be implicitly and cheerfully submitted to, 
even though contrary to our wishes, and even 
what seems best to our reason ; which is submis- 
sion to the Providence of God. 



264 MORAL SCIENCE. 

Another duty clearly incumbent on the ra- 
tional creature of God, is trust or confidence. 
As man is dependent, and as the 

Trust. 

supply of his necessities can be 
derived from no other source than from God, it 
is evidently his duty to place his confidence in 
God for every thing, believing in his goodness, 
faithfulness and power. 

This trust in God, however, involves the 
duty of prayer. It is as natural and reasonable 

for a dependent creature to apply 

Prayer. 

to its Creator for what it needs, as 
for a child thus to solicit the aid of a parent 
who is believed to have the disposition and 
ability to bestow what it needs. Plausible 
objections have been raised against the duty 
of prayer, derived from the omniscience of 
God, and from his immutable purposes. But 
these objections possess no real validity. For 
although God knows perfectly beforehand whau 
his creatures need, yet the acknowledgment of 
their dependence is manifestly proper, and the 
offering of petitions for such things as they 
need, has a tendency to keep up a proper sense 



DUTY TO CKEATOR. 265 

of dependence. And as God deals with, his 
creatures according to the nature which he has 
given them, it is proper that he should require 
of them such dispositions and acts as are becom- 
ing independent creatures. This, too, is in accord- 
ance with the conduct of men on whom others 
are dependent. The object of prayer, including 
praise, is to preserve in the mind a right state 
of feeling towards a Being to whom it owes 
every thing, and from whom alone blessings 
can be expected. The highest privilege of the 
most exalted creature is to enjoy communion 
and intercourse with the Infinite Source of 
all good. Prayer is the only means which 
man enjoys of holding immediate intercourse 
with his Maker. And this privilege is the 
highest honour which he can enjoy in the pre- 
sent state. So also, it is a means of the most 
sublime happiness. By this exercise he drawa 
near to God, and when such approaches are 
made sincerely and affectionately on his part, it 
cannot be doubted that Divine communications 
will be vouchsafed, and the light of the Divine 
favour be lifted upon him, and the answer to his 
12 



266 MORAL SCIENCE. 

prayers be granted by the dispensations of di- 
vine Providence toward him. 

As to the objection derived from the im- 
mutability of the Divine purposes, it arises 
from a narrow view of this sub- 

i 8 ^ J' ect > whict le ^es out an import- 
ant part of the Divine plan. The 
purposes of God, though immutable, are not in- 
consistent with the freedom of the creatures, nor 
with the use and efficacy of appropriate means. 
The truth is, all these acts and means are in- 
cluded in the Divine plan. If God has decreed 
that a certain field shall produce a plentiful crop ; 
he has also decreed that all the influences of 
sun, rain, and the necessary labour shall take 
place. And if he has purposed to bestow cer- 
tain favours on his rational creatures, he may in 
the same manner purpose that these benefits shall 
be given in answer to prayer; so that prayer may 
be considered as the means by which these bless- 
ings are obtained as truly as a plentiful crop is 
the effect of a skilful and laborious tillage of the 
ground. 

As to external acts of devotion, reason and 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 267 

nature teach, that humility and reverence in 
our words, attitudes, and gestures 
are highly proper when we ad- Outward acts of 
dress our praises unto God. When 
we are filled with devotional feelings, nature 
prompts to give utterance to our emotions ; and 
the use of appropriate sounds and gestures seems 
also to keep up and increase the feelings of the 
mind. These outward expressions, however, are 
not essential to acceptable prayer. The silent 
breathings of desire are known to God, and will 
be acceptable to him. It is reasonable to believe 
that God never takes more complacency in his 
creatures, than when they come before him in 
the humble, reverential posture of adoration, 
prayer, and praise. 

Nothing can be more evident, than that the 
creature should exercise benevo- 
lence or good will towards the g J^£ to tho 
Author of his being. Not that we 
can desire Him to be more excellent, more wise, 
more powerful, or more independent than he is ; 
but we may rejoice in all his attributes and glory 
in his greatness, and be delighted with the idea 



268 MORAL SCIENCE. 

of his unbounded and uninterrupted happiness ; 
and in these elevated emotions of joy, and acts 
of glorying and glorifying God, it is believed 
that the purest, sublimest, and most constant 
happiness of all holy beings consists. Nothing 
is more evident to impartial reason, than that the 
glory of God should be the supreme object of 
the rational creature's pursuit. It is, in fact, the 
noblest object which can be considered. We are 
unable to imagine any thing more glorious for 
God himself to seek, than his own glory. Cer- 
tainly, then, it is the highest end at which any 
creature can aim ; and it is a sentiment entirely 
accordant with reason, that all the creation was 
produced for the purpose of exhibiting the 
glory of God. And man was endowed with a 
capacity of knowing and loving God, for the 
very purpose of glorifying his Maker. Not that 
any addition can be made to the essential per- 
fection and felicity of the Eternal One ; but the 
manifestation of these perfections is what is pro- 
perly called the glory of God. 

All the duties which have been specified, 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 269 

commend themselves, as obligatory on the ra 
tional creature, to every impartial 

Summary. 

mind; all that seems further ne- 
cessary is to give a brief summary of what has 
been said on this subject. 

The order in which these devotional exercises 
are set down is not very important ; for though 
there is an order of precedence 

-, -,-, . t All included in 

and sequence m all our mental ex- i ove . 
ercises, yet while it is unnecessary 
to speak of these affections which have God for 
their object, seriatim, they are commonly 
combined and mingled in the conscious ex- 
perience of the mind; so jthat in the same 
moment various acts and exercises appear to 
be simultaneous. They may, however, be all 
comprehended under the single term, Love, if 
we give a genuine meaning to that term. 

The summation which seems as proper as 
any other which occurs, is the following : 

1. Adoration, having for its 

Duties to God. 

object the greatness, majesty, ho- 
liness, and incomprehensibility of God. 

2. Admiration, or holy wonder of the wis- 



270 MOKAL SCIENCE. 

dom of God in the multiplied contrivances and 
organizations in the created universe. 

3. Esteem for and complacency in GodCs moral 
excellence. 

4. Desire of Union and Communion with God, 
and of conformity to his character. 

5. Gratitude for his goodness manifested in 
all creation ; but particularly to man, in the con- 
stitution of his soul and body, and in the provi- 
sion made by the providence of God for the sub- 
sistence and comfort of the human family, and 
of all living creatures. 

6. Trust, or Confidence in God, as a benignant 
and kind Father and Protector, who will not 
abandon the work of his own hands, nor be 
wanting in contributing to their happiness in 
future, as long as they are obedient to his will. 

7. Acquiescence in the will of God, and sub- 
mission to those dispensations which even cross 
the natural feelings, is an evident moral duty. 
Indeed, the surrender of soul and body to God, 
to be used and disposed of by him for his own 
glory, is the state of mind of which the moral 
(acuity approves. 



DUTY TO CREATOR. 271 

8. Prayer to God for such, things as -we need, 
is a duty dictated by the law of nature, includ- 
ing suitable expressions of our devotional feel- 
ings in words and gestures. But no creature 
nas a right to institute or adopt any ceremonies 
of worship which God has not appointed. 

9. Making the Glory of God the supreme end 
of all his actions, the object of his constant and 
untiring pursuit ; and rejoicing and triumphing 
in the infinite glory, independence, immutability, 
and blessedness of God. 

The above enumeration, it is believed, com- 
prehends the internal acts and exercises in which 
the duty of man to God consists, 

What reason af 

which duties plainly arise out of firms of man's ali- 
en state. 

the attributes of God and man's 
relation to him, as his Creator, Preserver, and 
Benefactor. And if man had never failed in the 
performance of these duties — if he had continued 
to exercise those affections which spontaneously 
spring up in his soul, when he came from the 
hands of his Creator, this world, instead of being 
a land of misery, would now have been a bloom- 
ing paradise of joy. And we may be sure that 



272 MORAL SCIENCE. 

a good God who loves all his creatures accord- 
ing to their actions, would never have permitted 
the natural evils which now oppress the human 
soul, to have entered into the world. Sickness, 
famine, and death in its thousand different forms, 
would have been unknown. 

It is evident from the slightest view of the 

character of man in all ages and countries, that 

he has lost his primeval integrity, 

Conclusion. 

that the whole race have by some 
means fallen into the dark gulf of sin and misery. 
This, reason teaches; but how to escape from 
this wretched condition, she teaches not. 



FINIS. 



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